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A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF MARX'S THEORY OF IDEOLOGY
September 1987
Phil Cox, B.A., University of Texas
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff
The attempt to construct a marxist theory of ideology
is bound up with the question of whether marxism may lay
claim to a privileged perspective (i.e., value free or non-
ideological) from which a critique of ideology can proceed.
A source for the construction of such a theory has of course
been Marx's texts themselves; a central issue in the widely
varying interpretations of these texts concerns what sort of
distinction Marx maintained between science (in particular,
msrxist theory) and ideology. Lying beyond the textual
exposition of the uses to which Marx put the term "ideology"
and what sort of distinction between science and ideology he
was working with, is of course the question of the
plausibility and coherency of his analyisis of ideology its
supposed contradistinction to science. I argue that a
number of commentators, who sought to establish a
distinction between science and ideology by identifying
science with "truth" and ideology with the "false" or "false
consciousness", rely on a selective and inadequate reading
Further, I claim that a variety of recentof Marx's texts.
marxist-oriented commentators, apparent critics of this
close Identification of science with truth and ideology with
falsity, in fact carry over the true/false opposition of
this earlier true consciousness/false consciousness view
which they originally sought to distance themselves from.
The truth/falsity opposition which they work back into a
theory of ideology undialectically opposes science to
ideology and springs from a similarly inadequate reading of
Marx's texts (specifically his sustained analysis of
classical political economy in Theories of Surplus Value)
and a parallel misrecogni tion of the ways in which science
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THE EARLY MARX: IDEOLOGY AND IDEALISM
The term "ideology" first occurs in Marx's major
writings in the Paris Manuscripts and he continues to make
use of it in most of his works up through the Critique of
the Gotha Programme, written seven years before his death.
Marx's frequent use of the term, and the persistence of
standard references in twentieth century marxism to "Marx's
theory of ideology" or the "marxist theory of ideology"
should not, however, obscure the fact that Marx nowhere
speaks as if he were self-consciously proposing a "theory of
ideology" in any unified manner. This fact need not be so
disturbing for marxist scholarship. Any account of "marxist
theory of class" must come to terms with similarly
beleaguering textual problems: Marx used the term "class"
in widely varying contexts, sometimes used synonymously with
other ambiguous terms such as "stratum" or "social group",
and failed to present a systematic account of the concept--
indeed, Marx appears to announce his intention (never
fulfilled) to offer such an account in the closing words of
the third volume of Capital.^ As with the concept of class,
Marx's account of ideology, however unsystematic, has proven
rich enough to foster a significant literature in social
theory
.
With the concept of ideology, then, an accurate reading
of Marx's work must remain sensitive enough to the shifting
- 1 -
of the term. It would be a mistake, however, to focus on
one or another use as definitively suggesting the "real
marxist theory of ideology" or to recklessly conjoin
different uses in behalf of such a theory. Hence in what
follows my approach will be to discuss the various uses to
which Marx puts the concept in his early texts—primarily
those written before 1859. In these texts Marx begins to
use the term to refer to the mistaken "idealism" he detects
in political economy, philosophy, and French political
thought. In several of these early texts an important shift
occurs through which Marx begins to speak of ideology as an
apologetic body of thought, a label which reflects his
more focused attention to the political significance of
ideological thought. This survey of the early Marx's
specific uses of ideology provides a foundation for the
subsequent discussion of the broader parameters of his
notion of ideology anticipated in these contexts. This way
of proceeding should remain attentive to the continuities in
Marx's treatment, yet not so neglect the discontinuities in
his use of the concept as to collapse the notion into a
static, reconstructed theory of ideology unfaithful to the
richness (and intransigence) of Marx's texts. In the
subsequent chapter I will explore the further dimensions of
ideology developed by the later Marx in his critique of his
predecessors and contemporaries in political economy.
Of Marx's predecessors, the French statesman and
political economist A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy is most often
2
credited with being the first to use and the greatest
popularizer of the term "ideology". De Tracy hoped his
self-conceived "science of ideas" would be the philosophical
foundation for creating new "scientific institutions" which
would dramatically change French society, De Tracy's
"science" can thus be understood as an amalgam of certain
ideas inherited’ from Condillac, Bacon, Locke, and other
Enlightenment thinkers, though with grand philosophical
pretensions of its own. De Tracy and the other Ideologues'^
from the Institut National (the loose collection of French
politicians and statesmen whose purpose it was to create and
oversee the new "scientific", viz., ideological,
institutions for the new France) shared with these
Enlightenment philosophers a general suspicion of medieval
scholasticism. Like Bacon, they wished to overthrow the
idols that becloud the mind, replacing them with the
certainties of "scientific" rigor. Like Locke and
Condillac, the Ideologues put great trust in the capacity
for empirical analysis to discriminate between truth and
illusion, and to liberate the mind from the power of the
latter. The Ideologues associated the source of (social)
evil with intellectual error—viz., faulty reasoning through
conceptual and linguistic inadequacies. Their critique of
metaphysics and religion further underscores their basic
philosophical/political program: What's wrong with French
society can be traced to incorrect and mistaken concepts;
therefore, society can be revolutionized and its evils
3
eliminated by supplanting these mistaken notions with the
correct ideas and concepts engendered by the analysis made
possible by the new science of ideas. Thus, for example,
the cause of an "evil" state power is to be found in the
minds of the citizenry and government officials, which must
contain misguided notions of "equality", "the good", etc.;
similarly, a "good" state power can be created and sustained
simply by subjecting misguided ideas to "scientific"
analysis and allowing their natural replacement with the
"good" or "correct" ideas which the Ideologues' analysis
insures. In similar fashion, the Ideologues believed that
if popular creeds were changed—viz., monitored and
corrected by the science of ideas—society would thereby be
changed
.
Marx had read De Tracy and mentions him several times
3in a number of texts. However most of these references are
passing remarks regarding De Tracy as one among many other
authors whose works serve as examples of misguided political
economy; nowhere does Marx offer a general account of De
Tracy as a thinker or specific reactions to his science of
ideas. But there are several obvious ways in which we can
see that Marx's early appropriation of the term "ideology"
to refer to the German idealist philosophers and "true
socialists" is apt. First we must remind ourselves that De
Tracy and his colleagues were by no means promoting a
"science" that was to be the critical tool for examining
other belief systems--ideologies . Rather, that "science"
4
was Itself the self-conceived ideology; for De Tracy this
endeavor was the "science of ideology" in the sense in which
"science" is equated with "ideology". For De Tracy and his
colleagues, their scientific study of ideas was entirely
legitimate. "Ideology", then, did not take on a pejorative
connotation until Napoleon denounced his former political
allies associated with the Institut.^ Both the Ideologues
and the idealist thinkers whose ideological bent Marx takes
issue with thought of themselves as great critics of
religion; both groups conceived their critiques of religion
as necessary for humankind to divest itself of the other-
worldly illusions and mystifications religion engenders.
Marx for his part was unquestionably sympathetic with a
thoroughgoing critique of religious belief. Yet neither
group carried such a critique through, as both sought to
replace mystified religious belief with a belief system
equally mystifying. The Ideologues sought to substitute
dogma in the form of their science of ideas and to propagate
it in the French educational system in precisely the way the
Church before the revolution propagated its dogma.
Similarly, the idealist thinkers who are for Marx
ideologists preached their own gospel, which was for Marx
objectionable on the same grounds as the religious beliefs
they sought to supplant. One thinks particularly here of
the Left Hegelians: Bruno Bauer's historiosophy and
deification of the activity of the spirit; Max Stirner's
absolute ego, as barren as the Christian god and as
5
interiorized and empty as the "soul"; or Feuerbach's
anthropocentric religion of humanity. Both the Ideologues
and Marx's idelaist thinkers sought the explanation for
social evils in the realm of the concepts rather than in an
explanation of the material conditions they took these
concepts to be descriptions of. Consequently the solutions
to social evils both groups envisioned also lay within the
realm of concepts: The material world can be changed
through a change in consciousness. Thus, the dissemination
of correct ideas about, say, human nature, would give rise
to relations of equality. Both the Ideologues and these
idealists, then, confused their language (their concepts)
with the material conditions they mistakenly took their
concepts to be actively engaging.
Marx recognized Hegel as the quintessential idealist
philosopher, and began his critique of Hegelian idealism in
his first work after his dissertation. The Critique of
Hegel 's Philosophy of Right. Nowhere in that work can one
find Marx equating (Hegelian) idealism with ideology, in
fact there are no references of any sort in that work to
"ideology". In the 1840 's Marx undertook several works
which involve lengthy critiques of a variety of
philosophers, political economists, and "true socialists"
whose work, Marx believed, was fundamentally misguided due
to their "idealist" foundations. These men who labored
under the shadow of Hegelian idealism Marx termed
"ideologists". Marx really only began using the term after
6
1845, but it's quite clear from some remarks in the mid-
forties that he felt it applied to Hegel's Absolute Idealism
which he had described in different terms in the Critique:
The only distinction between Saint Max
[Stirner] and all his predecessors is
that he knows nothing about these
concepts—even in their arbitrary
isolation from real life, whose products
they were—and his trivial creative work
in his copy of Hegelian ideology is
restricted to establishing his ignorance
even of what he cooies.
5
Hegel idealizes the conception of the
hsld by the political ideologists
who still took separate individuals as
their point of departure, even if it was
merely the will of these individuals;
Hegel transforms the common will of
these individuals into the absolute
will, and Jacques le bonhomme [Stirner]
bona fide accepts this idealisation of
ideology as the correct view of the
and, in this belief, criticizes it





It would be a mistake, though, to naively assume that the
idealism Marx uses synonymously with ideology and associates
with the authors criticized in his works of the 1840 's is to
be equated with the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. For the
early Marx, the idealism that is ideology shares with (and
takes from) Hegel's system the view, simply put, that
consciousness has an ontological autonomy—consciousness is
self-sufficient and can be explained entirely in its own
terms. This idealist view of consciousness has led
philosophers to hypostatize abstract ideas or concepts,
taking them as the only legitimate objects of inquiry into
or engagement with the material world. Thus idealists
7
study" ideas, concepts, theories with complete disregard
for or ignorance of the material conditions and social
contexts from which these concepts arise and which these
concepts are taken to be explanations of (e.g., the
'abstract state", "equality", "property", etc.). For Marx,
these idealist abstractions have been the (counterfeit)
currency of far too much of early neneteenth century
history, philosophy, and political and economic theory.
Hence in his early works Marx undertook sustained critiques
of, for example, Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner,
and Proudhon on the basis of the idealistic, viz.
,
ideological character ‘of their work. It will be worth
examining Marx's specific treatments of several of these
authors in order to present a more comprehensive picture of
the sort of idealism that was for the early Marx ideology.
Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, written
during 1844, contains a few brief references to forms of
thought he will later describe as ideological, though that
term never appears anywhere in the Manuscripts. The
idealist abstraction of the concept of "property in general"
is treated more comprehensively by Marx in his later
commentary on political economists, but Marx here takes note
of the folly engendered by the use of such an inflated
concept
;
We have, of course, derived the concept
of alienated labour (alienated life)
from political economy, from an analysis
of the movement of private property.
8
But the analysis of this concept shows
that although private property appears
to be the basis and cause of alieL^ed
abour
, it is rather a consequence ofthe latter, just as the gods are
fundamentally not the cause but the
product of confusions of human reason.^
Later in the Manuscripts Marx Introduces another metaphor
that underscores the parallel between religious
mystification and the idealist rendering of "property":
Thus, from the viewpoint of this
enlightened political economy which has
discovered the sub.i ec t ive essence of
wealth within the framework of private
property, the partisans of the monetary
system and the mercantilist system, who
consider private property as a purely
objective being for man, are fetishists
and Ca thoJics. ... Just as Luther
recognized religion and faith as the
essence of the real world. .
.
just as he
annulled external religiosity while
making religiosity the inner essence of
man; just as he negated the distinction
between priest and layman because he
transferred the priest into the heart of
the layman; so wealth external to man
and independent of him (and thus only to
be acquired and conserved from outside)
is annulled.
O
A few other suggestions in the Manuscripts of later
developments in Marx's mature analysis of ideology may be
noted here. "Religion, the family, the state, law,
morality, science, arts, etc....", later to resurface as
"ideological superstructures" are mentioned only in passing
as being influenced by economic and material conditions.^
In similarly brief but suggestive remarks the young Marx
warns against the obfuscation of idealist abstractions and
















This history has not so far been
conceived in relation to human nature
....since in the condition of alienation
it was only possible to conceive real
human faculties and human species-action
in the form of general human existence,
as religion, or as history in its
abstract, general aspect as politics,
art, and literature, etc.... What is to
be thought of a science which stays
aloof from this enormous field of human
labour, and which does not feel its own
inadequacy even though this great wealth
of human activity means nothing to it
except perhaps what can be expressed in
the single phrase— "need", "common
need"?^^
While completing the Manuscripts
,
Marx began working
with Engels on The Holy Family. That treatise, along with
The German Ideology (written in 1846 in Brussels), represent
their most sustained and developed criticisms of the Left
Hegelians, "true socialists", and various other political-
philosophical authors whose currency of abstractions and
idealist concepts they reject. While The Holy Family is the
more polemical of the two works, and, although Marx does not
there explicitly characterize this sort of idealism as
1
2
" ideology" ^ , The Holy Family contains a much more expanded
picture of what Marx objected to in the thought of these
idealist thinkers.
In The Holy Family Marx ridicules and attacks the
idealism he finds in Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Proudhon, and,
to a lesser extent, Franz Zychl inski and Ludwig Feuerbach.
10
He uses a number of different terms to mock their form of
Idealism "Speculative Construction", "Critical Criticism",
'Absolute Criticism" and other assorted "Mysteries" mimicing
a religious aura—and doesn't hesitate to trace their
thought to the master's Absolute Idealism: "Yet Absolute
Criticism has learnt from Hegel's Phenomenology least the
art of changing real objective chains that exist outside me
into mere ideal, mere subjective chains existing in me, and
thus to change all exterior palpable struggles into mere
struggles of thought. "13 Marx, of course, the Left
Hegelians' idealism was much less sophisticated than that of
Hegel, whose System circumscribed the narrow philosophical
limits of his successors. Speaking of Bruno Bauer, and
David Strauss, whose Life of Jesus had inspired many of the
Left Hegelians, Marx writes, "They both criticized Hegel
insofar as with him each of the true elements was falsified
by. the other, while they carried each of the elements to its
one-sided and hence consistent development. Both of them
therefore go beyond Hegel in their Criticism, but both of
them also remain within his speculation and each represents
one side of his system. Not only do the men Marx takes
issue with create their own vocabulary of abstractions,
concepts, ideal categories which lead them to neglect real
material conditions while imagining that they're explaining
them, but they make a further but conjoined error in
assuming that a change in these ideas or concepts can alone
change the conditions in the real world with which they're
11
presumed to be associated. Crudely put, this is the notion
that "ideas themselves alone can change things". This
belief echoes the dogmas of the French Ideologues who sought
to create social reform through a reform of concepts, and
anticipates the criticisms of the Left Hegelians and
political economists Marx delivers later in The German
Ideology and in his mature political economy. Of a motto in
an eighteenth century newspaper, "The great appear great in
our eyes... only because we kneel. Let us rise!", Marx
comments, "But to rise it is not enough to do so in thought
and to leave hanging over our real sensual head the real
p^lpsble yoke that cannot be subtilized away with ideas"
.
Speaking in general terms, Marx observes, "Ideas can never
lead an old world system but only beyond the ideas of the
old world system. Ideas cannot carry anything out at all.
In order to carry out ideas men are needed who dispose of a
certain practical force. In The Holy Family Marx
juxtaposes the empty abstractions of the idealist left, in
this case Edgar Bauer:
Critical Criticism sees nothing but
categories everywhere. According to
Herr Edgar To Have and Not to Have,
wages, salary, want and need, and work
to satisfy that need are nothing but
categories. If society had to free
itself only from the categories To Have
and Not to Have, how easy every
dialectician, were he even weaker than
Herr Edgar, would make it for it to
"overcome" and "abolish" these
categories! But Not to Have is not a




not only to the developing science of political economy
unenamored of such "ideals", but also to the active
consciousness Marx sees developing within the working class:
But these massy, communist workers,
employed, for instance, in the
Manchester or Lyons workshops, do not
believe that "pure thinking" will be
able to argue away their industrial
masters and their own practical
debasement. They are most painfully




life- They know that property, capital,
money, wage-labour and the like are no
ideal figments of the brain but very
practical, very objective sources of
their self-estrangement and that they
must be abolished in a practical,
objective way for man to become man not
only in thinking, in consciousness, but
in massy being, in life. Critical
Criticism, on the contrary, teaches them
that they cease in reality to be wage-
labour , . . .that they abolish real capital
by overcoming in thinking the category
Capital, that they really change and
transform themselves into real human
beings by changing their "abstract ego"
in their consciousness and scorning as
un-Critical operations all real changes
in the real conditions of their
existence
18
Throughout The Holy Family Marx polemically dismisses this
sort of idealist thought, whose absurdity is enlarged in its
unsophisticated borrowing from Hegel's Absolute Idealism
coupled with its nearly complete ignorance or avoidance of
the social conditions its spokesmen think of themselves as
explaining. But a few passages in The Holy Family signal
the beginning of an important shift in Marx's treatment of
left idealist thought, a shift that does not come to
fruition until midway through The German Ideology. Most of
13
Marx's characterizations of left idealist thought have it
that "even when it [the 'Critical Criticism' of Bauer] seems
to be engaged with some object it does not come out of its
objectless solitude into any true social relation to any
real object, because its object is the object of its
imagination, only an imaginary ob ject . . . this isolation of
nothing from everything, from all thought, comtemplation
,
etc., is absoJute nonsense
.
But in a passage immediately
following that remark Marx cryptically admits that these
idealist abstractions are not just nonsense. Rather, the
real material conditions above and beyond which the left
idealists appear to loftily hover, return to hound the
idealists with unpleasant associations, as Marx suggests in
a clever metaphor: "By the way, the solitude which it
[ Critical Criticism'] achieves by isolating and abstracting
itself from everything is no more free from the object from
which it abstracts itself than Origenes was from the genital
organ that he cut off from himself.
While Marx commonly uses dismissive terms such as "pure
fantasy" , "absolute nonsense" , or "absurd fancy" , to
characterize left idealist conceptual abstractions, in some
passages he intimates that such concepts are richer than
that. In The Holy Family Marx occasionally speaks of left
idealist abstractions as not simply nonsense, but as a form
of thought that takes refuge in nonsensical concepts
precisely as it finds itself confronting contradictions in
the real world. Thus in what it avoids, and in the
14
nonsensical or absurd conceptual abstractions it takes on in
the process, the forms that left idealist thought takes
signal the social, material, or economic contradictions it
must gloss over. Idealist thought may attempt in this way
to avoid contradictions in the social reality it thinks
itself to be describing by
...searching in the genuine theological
manner, outside the whole, for the
conditions for its existence. Critical
speculation moves outside the object
which it pretends to deal with. The
whole contradiction is nothing but the
movement of both its sides, and the
condition for the existence of the whole
lies in the very nature of the two
sides. Critical Criticism dispenses
with the study of this real movement
which forms the whole in order to be
able to declare that it. Critical
Criticism as the calm of knowledge, is
above both extremes of the
contradiction
21
But it cannot completely and forever cover over the
contradictions Marx is speaking of here—such as that
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, labor as free
contract and labor as compulsion, or between wage labor and
capital. We can see here an early suggestion of the shift
between the treatment of idealism as ideology and the
treatment of "apologia" as ideology which Marx is later to
make in the middle of The German Ideology . The nonsense
of idealism becomes the ideology of apologia as these
authors are confronted with widening social contradictions,
which their rhetoric and abstractions become less and less
capable of mystifying. The choice between taking refuge in
15
mystified abstractions and openly confronting these social
contradictions was most pointed for the political
economists
;
The economists themselves occasionally
feel these contradictions, the
discussion of which is the main content
of the struggle between them. When,
however, the economists become conscious
of these contradictions, they themselves
attack private property in one of its
particular forms as the falsifier of
what is in itself (i.e., in their
imagination) reasonable wages, in itself
reasonable value, in itself reasonable
f rsde . Adam Smith, for instance,
occasionally polemicizes against the
capitalists, Destutt de Tracy against
the bankers, Sismonde de Sismondi
against the factory system, or Ricardo
against landed property. . .
.
2 3
other political economists, not as "honest" or "scientific",
shout within that contradiction completely unaware
24of it." We will see, however that in The German Ideology
and in his later political economy, Marx is much harsher on
the left idealists and political economists, using the term
"apologists" for those who obfuscate in the face of social
contradictions and replace open and honest "scientific"
analysis with empty abstractions and idealist concepts.
Before passing on to the uses of idealism and apologia
in The German Ideology we should note a few others of the
"speculative fictions" inherited by the Left Hegelians from
Hegel which Marx attacks in The Holy Family. These
fictions, in Marx's view, may be traced to the "spirit"-
"matter" antinomy that pervades Hegel's system. Bruno
Bauer, as much as Hegel, deified the notion of history.
16
transubstantiating it from the science of humankind's real
material and social conditions into a metaphysical entity
which stands above and manifests itself in individual men
and women. Similarly, Bauer transforms self-consciousness
into a substantive entity, a separate form of Being.
Bauer's equation of human life with intellectual activity
and intellectual activity with an ontologized, deified self-
consciousness underscores the Hegelian separation of thought
from nature or the world. Bauer and other Left Hegelians
counterpose the abstract idea of "progress" with an equally
abstract idea of the "masses", believing that any doctrine,
belief, or idea appropriated by "the masses" is thereby
degraded and distorted. Marx rejected entirely these
abstractions, and the supposed antinomy between any
corresponding particulars. Finally, Bauer holds up the
an ideal abstraction opposed to mere individuals.
' oJi the other hand, saw the state as a product of the
interests of individuals, whose true human community was
prior, not subservient, to the state. Marx's critique of
the Left Hegelian Ideas of the "state", "progress", "self-
consciousness", etc. , in The Holy Family provides the
outlines for his mature materialist theory of history in its
rejection of these idealized concepts as "ideology".
In The German Ideology Marx (and Engels) carry on their
critique of Left Hegelian idealism and true socialism as
ideology begun in The Holy Family, but now they specifically
use the term "ideology" in reference to left idealist
17
The German Ideology concentrates its sustained
of the idealist assumption that mistaken,
or degenerate ideas are the primary cause of
social evils and human misfortune on Ludwig Feuerbach and
Max Stirner and the so-called true socialists Grn, Fourier,
Saint-Simon, and Proudhon.” essential characterization
of their idealism as ideology is traced to its dependence on
Hegel's system:
German criticism has, right up to its
latest efforts, never left the realm of
philosophy. It by no means examines its
general philosophic premises, but in
fact all its problems originate in a
definite philosophical system, that of
Hegel. Not only its answers, even in
its questions there was a
mystification. ... To begin with they took
pure, unfalsified Hegelian categories
such as "substance" and "self-
consciousness", later they secularised
these categories by giving them more
profane names such as "species", "the
unique", "man", etc.„_
2 6
Again, Marx emphasizes the "religious" dimension of idealist
thought— the deification of concepts, their "Ideas" and
abstractions made holier than the real conditions their
empty phrases ostensibly describe. As in The Holy Family
in which left idealists create their own hollow concepts and
abstractions "which not even the appearance of an outside
world disturbs any longer", so in The German Ideology these
ideologists are said to imagine "abstractions in themselves
[which are] divorced from real history". 28 These inflated
grand concepts are mistaken for the reality they pretend to







ideologists any real knowledge of or engagement with real
human conditions:
So, after the ideologists had assumed
that ideas and thoughts had dominated
history up to now, that the history of
these ideas and thoughts constitutes all
history up to now, after they had
imagined that real conditions had
conformed to man as such and his ideal
conditions, i.e. to conceptual
determinations, after they had made the
history of people's consciousness of
themselves the basis of their actual
history, after all this, nothing was
easier than to call the history of
consciousness, of ideas, of the holy, of
established concepts— the history of
"man" and to put it in the place of real
history
.
This leads to the same mistake as described in The Holy
Fami2y--as real history is supplanted by conceptual
abstractions, so the ideologists are led to believe that the
way to change real material conditions is to forge a change
in consciousness. By attacking or reforming concepts, the
ideologist thinks he's attacking or changing real forces,
real material conditions. One abolishes, say, the condition
of social inequality by abolishing one's concept of
inequality. Throughout The German Ideology Marx
demonstrates the absurdity of this perspective of the
ideologists by treating concepts in the ideologists'
"inverted" fashion:
The very same ideologists who could
imagine that right, law, state, etc.,
arose from a general concept , in the
final analysis perhaps the concept of
man, and that they were put into effect
for the sake of the concept--these same
19
Ideologists can, of course, also imaginetnat crimes ae committed purely becauseot a wanton attitude towards someconcept, that crimes, in general, arenothing but making mockery of conceptsand are only punished in order to' dojustice to the insulted concents^ 30
In similar fashion, Marx mocks the other reified concepts of
the ideologists—such as the "state", "property", "self-
consciousness", etc.—which he first attacked in The Holy
Family.
All of these basic themes were put forward initially in
The Holy Family and reiterated in The German Ideology,
though they occasionally appear in somewhat different form
as Marx chooses to emphasize different men as the
representatives of ideological thought. However, there are
several significant developments or changes in the treatment
of ideology in The German Ideology, lending it a more
substantial role in Marx's historical materialism which
finds perhaps its first coherent articulation in The German
Ideology. In The Holy Family conceptual abstractions such
as property" or "the state" were described by Marx as
phantoms", "illusions", "distortions", or "nonsense"
t)y the left idealists. In The German Ideology Marx
comes to recognize that these abstractions or idealizations
are more than nonsense in the minds of left idealists— the
form they take corresponds to the "idealizations" in the
image a certain class— the bourgeoisie—makes of itself.
The abstractions of the left idealists are not merely their
own creations; rather their abstract expressions and
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concepts are "theoretizations" or "idealizations" of real
(bourgeois) class Interests. Further, their failure to
recognize the coincidence of their idealizations with those
of the bourgeoisie is Itself "ideological". In recognizing
this Marx moves from identifying Ideology with Idealism and
begins to associate it with the sense of "apologia". This
shift should become clearer if we look more closely at the
text of The German Ideology
,
The German Ideology contains a substantive sketch of
Marx's theory of historical materialism only hinted at in
earlier works; for this reason many commentators have
recognized it as the first mature work of marxism. Marx's
developing historical materialist theory leads him to
recognize how classes which are ascending in power or
dominance come to think of and present themselves as
representing "universal" interests—viz . , the interests of
the other classes. It is worth looking at length at Marx's
early statement of this point in The German Ideology.
For each new class which puts itself in
the place of one ruling before it is
compelled, merely in order to carry
through its aim, to present its interest
as the common interest of all the
members of society, that is, expressed
in ideal form: it has to give its ideas
the form of universality, and present
them as the only rational, universally
valid ones. The class making a
revolution comes forward from the very
start, if only because it is opposed to
a class, not as a class but as the
representative of the whole of society,
as the whole mass of society confronting
the one ruling class. It can do this
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because initially its interest really isas yet mostly connected with the common
interest of all other non-ruling
classes, because under the pressure ofhitherto existing conditions its
interest has not yet been able to
develop as the particular interest of a
particular class.
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There are two senses here in which a class may be said to
"universalize" its interests which Marx distinguishes in
later passages. One sense, indicated in the passage above,
applies to a class which, ascending in power in opposition
to a ruling class, shares with all other classes over which
that ruling class exercises hegemony the common interest of
ending that domination. To take an example which Marx makes
much of in later works, the rising bourgeoisie shared with
the peasantry an interest of opposing aristocratic rule.
That alliance of common interest was legitimate until the
bourgeoisie itself assumed a dominant position, which it
could maintain only at the expense of the interests of the
subordinate classes. After that stage, when that initial
alliance or interest continues to be portrayed as common or
universal, its representation becomes ideological. The
other sense of the claims of "universality" that are
ideological is related to the first—rather than simply the
illegitimate generalization of one class's interests over
another's, it has to do with the projection of one class's
interests or ideology over all historical epochs and future
social formations. This second sense can be said to include
the first, since if a class was successful in presenting its
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interests, or "idealizations”, or "ideologies" as universal
over all historical epochs it would therefore be successful
in presenting its ideology as universal over its own epoch.
This second sense of "universality", however, brings out the
way in which certain concepts or abstractions, far removed
from specific articulations of class interests, can be taken
on by one class or another at one historical epoch or
another as ideological constructs. Thus, for example, the
bourgeoisie ascending in power immediately after the French
Revolution could invoke the notion of "equality" as
representing the cessation of aristocratic privilege, and
the bourgeoisie after it has secured its position of
hegemony could invoke the concept of "equality" as meaning,
' equality for all" before the rule of bourgeois law.
What the Marx of The German Ideology comes to see,
then, is how the conceptual abstractions of the left
idealists can coincide with the abstractions and
idealizations of concepts laying claim to "universality"
made by a certain class, the bourgeoisie. Marx's
examination of Max Stirner's work illustrates this point.
In repeating the left idealist confusion that Ideas dominate
history and that existing conditions can only be changed by
a change in these Ideas, Stirner thinks, for example, that
his abstract "life-principle" is itself the creator of
social life:
Since Saint Max [Stirner] pays no
attention to the physical and social
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life of the individual, and saysnothing at all about "life", he auiteconsistently abstracts from historical
epochs, nationalities, classes, etc,,
or, which is the same thing, he inflates
the consciousness predominant in the
class nearest to him in his immediate
environment into the normal
consciousness of "a man's life"
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In abstracting from all historical epochs" Stirner
constructs an "ideal citizen" and an "ideal state" on the
basis of his abstract and deified notion of the "life-
principle". In doing so he never seems to realize or
acknowledge that these "ideals" he arrives at, or, rather,
conjures, are the "idealizations", "universalizations", or
generalizations" of one class's abstracted interests over
all other classes:
Since Saint Max identifies the bourgeois
with the good burghers, with the petty
German burghers , he does not grasp what
has been transmitted to him as it is in
fact and it is expressed by all
competent authors—viz., that the
liberal phrases are the idealistic
expression of the real interests of the
bourgeoisie—but, on the contrary, as
meaning that the final goal of the
bourgeois is to become a perfect
liberal, a citizen of the state
3 3
[emphasis added]
It should be emphasized that it is the assumptions of left
idealist thought—put simply, that it is Ideas that dominate
the world— that provide the philosophical foundation for the
acceptance or universalization of "ideas"—however distant
from the material conditions they pretend to describe,
however limited to a particular stage of historical




outlook or interests. Hence the left idealists so
easily become, however unknowingly, the spokesmen for the
abstractions of the bourgeoisie. Again, Stlrner is the
perfect foil here:
. . .he actually believes in the
domination of the abstract ideas of
ideology in the modern world; he
believes that in his struggle against
'predicates", against concepts, he is no
longer attacking an illusion, but the
real forces that rule the world. Hence
his manner of turning everything upside
down, hence the immense credulity with
which he takes at their face value all
the sanctimonious illusions, all the





Stirner's "revolt" against the fixation
of desires and thoughts is thus reduced
to an impotent moral injunction about
self-control and provides new evidence
that he merely gives an ideologically
high-sounding expression to the most




Another point deserves particular emphasis here. In
speaking of Stirner, as in his criticisms of all the other
left idealists up through most of The German Ideology, Marx
avoids describing the thought of the left idealists as a
contrived or dupJicitously constructed justification of
these bourgeois ideals. Thus, in a claim of Marx's such as
that Stirner "takes as the actual, earthly basis of the
bourgeois world the distorted form in which the
sanctimonious and hypocritical ideology of the bourgeoisie
voices their particular interests as universal interests",
there is no explicit suggestion that Marx thinks Stirner
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guilty of duplicity or hypocrisy in his perhaps unwitting
defense of bourgeois idealizations . ^6 ^ a later passage
Marx puts this point in a way that similarly suggests that
the primary parallel he wants to draw between left idealist
thought and bourgeois idealization is one of content (along
with of course the corresponding political consequences)
rather than one of, intention (say, to construct and promote
"Idealizations" that deceive a class concerning where its
real interests lie): "in actual content he [Stirner] is,
therefore, the defender of the practical petty bourgeois
.
Furthermore, Marx's language makes it clear that it is more
the affinity between the philosophical foundations of left
idealist thought and the representation of "universality"
carried out by the bourgeoisie that leads Stirner to end up
defending bourgeois ideals, rather than any calculating
advocacy of class interests on Stirner 's part:
Our whole exposition has shown that
Saint Sancho [Stirner] criticizes all
actual conditions by declaring them "the
holy" , and combats them by combating his
holy idea of them. This simple trick of
transforming everything into the holy
was achieved, as we have already seen in
detail above, by Jacques le bonhomme
[Stirner] accepting in good faith the
illusions of philosophy, the
ideological, speculative expression of
reality divorced from its empirical
basis, for reality, just as he mistook
the illusions of the petty (bourgeois
concerning) the bourgeoisie for the
("holy essence" of the) bourgeoisie, and
could therefore imagine that he was only
dealing with thoughts and ideas.
O O
However, in some key passages in the second half of The
German Ideology Marx turns his attention to the role the
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left Idealists play in the propagation of abstractions (even
If unconsciously) that leads Marx to shift to describing
left idealist thought as "apologia" (in the sense of a
defense or justification) for a certain class's interest
rather than as simply idealism. it is this sense of
Ideology as "apologia" which is taken up by Marx in his
larger body of work after The German Ideology (even though
there are a few scattered passages in which he seems to be
identifying ideology straightforwardly with idealism in the
manner of The Holy Family and the first half of The German
Ideology) . Marx's later identification of ideology with
apologia further underscores the fact that it is the
correspondence in content between left idealist conceptual
abstraction and class-defined idealizations of the
bourgeoisie, rather than "genetically" the class background
of the idealists or any necessarily conscious wish on their
part to further the interests of a certain class, that
establishes the relationship between idealist abstractions
and bourgeois ideals. The mature Marx uses this sense of
ideology to apply equally, for example, to thinkers whom he
specifically describes as unwittingly appropriating
bourgeois idealizations, and to those such as the "vulgar
economists" or "hired prize-fighters" who self-consciously
set out to defend and propagate the idealizations of class
interests. These authors are discussed in the subsequent
chapter in the context of Marx's critique of political
economy. In the meantime we should take note of these final
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passages in The German Ideology where Marx first articulates
the apologetic nature of this congruence between the
abstractions of the ideologists and the idealizations of
bourgeois class interests. He observes that the
abstractions Stirner puts his faith in and believes he is
independently giving voice to correspond in fact to the
ideal expressions of bourgeois class interests:
. . .the conditions of existence of the
ruling class ... which are ideally
expressed in law, morality, etc., to
^^ich (conditions) the ideologists of
that class more or less consciously give
a sort of theoretical independence; they
can be conceived by separate individuals
of that class as vocation, etc., and are
held up as a standard of life to the
individuals of the oppressed class,
ss an embellishment or
recognition of domination, partly as a
moral means for this domination.
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The true socialists" make the same error as the left
idealists mentioned above in their belief that ideas and
concepts are the determinants of real social and economic
conditions
:
It is difficult to see why these true
socialists mention society at all if
they believe with the philosophers that
all real cleavages are caused by
conceptual cleavages. On the basis of
this philosophical belief in the power
of concepts to make or destroy the
world, they can likewise imagine that
some individual "abolished the cleavage
of life" by "abolishing" concepts in
some way or other. Like all German
ideologists, true socialists continually
mix up literary history and real history
as equipotent ial . This habit is, of
course, very understandable among the
Germans, who conceal the abject part
28





True to form, one of the "true socialists", Karl Grn, after
creating the idealized categories of "Production" and
"Consumption", speaks of how in fact these abstract
categories actually form a unity. He observes that his own
enjoyment of "consumption" of, for example, coffee or sugar,
can just as well be seen as "production", that is, the
production of coffee or sugar in the colonies for his
enjoyment. In equating "consumption" and "production" Grn
only succeeds in masking the real material and social
conditions. Of Grn's collapsing of real production and
consumption into the unity of their "ideas" Marx remarks:
One can see that the outcome of such exuberance as this is
simply an apology for existing conditions
.
For Marx, the role left idealists and true socialists
have played in the propagation of bourgeois ideals or
illusions (viz.
, generalization or universalization of
class interests) is concesled. These bourgeois ideals
themselves both reflect the domination exercised over
subordinate classes and serve as a "moral" justification in
support of this hegemony--i . e . , apologia.
Finally, one other dimension of Marx's treatment of
ideology in The German Ideology should be pointed out. In
analysing the correspondence between idealist and bourgeois
abstractions, and in recognizing the role the former play in
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propagation of the latter,
the hegemony furthered by the
Marx tor the first time acknowledges their "institutional"
supports. Thus he speaks of the Ideological illusions
reflected in the "juridical expression of property", of the
"politicians, lawyers, and other ideologists" who articulate
these ideals, and of the bourgeois idealizations within
"family and political relations" being maintained through
"their entire ideological superstructure"
.
As Marx moved
away from identifying ideology simply with idealism and
began to use the term in the sense of apologia—and
consequently began to address the role it plays in the
maintenance of bourgeois idealizations—he first came to
speak of the institutional frameworks within which the real
interests of class are served by the idealized forms they
take on.
It will be useful here to briefly sketch some of the
aspects of the early Marx's notion of ideology as apologia
which anticipate some later developments and problems in his
theory before looking at his critique of the classical
political economists. It's clear in the early work that
Marx applied the term to the work of authors regardless of
their class background and regardless of whether they
intended to defend or oppose a particular class's interests
(i.e., whether they were "consciously' or "unconsciously"
ideological) . We will see later that Marx continued to
apply the term to both (for example, both to economists who
were unabashed advocates for the bourgeoisie's interests and
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in their
to those who made every effort to be "objective"
science), while, on the other hand, he also admitted the
importance of a "sociological inquiry" into the social
background and class interests of the authors he considered.
An ideological critique for Marx begins as an investigation
into the content of a body of thought. Hence Marx is
concerned in the first instance with truth—such as whether
certain claims of the classical political economists are
true, or whether the bourgeoisie's claim to represent the
interests of certain classes in a particular instance is
legitimate, etc. Furthermore, and this point is not
unrelated to the previous, the investigation into the nature
of ideology also includes an analysis of the social and
material interests to which an ideological body of thought
is tied. As reflected in his early formulation of ideology
as apologia, such an analysis includes both an account of
the conditions which might give rise to or influence
thought, and an account of what interests a body of thought
might in fact serve or help to maintain. In any case we
must wait until the discussion of Marx's critique of the
poiitical economists before these points can be sorted out
and the merits of the so-called "genetic" fallacy criticism
of Marx can be evaluated.
Another aspect of Marx's theory which must await the
fuller discussion in the next chapter is the notion of
"false consciousness". One thing that can be said here,
though, is that in his treatment so far Marx views the
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ideological not so much as "false” as it is "concealing",
concealing in the sense of leaving unexamined significant
aspects of social and material reality—such as
contradictory tensions within society. We must also keep in
mind Marx's observation that at a certain stage the
universal or ideal" claims of the bourgeoisie were to
some extent true; we will see later developments in Marx's
view that further underscore his suggestion that ideology
must contain enough "truth" for it to be plausible. if
Ideology were to be completely identified with the false, we
couldn't draw the connection Marx outlines between
Ideological forms and the class interests that can guide
them, or between the plausibility (viz., partial truth) of
ideology and the social effects it can have. Once again,
this issue anticipates several points to be covered below—
particularly the admixture of scientific understanding and
ideological abstraction Marx sees in the classical political
economists, and the dialectical view of, for instance,
Teodor Adorno, that ideology, as thought in need of
Justification, must contain both the true and the false.
Furthermore, Marx's early work brings out the fact that one
cannot speak of the ideological without at the same time
addressing the nature of the material conditions of social
reality: Just as, for instance, changing social conditions
in post-Revolutionary France changed how bourgeois concepts
and left idealist abstractions are to be evaluated, so
developments in the early nineteenth century changed the
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scientific and -ideological" aspects of the political
economy of the time. Hence, the question of the scientific
or ideological character of, in the latter instance,
political economy, is inseparable from the historical
conditions within which it existed. Finally, it should be
noted that the early Marx never identified ideology with
specific considerations of value or value judgments-the
authors Marx treats may have embraced values inimical to
those held by Marx, but Marx understood his critique to
proceed without primary attention to those values. Those
interpreters of Marx who hold that his critique of ideology
was merely an attack on the values those ideologists may
have held not only assume an unhistorical view of Marx's
notion of ideology, but also embrace a disquiet ingly rigid
and undialectical distinction between "facts" and "values".
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AFTER 1859: APOLOGIA AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Marx infrequently Identified ideology with idealism in
his later economic works. Rather, ideology became
synonymous with "apologia". An examination of the
particular sense in which Marx used "ideology" as "apologia"
in political economy not only reveals another dimension of
his concept of ideology, but also illuminates the way in
which he distinguished a scientific problematic (science in
the sense of wlssenschaft—organized, systematic knowledge)
from that of ideology. The scientific viewpoint of the
political economists Marx termed "vulgar", and to a lesser
extent that of Smith and Ricardo, were "ideologically"
influenced by exoteric" concerns (e.g.
, class interests)
and the "mystified appearances" of capitalist phenomena.
The work of Smith and Ricardo, however, is distinguished
from that of the vulgar political economists by the sense in
which their work both reflects and brings into question the
underlying contradiction in capitalist reality. The work of
the vulgar political economists, u nd i a 1 e c t i c a 1 by
comparison, characterizes only the manifest, superficial
appearances within capitalism, and further disguises its
contradictions through didactic, p s e u d o - r a
t
i ona 1
justifications of these mystified appearances.
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*********
The Identification of ideology with "idealism" is to be
found only sporadically in Marx's major works after the
1840's. As discussed in the previous chapter, the young
Marx had taken the work of several philosophers and
political thinkers to task for their substantial investment.
If not foundation in, German Hegelian idealism of one sort
or another. The occasional correspondence of ideology and
idealism in his later economic works, however, involves an
idealist error" of a much less systematic sort. Here Marx
simply uses* "idealism" to refer to "overabstraction"--the
use of general concepts too superficial or artificially
universal to engage the phenomena of the real world:
The whole objective world, the "world of
commodities", vanishes here as a mere
aspect, as the merely passing activity,
constantly performed anew, of socially
producing men. Compare this "idealism"
with the crude, material fetishism into
which the Ricardian theory develops in
the writings "of this incredible
cobbler", McCulloch, where not only the
difference between man and animal
disappears but even the difference
between a living organism and an
inanimate object. And then let them say
that as against the lofty idealism of
bourgeois political economy, the
proletarian opposition has been
preaching a crude materialism directed
exclusively towards the satisfaction of
coarse appetites.^
Many of whom Marx considered to be "vulgar economists" had
the habit of this error— this is the false abstraction of
neglecting "particulars" in the misdirected service of
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"universals" as evidanf- in <=«>,aaent m, for example, the view of a
nation as an aggregate body working merely for the
satisfaction of national wants. ^ But the vulgar economists
were by no means the only political economists into whose
work such false abstractions found their way. A theme of
Marx's present in many passages of Capital and in a great
deal of the three volumes of Theories of Surplus Value is
that the vulgar economists mined many of the mistakes or
misconceptions of Smith and Ricardo arising from "idealist"
or "forced" abstractions to reproduce their own misguided
views. After reviewing some of the mistakes in Ricardo's
formulation of the rate of profit, for example, Marx
observes
. . .it must be noted that Ricardo commits
all these blunders, because he attemots
to carry through his identification of
the rate of surplus value with the rate
of profit by means of forced
abstractions. The vulgar mob has
therefore concluded that theoretical
truths are abstractions which are at
variance with reality, instead of
seeing, on the contrary, that Ricardo
does not carry true abstraction far
enough and is therefore driven into
false abstraction.
O
It should be emphasized, though, that the idealism Marx
charges Smith and Ricardo, and even the vulgar economists,
with is not of the systematic and pervasive sort he earlier
attributed to Stirner, Bauer, or the "true socialists".
This "idealist tendency" is only one among many far more
significant forms of misconception or "ideological"
direction which Marx denounced in political economy. But
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there is one form of idealist thought or false abstraction
that should be mentioned here at least in passing. it has
to do with the false or artificial resolution of
contradictions (an issue discussed at length at the end of
this chapter). Specific material forces of conflict are
"abstracted" out of existence by vulgar political economists
when they create "ideals" which, if only reality brought
itself into correspondence with them, would never generate
conflict or crises. Their apologia for these idealizations
being passed off as legitimate political economy, the real
conflicts of material reality need not be bothered with.
Indeed, these real elements of conflict (and, one may
assume, the supposed crises they so unfortunately give rise
to) must be seen as irrelevant as long as the real task of
economy is taken to be the conjuring of a
seemingly consistent set of ideals; it would merely, then,
be up to the real world to bring itself in line with these
abstractions. As Marx puts it.
In the crises of the world market, the
contradictions and antagonisms of
bourgeois production are strikingly
revealed. Instead of investigating the
nature of the conflicting elements which
erupt in catastrophe, the apologists
content themselves with denying the
catastrophe itself and insisting, in the
face of their regular and periodic
occurrence, that if production were
carried on according to the textbooks,
crises would never occur. Thus the
apologetics consist in the falsification
of the simplest economic relations, and
in particular in clinging to the concept
of unity in the face of contradiction.
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This problem can be put very simply: "...a contradiction is
denied, by abstracting from a contradiction which really
exists in production. ”5 Marx had a lot more to say,
however, regarding the different ways contradictions are
handled in political economic theory. As will be shown in
the later part of this chapter, Marx saw a distinction of
enormous importance in the respectively different ways
Smith, Ricardo, and the vulgar political economists treated
(or failed to treat) contradictions in their theoretical
work. In fact, the distinctions Marx draws here underscore
a sense in which Smith and Ricardo's work may be said to be
dialectical in a manner which vulgar economy falls short of.
In the meantime it should simply be noted that the previous
identification of ideology with idealism of a sort more or
less drops out of the later economic works; it is then only
occasionally used to pejoratively characterize the wild
abstractions resorted to by political economists in their
efforts to avoid recognizing, acknowledging, or explaining
contradictory elements in capitalism and their resultant
crises
.
In Capital and Theories of Surplus Value Marx uses the
term "apologist" to the near exclusion of "idealist" or even
"ideologist". At times "apologia" is simply used to refer
to thought which is expressive of "bourgeois sentiment".
While Marx may speak of the "apologetic purpose" of the
vulgar economists' dogmas,^ he observes in many other
passages that apologia is produced by vulgar economists
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other
"without thinking, naively, and unconsciously
^
times "apologia" is particularly used in reference to
political economy which glosses over social contradictions
by ignoring the real material conditions which give rise to
them or idealizing those conflicting conditions out of
existence through forced abstractions (as mentioned above),
or in reference to the various attempts to formulate a
theory of production such that non-laboring classes become
the source of wealth. other times it is described as a
"fetishism" peculiar to bourgeois political economy "which
metamorphoses the social, economic character impressed on
things in the process of social production into a natural
character stemming from the material nature of those
things. These varieties of meaning can best be handled
within the discussion below of the distinctions Marx drew
among the different political economists. In the meantime
we may crudely summarize these varying uses of "apologia" by
reading it as a justificatory body of thought understood as
a defense (sometimes patently partisan, but possibly
undertaken quite naively) of the justice or integrity of
class relations within a social formation.
Many of Marx's commentators, particularly Western
^^.rxists of the second half of the twentieth century, have
considered these two characterizations of ideology— idealism
and apologia— to be adequate or definitive accounts of how
Marx used the term. However, Marx's early identification of
ideology with a sort of idealism is only to be found in
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passing and infrequently in his writings after the 1840 's
Most commentators have generally ta.en apologia to he the
richer and more developed concept. When the reading of
Idealism as Ideology and the reading of apologia as Ideology
are subsumed into one unified theory of Ideology,
P rticularly when the varied meanings suggested above are
collapsed Into some generic notion of apologia, quite
Significant elements in Marx's uses of Ideology can be too
easily overlooked or neglected. Again. it should be
emphasized that Marx nowhere speaks as though any particular
mention of ideology is to be understood as part of some
broader "theory of Ideology"; his widely varying treatments
in shifting contexts further underscore the fact that he
appropriated the concepts as he needed to, without any self-
conscious concern for the presumed boundaries of any larger
theory
.
One of these usages which is significantly different
from the others, and sufficiently rich in itself so that its
subsumption under an eclectic category of apologia would
detract from its unique theoretical value, is Marx's account
and critique in Capital and Theories of Surplus Value of his
predecessors and contemporaries in political economy. The
three volumes of Theories of Surplus Value, and large
sections of the other three volumes of Capital, make up a
sustained treatment of the classical political economists
fheir successors, and hence provide a uniquely rich text
for investigating the sense in which Marx analyzes the
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"ideological" in political economy. Furthermore, as Marx
considers classical political economy to be a science and
certainly some of its practitioners—specif ically Smith and
Ricardo— to have a legitimate claim to being scientific, the
use of "ideology" in these texts should provide insight into
a contemporary area of dispute in a marxist theory of
ideology, viz., the relations—dl fferences
, similarities,
parallels, tensions between science and ideology.
By way of introduction it should be noted that Marx did
not view political economy as a seamless or linearly
developing science. Throughout Capital and Theories of
Surplus Value one finds Marx remarking how, for example.
Smith and Ricardo--for Marx the two scientific beacons of
classical political economy— "tak[e] a step back" to an
cruder conception within their science, reverting
to a vulgar conception, or, however uncharacteristically,
leave their scientific insights behind and reproduce a
class-based mystification of some aspect of the capitalist
system of production. A few examples should suffice for the
moment
.
Among the many problems Marx saw in Smith's categories
of fixed and circulating capital was the "crudely empirical
manner in which Smith broaches the investigation [which]
engenders at the very outset a lack of clarity." Smith made
little progress in understanding capitalist circulation:
"But his progress is confined to this generalization
[circulating and fixed capital] of the categories. His
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implementation is far inferior to that of Quesnay."10 ^t
many places in Capital Smith is said to "regress" or
"relapse. . .entirely into physiocratic errors" whose
political economy Smith otherwise far exceeds. Marx
unquestionably viewed Smith's work as considerably uneven:
"In his description of the process of reproduction, and of
accumulation, Adam Smith, in various ways, not only made no
advance, but even lost considerable ground, compared with
his predecessors, especially the Physiocrats ." ^ 2 post-
Smithian political economy was not immune to Smith's errors:
Adam Smith has in fact led 'astray' all the later
economists, including Ricardo .... As my exposition has shown,
the lack of this differentiation made any scientific
presentation [of rent] quite impossible. „13 Ricardo is
occasionally faulted for the moments he not only fails to
improve on, but fails to equal. Smith's work: "Ricardo
simply answers that this is how matters are in capitalist
production. Not only does he fail to solve the problem [of
the law of value] ; he does not even realize its existence in
Adam Smith's work."^'^ Finally, Marx notes how Smith is both
behind and ahead of Ricardo:
Ricardo is ahead of Adam Smith in that
these apparent contradictions [in the
law of value] — in their result real
contradictions—do not confuse him. But
he is behind Adam Smith in that he does
not even suspect that this presents a
problem, and therefore the specific
development which the law of value
undergoes with the formation of capital




These last two passages anticipate one of the ways in which
Marx gives a dialectical reading of the "progress" or nature
of a science such as political economy. what is of greater
import in this regard will be the sort of developments in
Smith's and Ricardo's thought which Marx describes as
simultaneously a step forward and a step backward; further,
what Marx says about the nature of these developments is not
unrelated to the question about (or the dialectics between)
science and ideology. This analysis will be developed later
on in the chapter
.
The procedure I will follow in developing this analysis
is the following. I will look at the ways Marx saw in
P'^ii'tical economy regressions in the science, "steps
backward", or moments in which political economists'
®^i®utific insights fail them or their "scientific
foundation drops out. This method will be selective in a
couple of ways. For one, Marx, particularly in Theories of
Surplus Value, covers a great many political economists and
social theorists, both well known and obscure, and
continually shifts back and forth from one problem in
political economy to another of widely varying importance
(ranging form the law of value to discussions of the nature
of compound interest).^® For another, not every sort of
"regression" or "step backward" in political economy is
relevant to this reading of the dialectical nature of the
science. For instance, there's nothing really unique or
interesting in the fact that a later thinker may fail to
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appreciate or
imporve on a predecessor, or may fail to
appropriate a predecessor's advances-such a situation could
simply be dismissed as a consequence of a difference in
intellectual depth or scientific ability between them.
There's nothing especially revealing in a theorist's failure
to continue a "scientific insight" or to make "progress"
beyond a certain point (evaluations which, in any case, can
only be made in hindsight, and only in terms of whatever
paradigms have come to dominate the later science).
Similarly, there's nothing intrinsically "dialectical" going
on when this "failure of progress" is seen to occur on a
discipline-wide scale; there's nothing necessarily
dialectical about scientific error. What makes all these
factors important for Marx is the particular kind of
regression, the specific sort of error made, the nature of a
"step backward", and the specific reasons why a particular
political economist (or the entire discipline after 1330
)
failed in developing or carrying on certain scientific
directions or advances. Hence we need to look very
carefully at the unique and specific reasons Marx saw all of
these things happening in political economy and how he
thought them to be particularly revealing. In what follows,
then, I will look at how Marx saw "steps backward" and the
"failure of scientific insights or foundation" in political
economy and how these characterize in varying ways both
"classical" political economy--Smi th and Ricardo—and those
who were for Marx the "vulgar" political economists. Such a
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review of how these terms differently apply to vulgar
economists and to Smith and Ricardo, and particularly the
richer senses of "steps backward" or "simultaneous progress
and regression" that Marx uses only for these two classical
political economists, will Illustrate what Marx thought
wrong with both vulgar and classical political economy, and
further suggest what It was about Smith's and Ricardo's work
that distinguished them and of which Marx thought so highly
yet not uncritically. To put this another way. I'll look at
what it was about Smith and Ricardo that led Marx to speak
of them as genuinely scientific, in spite of their
shortcomings, and in contradistinction to the vulgar
political economists. What results from this treatment
should be an appreciation of how the critique Marx delivered
of both the classical and vulgar political economists, and
the differences he saw between them, reveal the
nature of political economy and thereby




Marx understood the integrity of a science to be
jeopardized when a discipline's purpose and method are
directed and systematically circumscribed by the interests
of a viewpoint or purpose which falls outside that science.
As we will see, Marx often characterized this tension by
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contrasting "esoteric" Interests-interests of understanding
and explanation Internal to a discipline—with "exoteric"
interests, or Interests derived from an external viewpoint.
Marx first puts the distinction In these terms In regard to
Adam Smith:
While we cannot reproach Adam Smith for
going in this analysis no farther than
all his successors (although a step in
the right direction could already be
discerned among the physiocrats), he
subsequently gets lost in a chaos and
this mainly because his "esoteric"
conception of the value of commodities
in general is constantly contravened by
exoteric conceptions, which on the whole
prevail with him, and yet his scientific
instinct permits the esoteric standpoint
to re-appear from time to time.^,^
For Marx then a discipline's esoteric understanding is
neglected or compromised when subordinated to the exoteric
interests in, most often, the viewpoint a capitalist would
have of the justice or propriety of the relations of
production under which he appropriates surplus value in the
form of profit. Put crudely, such exoteric interests
prevail when, for example, the (scientific) interest in
understanding or explaining how surplus value is produced is
superceded by the interest the capitalist has in justifying
her or his appropriation of that value. It should be
understood, though, that these terms are not by any means
simply and strictly separable: An explanation (correct, or
incorrect) of the mechanisms of production can be used to
justify a means of expropriation of profit. The crucial
point for Marx is whether the scientifically grounded
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purpose of understanding takes primacy over the (Inevitably
present to some degree) external Interests. Smith and
Ricardo are not dispossessed of their own such external
interests, but in Marx's view they—unlike the vulgar or
base economists—did not sacrifice their primary interest in
scientific understanding to these outside interests.
The contrasts Marx draws between the work of Ricardo
and that of Malthus illustrate this point well. Ricardo
views the proletariat as on the same level as machinery or
beasts of burden or commodities because from his viewpoint
their being purely machinery of beasts of burden is
conducive to 'production' or because they really are mere
commodities in bourgeois production." Marx takes this
viewpoint to be "stoic, objective, scientific".^® Malthus
makes the very same move—he "reduces the worker to a beast
of burden for the sake of production"
. But Marx reads
these two men's viewpoints very differently, even though
they reach the same conclusion here, because, while Ricardo
asserts the commodity nature of workers as it follows from
his scientific understanding of the nature of capitalist
production, Malthus asserts the debasement of the worker
because the foundation of his viewpoint is the defense of
the interests of a class against another— the aristocracy
and the landed bourgeoisie against the industrial
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The fact that Ricardo's
and Malthus' conclusions here are grounded on different
foundations--scientif ic interest in understanding on the one
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hand and the defense or justification of class interests on
the other— lends a very different character to their work
and brings them to very different conclusions elsewhere.
Since Ricardo's understanding of the debasement of the
working class was formed by interest in scientific
understanding, he was prepared to draw equally "ruthless"
conclusions about other classes when that understanding so
suggested. In Malthus' perspective, however, scientific
understanding is subordinated to his interest in defending
class interest, hence he cannot draw any conclusions
unfavorable to that interest. Marx puts this difference
clearly: *
Thus Ricardo's ruthlessness was not only
scientifically honest but also a
scientific necessity from his point of
view. But because of this it is also
quite immaterial to him whether the
advance of the productive forces slays
landed property or workers. If this
progress devalues the capital of the
individual bourgeoisie it is equally
welcome to him. If the development of
the productive powers of labor halves
the value of the existing fixed capital,
what does it matter, says Ricardo. The
productivity of human labor has doubled.
Thus here is scientific honesty.
Ricardo's conception is, on the whole,
in the interests of the industrial
bourgeoisie only because, and in so far
as their interests coincide with that of
production or the productive development
of human labor. Where the bourgeoisie
comes into conflict with this, he is
just as ruthless towards it as he is at
other times toward the aristocracy.
But Malthus! This wretch only
draws such conclusions from the given
scientific premises (which he invariably
steals), as will be "agreeable" (useful)
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to the aristocracy against thebourgeoisie and to both against thSproletariat. Hence he does not wantproduction for the sake nf . .
hm- •
Ks O production,
maintains orxtends the status quo, and serves theinterests of the ruling classes.
2
q
It is above all, then Ricardo's "honesty which so
essentially distinguishes him from the vulgar economists"—
his ability and willingness to proceed with conclusions
regardless of their consequences for the Interests of a
class, rather than to seek conclusions which correspond to
and serve class interestc; d a. a:^ c esrs. But for Marx it was not jsut
the unabashed defense of class interests as with Malthus
that can compromise a science; in more subtle ways, a
theorist's commitment to any set of values—be they moral,
religious, sentimental, racial—can compromise a science's
integrity if the commitment to that science is subverted by
a more powerful and more essential commitment to those
values. It should be emphasized though that Marx never
suggested that a theorist could ever legitimately practice a
science completely uninfluenced by whatever other values she
or he holds; rather, the practice of a science suffers when
values or interests not internal to the science take
precedence over the demands of that science and control its
directions and acceptable results. Marx certainly
recognized that commitments to values external to political
economy were held by Smith and Ricardo, but didn't
necessarily subvert their scientific foundation: "In so far
as it does not involve sinning against his science, Ricardo
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is always a philanthropist, just as he was in practice,
As we will see, the work of the vulgar economists,
and that of Ricardo and Smith, was delimited insofar as they
accommodated their work to interests arising from a non-
scientiflc foundation: "But when a man seeks to accommodate
science to a viewpoint which is not derived from science
Itself (however erroneous it may be) but from outside, from
alien, external interests, then I call him 'base'. ".23
This contrast between such men as Smith and Ricardo,
whose commitment to scientific understanding carries over to
a commitment to their conclusions regardless of their
consequences for class interests, and the vulgar economists,
who essentially set out to defend and justify class
interests in the guise of a science, is evident in their
very approaches to explaining what constitutes productive
labor. Smith drew a distinction between productive and
unproductive labor. In this latter category he placed
government officials, judges, lawyers, the clergy, etc.
,
along with jesters, prostitutes, and menial servants of all
kinds because in his view neither group produces value, but
rather lives on the produce of other people's industry:
The labor of some of the most
respectable orders in the society is,
like that of menial servants,
unproductive of any value and does not
fix or realize itself in any permanent
subject, or vendible commodity. . . .The
sovereign, i.e., with all the officers
both of justice and war who serve under
him, the whole army and navy, are
unproductive laborers. They are the
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servants of the public, and aremaintained by a part of the annual
industry of otherpeople.... In the same class must be
^^^yers, physicians,men of letters of all kinds; players,buffoons, musicians, opera-singers,
opera-dancers, etc.^^ ^
Thus Smith's understanding of the path of development of the
productive forces necessary to capitalism led him to
question the previously sacrosanct role of the "respectable
orders of society", viewing the realization of their
interests rather as a hindrance to the development of
capital. Similarly, Smith elevated the role of the
productive laborer, as he understood their fundamental
contribution in capitalist production. Ricardo, however, as
the quintessential expositor of the logic of capitalist
production, while he shared Smith's insights regarding the
distinction between productive and unproductive labor, and
how the latter is the fundamental source of value in a
capitalist economy, took this one step further and discarded
Smith's illusions about the consequently privileged
character of productive labor. In Marx's words.
Ricardo fully shares Adam Smith's view
of the distinction between productive
and unproductive labor, that the former
exchanges its labor directly for
capital, the latter directly for
revenue. But he no longer shares
Smith's tenderness for and illusions
about the productive laborer. It is a
misfortune to be a productive laborer.
A productive laborer is a laborer who
produces wealth for another. His
existence only has meaning as such an
instrument of production for the wealth
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of others. If therefore the samequantity of wealth for others can becreated with a smaller number ofproductive laborers, then thesuppression of these productive laborersIS in order
.
25
Here Ricardo's "ruthlessness" is a great scientific merit.
Insofar as he lays aside his concern for other human beings
or the welfare of a particular class he is able to assume
the viewpoint of capitalist development and give voice to
Its real logic. Ricardo is unabashed about the foregoing of
such concerns in the service of this logic: "l shall...
greatly regret that considerations for any particular class
are allowed to check the progress of the wealth and
population of the country. precisely
Ricardo's suspended concern for the interests of a class or
the welfare of human beings that allows him to glimpse the
structure of capitalist development, and which, predictably,
lesser economists, whose class defensiveness or
sentimentality overshadows their pursuit of scientific
understanding, hold against Ricardo:
It is that which is held against him, it
is his unconcern about "human beings",
and his having an eye solely for the
development of the productive force,
whatever the cost in human beings and
capi tal -values , it is precisely that
which is the important thing about him.
Development of the productive forces of
social labor is the historical task and
justification of capital.
Smith and Ricardo, then, shared in the insight that it
was the laboring class, not the "idle" classes, who were the
real source of the creation of value in capitalist
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production. Ricardo took this a step further by eliminating
Illusions about the privileged status Smith had attached to
laborers in virtue of their production of value. Ricardo
correctly understood how being a productive laborer was not
a privilege but a burden, as a productive worker is
precisely one who is obliged to create wealth for others.
Ricardo attempted to express this logic in terms of its own
internal dynamics, rather than subordinating his primary
interest in understanding capitalist development wholly to a
competing and compromising interest of a particular class.
It was quite otherwise in the vulgar economists' treatment
of productive and unproductive labor.
The great lot of vulgar economists (after 1830) found
Smith and Ricardo's distinction between productive and
unproductive labor quite unsettling. According to Marx,
these "polemics against Adam Smith's distinction between
productive and unproductive labor were for the most part
confined to the 'Gods of the lesser tribes'
; they are not to
be found in the work of any economist of significance—of
anyone of whom it can be said that he made some discovery in
political economy. What precipitated these polemics was
the profound discomfort so-called "higher-grade workers"
—
state officials, jurists, priests, etc. — felt in being
relegated economically to the same class as clowns and
menial servants. The view Smith had expressed, with Ricardo
after him, was an economic treatment of these professions
which understood them as incidental expenses of production.
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which should, according to the logic of this stage of
development, be cut down to a minimum and provided as
inexpensively as possible. For Smith, this was merely a
consequence of the correct, scientific analysis of the role
these professions actually played in society, but a
perspective also shared by the industrial capitalists and
the working class. These unproductive professions, at the
time Smith was writing, were merely a drain and a hindrance
on the development of capital—viz . , industrial capital, and
can only be properly, scientifically understood as such. in
response to this suspicion cast on professions which had
previously enjoyed "superstitious veneration",
...the sycophantic underlings of
political economy felt it their duty to
glorify and justify every sphere of
activity by demonstrating that it was
"linked" with the production of material
wealth, that it was a means towards it;
and they honored everyone by making him
a "productive laborer" in the "primary"
sense, namely, a laborer who labors in
the service of capital, is useful in one
way or another to the enrichment of the
capitalist, e^c.^g
Of the vulgar economists who were confronted with
Smith's productive/unproductive distinction, Marx asserts:
"The glorification of servility and flunkeyism, of tax-
gatherers and parasites, runs through the lot of them.
Compared with these, the rough
classical economy stands out as
conditions . What, then, accounts
that, regarding the question of the
cynical character of





nature of "higher-grade workers", the vulgar economists
after the 1830 's turn out to be apologists for the
unproductive professions, while Smith and Ricardo's attitude
is one of cynicism? Both men wrote at a time when priests,
jurists, etc., were still allied with landlords and
agricultural wealth, the realization and maintenance of
whose interests contradicted the development of industrial
capital. An esoteric, scientific understanding from the
viewpoint of developing capitalist production would then
mandate that these professions be viewed as hindering
capitalist development. The landed aristocracy, the
landlords, and the agriculturists were a declining class; a
scientific understanding of their decline, and of the rise
of industrial capitalists, would therefore generate an
increasing scepticism regarding the ideological claims and
superstitious veneration" which these professions were
attempting to bestow on these declining classes.
Their role in supporting these classes, and the livelihood
they thereby gain, would consequently be less opaque to
political economists of the time. However, things had
changed by 1830. The industrial bourgeoisie was no longer a
rising class and the "ideological professions" were no
longer allied to the disappearing aristocracy and landlords.
Rather, the industrial bourgeoisie was now the dominant
class, and the "ideological professions" were allying
themselves to the industrial bourgeoisie, to their mutual
benefit. The vulgar economists found themselves in a very
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different social context-the scientif icaliy grounded
scepticism concerning classes which don't directly
participate in production developed by Smith and Ricardo
would no longer apply to a declining class, but would
question the legitimacy of a dominant class, the industrial
bourgeoisie, and its apologists who had so recently allied
themselves with the bourgeoisie. As Marx puts it,
Political economy in its classical
period, like the bourgeoisie itself in
its parvenu period, adopted a severely
^^i^ical attitude to the machinery of
the State, etc. At a later stage it
realized and as was shown too in
practice learned from experience that
the necessity for the inherited social
combination of all these classes, which
in part were totally unproductive, arose
from its own organization .... It was
therefore time to make a compromise and
to recognize the "productivity" of all
classes not directly included among the
agents of material production.
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Thus the context of the social formation in which Smith and
Ricardo wrote made it possible to take a "purely economic",
esoteric' , or "scientific" standpoint regarding productive
and unproductive labor. On the other hand, after the
bourgeoisie had achieved dominance, and allied itself with
the "ideological professions", such a standpoint would
inevitably be confronted with "exoteric" antagonism—class
interest—with which the vulgar economists, faced with such
a choice, chose to ally themselves.
This sense of the weakening of the integrity of
political economy as a science as its esoteric, scientific
foundation is accommodated to or replaced by exoteric
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interests is closely related to another sense in which Marx
saw political economy weakened, discussed later on in this
chapter. m this sense Marx understood the vulgar political
economists to be giving up any claim of practicing science
insofar as they sought to gloss over, cover up, -reason” out
of existence, or otherwise ignore the real contradictions
within the capitalist system of production (and their
corresponding reflections in theory) which had been
suggested, or at least inadvertently brought to light, by
the esoteric understanding of their predecessors. One of
the ways, of course, to cover over or ignore such
contradictions brought out by the esoteric understanding of
their discipline is to subvert that understanding by
replacing it with an "exoteric" viewpoint. If any esoteric
understanding of contradictions in the nature of capitalist
production carries uncomfortable implications for a
particular class's interest, that esoteric understanding can
be subverted and these contradictions covered over by
appealing to the "common understanding" of how, for example,
a commodity might "appear" in the process of circulation.
Thus the "common understanding" can be the "exoteric"
viewpoint appealed to by vulgar economists to supplant any
esoteric or scientific recognition of the nature of the
contradictions in capitalist production. However, Marx's
views on how contradictions are disguised or ignored, and
the impact of this willful ignorance on the practice of
political economy, are sufficiently distinct from (even
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though they overlap with) his views of the Influence of
exoteric interests on a science as to deserve to be
treated separately.
In sum, Marx thought a discipline "scientific" if it
could lay claim to an organized body of knowledge while
remaining true to its own "esoteric" interests in this
knowledge. When a discipline accommodates itself to a
viewpoint outside itself, it sacrifices its scientific
foundation to "exoteric" interests. Marx considered Smith
and Ricardo to be on the whole scientific, as the character
of their work displays more of an interest in understanding
than an interest in justifying any particular class's
privilege in the capitalist system. Moreover, Smith and
Ricardo were willing to pursue their "esoteric" discipline
without regard to whether their conclusions were comfortable
or unsettling to any particular class to a degree unknown in
any of the vulgar economists. The vulgar economists, as
illustrated in their reaction to Smith's advance in coming
to understand the nature of productive labor, were always
willing to subordinate the scientific foundations to which
they might otherwise lay claim to the exoteric interest of
class privilege. The vulgar economists, in their production
of apologetic rather than understanding, not only failed to
advance the science of political economy, but contributed to
its "retrogression" by seeking to repudiate the advances
made by their predecessors Smith and Ricardo.
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****** * * * *
Not to be outdone in the German tradition of philosophy,
Marx concerns himself in much of his mature work with
understanding the difference between the way things "appear"
and the way things "really are" . Much of his masterwork
Capital is an attempt to come to terms with mystifications
surrounding, for example, the nature of money, the commodity
(misconceived as apart from the social relations that
determine it)
,
or labor (its wage misconceived as an
exchange of equals). m his more specific critiques of
individual political economists Marx focused on a number of
such mystifications—how the "phenomenon appears commonly"
or how things "appear" to an agent within the capitalist
system which find their way into the work of Smith,
Ricardo, and of course most abundantly the vulgar
economists. Political economy is diminished as a science
insofar as these "common conceptions", these "appearances",
replace a scientifically grounded understanding of the
relations" of phenomena otherwise comprehended
on the "surface".
These confusions or mystifications come about from the
way things are said to appear in competition or the
circulation process. Thus, for example, a commodity's value




Although the excess value of a commodityver Its cost-price is shaped in theimmediate process of production, it isrealized only in the process ofcirculation, and appears all the morereadily to have arisen from the processof circulation, since in reality, under
competition, in the actual market, itdepends on market conditions whether ornot and to what extent this surplus isrealized
.
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Mistaking the "appearances" of circulation for the realities
of capitalist production was not new to nineteenth century
political economy: Earlier theoretical treatments of the
mercantile system "proceeded necessarily from the
superficial phenomena of the circulation process as
individualized in the movements of merchant's capital, and
therefore grasped only the appearance of matters.
Similarly, later political economists have on the whole
failed to practice a science that penetrates to a deeper
level of understanding. Rather they take up and
unquestioningly accept the viewpoint of things as they
appear to participants in the capitalist system:
We can well understand why the same
economists who oppose determining the
value of commodities by labor-time,
i.e. , by the quantity of labor contained
in them, why they always speak of prices
of production as centers around which
market-prices fluctuate. They can
afford to do it because the price of
production is an utterly external and
prima facie meaningless form of the
value of commodities, a form as it
appears in competition, therefore in the
mind of the vulgar capitalist, and





Political economists in general, then, have failed to
what was for Marx a central principle in reaching a properly
esoteric or scientific understanding of the capitalist
system of production—viz that the •real" nature of the
system is "hidden" or "concealed" behind "appearances" or
"surface phenomena". In a famous passage Marx puts this
quite straightforwardly: "...all science would be
superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of
things directly coincided . "35 on the contrary, then,
scientific understanding in political economy is possible
only when the "way things appear" to the capitalist in the
circulation process is not allo«>ed to replace the viewpoint
of the "way things are" in production: "The real science of
modern economy only begins when the theoretical analysis
passes from the process of circulation to the process of
production." These misleading "appearances", derived from
the viewpoint of the participant in the capitalist system,
are taken up in varying degrees and in various ways by
Smith, Ricardo, and of course the vulgar economists.
While Marx had no doubts about the "great scientific
merit" of Smith's work, he never hesitated to point out
where Smith takes a "step backward", or where his scientific
insights fail him, precisely because of his reversion to the
"common", unscientific view, the level of "appearances".
Many of the scientific errors and inconsistencies in Smith's
work in fact are due to his naive juxtaposition of
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scientific insights and common misconceptions of the
capitalist
:
...Smith on the one hand expresses thethoughts of the agent of capitalist
production and presents things boldlvand comprehensively, as they appear toand are thought of by the :a??e” asthey influence him in practice, and as,indeed, they appear on the surface,
while, on the other hand, he





In Marx's view it was not uncommon for Smith to start out
from a scientific foundation, correctly on the "real, inner
relationships" only to allow the superficial, vulgar
misconception to supplant and contradict his originally
well-founded explanation. Thus his theory of rent, which
began as a correct, scientific explanation, collapses as he
shifts to the level of appearances, the superficial
viewpoint of the capitalist:
The vulgar conception however that wages
• arise from labor, but profit and rent
—
independently of the labor of the
worker—arise out of capital and land as
separate sources, not for the
appropriation of alien labor, but of
wealth itself, evidently creeps into
Adam Smith's writing already at this
stage. In this fantastic fashion, the
profoundest concepts intermingle with
the craziest notions, such as the common
mind forms in an abstract manner from
the phenomena of competi tion . .
„
Smith's inconsistencies in his theory of rent are not
unrelated to the more pronounced juxtaposition of capitalist
misconceptions and scientific understanding to be found in
his theory of value. Marx devotes considerable passages in
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Theories of Surplus Value to uncovering how Smith shifts
back and forth between two different definitions of value-
at times he defines value by the quantity of labor expended
which IS contained in a commodity, while at other times he
speaks of value in terms of the quantity of living labor
which can be bought in exchange for the commodity. On the
one hand Smith correctly understood how wages, profits, and
rent are components of value; on the other hand he
continually undermines this conception by regarding the
prices of wages, profit, and rent as antecedent factors and
attempting to determine them independently so as to compose
the price of the commodity out of them. For Marx this shift
represents the ambivalence in Smith between the viewpoint of
the capitalist and scientific explanation: "The meaning of
this change of approach is that first he grasps the problem
in its inner relationships
,
and then in the reverse form, as
^PP^3rs in competition. These two concepts of his run
counter to one another in his work, naively, without his
being aware of the contradiction."^^
As should be clear from these passages, Marx offers a
very critical interpretation of the shift between the level
of appearances (the viewpoint of the capitalist) and that of
the real, inner relations (the scientific viewpoint) that
pervades Smith's work. Marx speaks of how Smith's
scientific analyses—his account of the true, inner
relations—are constantly ambushed by the "creeping in" of
the misconceived appearances common to the viewpoint of the
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capitalist. However, for the moment we should simply take
note of a peculiar passage in which Marx's tone seems to
shift while discussing this ambivalence in Smith:
On the one hand he traces the intrinsic
connection existing between economic
categories or the obscure structure of
the bourgeois economic system. On the
other, he simultaneously sets forth the
connection as it appears in the
phenomena of competition and thus as it
presents itself to the unscientific
observer just as to him who is actually
involved and interested in the process
of bourgeois production. One of these
conceptions fathoms the inner
connection, the physiology, so to speak,
of the bourgeois system whereas the
other takes the external phenomena of
life, as they seem and appear and merely
describes, catalogues, recounts and
arranges them under formal definitions.
With Smith both these methods not only
merrily run alongside one another, but
also intermingle and contradict one
another. With him this is justifiable
. . .since his task was indeed a twofold
one. On the one hand he attempted to
penetrate the inner physiology of
bourgeois society but on the other, he
.partly tried to describe its externally
apparent forms of life for the first
time, to show its relations as they
appear outwardly and partly he had even
to find a nomenclature and corresponding
mental concepts for these phenomena,
i.e., to reproduce them for the first
time in the language and in the thought
process. The one task interests him as
much as the other and since both proceed
independently of one another, this
results in completely contradictory ways
of presentation: the one expresses the
intrinsic connections more or less
correctly, the other, expresses the
apparent connections without any
internal relation.^,,
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In this passage Marx, rather than speaking of the "forms of
appearance" that creep into Smith's account as merely
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unfortunate handicaps on his scientific practice, seems to
intimate that there is a legitimate sense in this dual
purpose— that of presenting the "forms of appearance"
,
"reproducing them in the language and in the thought
process" juxtaposed to a "scientific" explanation of what
gives rise to these appearances. Marx's own work, in fact,
in particular Capital, can be read as embodying these
simultaneously opposed and complementary purooses . While it
is clear from the earlier passages that Marx typically
thought of superficial conceptions/appearances as
diminishing the scientific value of Smith's work, we should
nevertheless keep in mind the sense of legitimacy in the
presentation of "appearances" in political economy suggested
above. This latter sense will be developed shortly in
connection with the "dialectical" nature of political
economy that is, how the work of Smith and Ricardo is
superior to that of other economists in the sense that the
former is "rich" enough to reflect or embody real
contradictions in capitalism, while the latter avoids,
brushes over, or otherwise attempts false resolutions of
contradictions. Further, Smith and Ricardo's work can be
seen to be at once regressive and progressive, in that their
work simultaneously reflects and brings into question "false
appearances" or misconceptions in a way that the vulgar
economists do not.
Marx also quite often attributes many of Ricardo's
mistakes to his neglecting the esoteric demands of his
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In some
science and descending to the level of appearances
instances he is said to "share Smith's confusion" between
"appearance" and "reality"; in others he himself introduces
the common viewpoint of appearances. Regarding Ricardo's
theory of profit, for Instance, Marx observes;
Some of the observations that occur in
Ricardo's writing should have led him to
the distinction between surplus-value
and profit. Because he fails to make
this distinction he appears in some
passages to descend to the vulgar view
—
...the view that profit is a mere
addition over and above the value of the
commodity; for instance when he speaks
of the determination of profit on




However, in a revealing remark Marx puts forth the
observation that, while again Ricardo's work was not
unmarred by occasional reversions to the "vulgar" view
,
he
was sensitive enough to the "dual purposes" that run
s^ch other in Smith's work to appreciate and pick
the esoteric understanding of inner relations begun by
Smith. It was quite the opposite with the vulgar economists
who, Marx often remarks, manipulated this ambivalence in
Smith by here picking up a bit of his "esoteric" advances
and there bringing in the level of appearances, in so doing
totally confusing the two. Their incapacity to distinguish
these two levels in Smith hence allowed them all to
everywhere and "always regard Adam Smith as their base,
whether they follow the esoteric or the exoteric part of his
work or whether, as is almost always the case, they jumble
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up the two. ""^2 Tr, M IIn Marx s view then it was a great
"scientific merit" of Ricardo's to approach Smith's work
with an understanding of these two levels and then to take
up the "esoteric" exposition of the "real relations"
concealed behind "manifest forms"
:
The basis, the starting-point for the
physiology of the bourgeois system— for
the understanding of its internal
organic coherence and life process— is
the determination of value by Isbor—
time. Ricardo starts with this and
forces science to get out of the rut, to
render an account of the extent to which
the other categories— the relations of
production and commerce—evolved and
described by it, correspond to or
contradict this basis, this starting
point; and in general, to examine how
matters stand with the contradiction
between the apparent and the actual
movement of the system .... Closely bound
up with this scientific merit is the
fact that Ricardo exposes and describes
the economic contradiction between the
classes as shown by the intrinsic
relations—and that consequently
political economy perceives, discovers
the root of the historical struggle and
development
.
To recapitulate Marx's view: Smith saw clearly enough
into the mechanisms of capitalist production to attempt to
describe the real, inner relations which must be the
beginning of a scientific understanding of the phenomena;
Smith, however, could never quite detach himself from the
viewpoint of the capitalist, the level of appearances, his
entrancement by which runs alongside his parallel but
contradictory esoteric exposition. Ricardo, nearly alone




work and attempted to direct his own political
economy towards an exposition of the "esoteric-
understanding of capitalism, an attempt not untainted by
reversions to the level of appearances or phenomena. The
vulgar economists, though, recognize no such distinction in
Smith s work, picking and choosing among appearances and
glimpses of real relations to create the most confused but
comfortable viewpoint, and make every effort to avoid the
implications of Ricardo's exposition of inner relations by
remaining within the viewpoint of appearances. in doing so
the vulgar economists in no way exceed but merely reproduce
the common misconceptions of the capitalist agent in
production; in speaking of how the vulgar economist
uncritically accepts the contradictory conception of value
and price of the capitalist, Marx notes, "But here the
vulgar economist is all the more satisfied, because he has
gained the profound insight of the bourgeois, namely, that
P^y® money for labor, and since precisely the
contradiction between the formula and the conception of
value relieves him from all obligation to understand the
latter. The vulgar economists' confusion between
phenomenal forms and inner relations then allows them to
avoid any recognition that this difference is part of
contradictions in capitalism, and hence to avoid any
scientific treatment of real capitalist relations. As Marx
puts vulgar economy's sanctification of "appearances" in
general terms.
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The actual process of appropriationtakes place only in the actualproduction process, behind which lies asa past stage that first formal
transaction in which capitalist andlaborer confront each other as mereowners of commodities, as buyer andseller. For which reason all vulgar
economists ... go no further than that
first formal transaction, precisely in
order by this trick to get rid of the
specific capitalist relation
45
In addition to the way in which the common, capitalist
viewpoint -creeps into" political economy, Marx speaks of
another way such common misconceptions compromise the
integrity of the discipline. In this sense common illusions
are not just transplanted into the work of political
economists, but they are systematized or interpreted in a
pedantic way so as to appear rational. Vulgar political
economists, and to a lesser extent Smith and Ricardo, do not
compromise their science so much by replicating common
notions in their work as by pseudo-rationally systematizing
them in dogma. This interpretation of the problem in
political economy is much more in line with Marx's constant
references to vulgar economy as "apologetic"—viz., the
emphasis is not so much on vulgar economists' reproduction
of the mystified conceptions of the capitalist as it is on
their production of ostensibly rational justifications of
these common notions. A number of Marx's passages bear out
this distinction between the common mystifications of the
capitalist and the ideology produced by vulgar economists to
justify these misconceptions:
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It IS just as natural for the agents ofproduction to feel completely at home inthese estranged and irrational forms ofcapital-interest, land-rent, labor-wages, since these are precisely theforms of illusion in which they moveabout and find their daily occupation.
It is therefore just as natural that
vulgar economy, which is no more than a
didactic, more or less dogmatic,
translation of everyday conceptions of
the actual agents of production, and
which arranges them in a certain
rational order, should see precisely in
this trinity, which is devoid of all
inner connection, the natural and





economy actually does no more
than interpret, systematize and defend
in doctrinaire fashion the conceptions
of the agents of bourgeois production
who are entrapped in bourgeois
production relations. It should not
astonish us, then, that vulgar economy
feels particularly at home in the
estranged outward appearances of
economic relations in which these prima
facie absurd and perfect contradictions
appear and that these relations seem the
more self-evident the more their
internal relationships are concealed
from i t . . .
. ^^
...vulgar economy ... deals with
appearances only, ruminates without
ceasing on the materials long since
provided by scientific economy, and
there seeks plausible explanations of
the most obtrusive phenomena, for
bourgeois daily use, but for the rest,
confines itself to systematizing in a
pedantic way, and proclaiming for
everlasting truths, the trite ideas held
by the self-complacent bourgeoisie with
regard to their own world.
4 o
Political economists are of course themselves partic





by "appearances" are no less ideological than the
mystifications of, for example, the industrial capitalist or
factory owner. What disturbs Marx in the passages above,
however, is the damage done to a science when it is directed
towards making these Illusions more plausible, reinforcing
their credibility, or justifying their supposed legitimacy.
When this happens on such a scale as vulgar economy,
"political economy has reached the end of its scope as a
science", viz., can no longer remain internally animated by
an "esoteric" practice.
• **********
Marx, then, in his mature work understood political
economy, as practiced both by the classical political
economists Smith and Ricardo and by the "herd" of vulgar
economists
,
to be jeopardized as a science in the following
broadly characterized ways
.
The " esoteric" core of the
science of political economy could be supplanted by or
accommodated to external interests, but may involve more
subtle normative values. The scientific character of
political economy is also jeopardized insofar as it
uncritically appropriates "vulgar" misconceptions or
mystifications common to the viewpoint of the agent in
capitalist production— to the extent that it accepts the
"illusions" at the level of "appearances" in the place of an
understanding of the "real, inner relations". Similarly,
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political economy loses its scientific character as it goes
about the business of constructing sometimes elaborate but
ys pedantic, didactic, and pseudo-rational
justifications of these "illusions" given at the level of
appearance, and thereby avoids any exposition of the real
relations behind these manifest forms. These are all senses
in which political economy produces "apologia" rather than
scientific understanding. Though both Smith and Ricardo
fell victim to these sorts of error, Marx of course thought
them far more characteristic of vulgar political economists,
and in fact distinguished the vulgar "herd" from Smith and
Ricardo primarily in terms of the far greater extent they
fell into these errors. There are, however, several other
significant considerations concerning the work of Smith and
Ricardo which Marx took as firmly establishing the great
value of their work and its scientific character, in
contradistinction to vulgar economy. It is these
considerations which establish the "dialect ical " character
of the work of Smith and Ricardo.
For Marx the capitalist system could only be understood
if one has an understanding of the contradictions which form
the basis of capitalist production. Primary among these
contradictions is the antithesis between dead and living
labor, between capital and labor. Any understanding of
these contradictions would necessarily involve the
realization of diametrically opposed class interests. The
vulgar economists, enamored as they were of the
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mystifications and illusions of the capitalist viewpoint,
could only acknowledge these contradictions at the risk of
questioning the legitimacy of these mystifications. Hence
their political economy became on the whole an apologetic
attempt to gloss over or disguise contradictions, "to reason
the contradictory phenomena out of existence"
. In
contrast, Marx saw in Smith and Ricardo's work the
"evocation" of capitalist contradictions. Sometimes they
produced theoretical advances that mirrored or reflected
these contradictions, or that even attempted to come to
terms with them. Sometimes their work contained within it
these contradictions, with no attempt to resolve them.
Other times they seemed unaware that they were trying to
explain in fact contradictory phenomena; the attempt to do
so only rendered their theories internally inconsistent
(eg.. Smith's two contradictory conceptions of value). But
therein lies one of their great scientific merits for Marx.
Whether or not they realized the contradictory nature of the
phenomena they were attempting to explain, or whether or not
they were aware of how such contradictions in reality were
reflected in their theories and rendered them inconsistent.
Smith and Ricardo's commitment to an "esoteric"
understanding, their sensitivity to the real phenomena of
capitalist production, was rich enough so that their work--
consciously or inadvertent ly--gave expression to these
contradictions, and hence insight into the hidden, inner
relations of capitalism. Marx put great store in the
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"dialectical" tension in Smith and Ricardo's work which
allowed oppositions or contradictions in reality to show
through, as against the false seamlessness of the work of
the vulgar economists, who neglected or covered over these
developing contradictions (hence neglected the nature of
capitalist reality) so as to align common misconceptions or
Illusions with an increasingly contradictory reality.
The vulgar economists were on the whole so animated by
an apolotetlc viewpoint, sacrificing any esoteric
understanding to exoteric apologia, that they typically
could attempt to explain capitalist production and its
"absolute contradictions without being in the slightest
degree aware of them" Whenever contradictory economic
pehnomena confronted them as when such contradictions were
suggested or exposlted by Ricardo, they sought a way out of
such confrontation either by substituting "mystified common
appearances" for economic reality or by denying real
oppositions by replacing them with pedantic, pseudo-rational
concepts of their own creation which could themselves be
"unified" in the realm of thought— thus "resolving" the
contradiction in reality. In either case for Marx such
"apologetics consist in the falsification of the simplest
economic relations, and particularly in clinging to the
concept of unity in the face of contradiction", in this way
attempting to "reason the contradictory phenomena out of
existence" . We should look at a few of Marx's passages to
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get a sense of how specific contradictions of capitalism are
denied by vulgar economists.
An understanding of crises in capitalism entails
recognition of the underlying contradictions which give rise
to them. Rather than face those contradictions, vulgar
economists opted to deny the reality of crises of
overproduction-but in effect, denying overproduction in one
form (as a general glut of commodities in the market), and
admitting its existence in another form. The vulgar
economists accomplish this feat not by calling this latter
form what it is—overproduction—but by renaming it "over-
abundance of capital". Marx considers this feat of pedantry
"an attempt to avoid the difficulty of explaining the
phenomenon, by denying it in one form (under one name) in
which it contradicts existing prejudices and admitting it in
a form only in which it becomes meaningless".®^ Such
apologetic sophistry is not limited to erasing the reality
of crises of overproduction, rather it is employed by the
vulgar economists to disguise the nature of any crisis in
century capitalism the underlying contradictions
of which the vulgar economists would otherwise be confronted
For Marx these sophisms in vulgar economy were often
so obvious and shallow as to reveal the reality of the
contradictions they were meant to mystify:
The apologetic phrases used to denv
crises are important in so far as they
always prove the opposite of what they
are meant to prove. In order to deny
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crises, they assert unity where there isconflict and contradiction. They aretherefore important insofar as one cansay that there would be no crises if the
contradictions which they have erased intheir imagination, did not exist infact. But in reality crises existbecause these contradictions exist
Every reason which they put forward
against crisis is an exorcised
contradiction, and, therefore, a real
contradiction, which can cause crises.
The desire to convince oneself of the
nonexistence of contradictions, is at
the same time the expression of a pious
wish that the contradictions, which are
really present, should not exist.
54
Other contradictions essential to capitalism, and hence to
an understanding of its real relations, are treated as
dupl ici tously
, if treated at all, by the vulgar economists.
Smith made a confused distinction between "fixed" and
"circulating" capital, which disguises the real distinction
between constant and variable capital. The vulgar
economists predictably celebrated this thoroughly confused
iriconsis tent Smithian distinction, patching over the
more obvious inconsistencies and preferring to overlook its
inadequacies. Their further mystification of an
already mystified and misleading distinction allowed them to
ignore the real contradiction which it misdescribes:
"Political economy subsequently went still farther by
holding fast not to the antithesis between variable and
constant capital but to the antithesis between fixed and
circulating capital as the essential and sole
55delimitation." With similar dismissal of any real
economic phenomena, the apologists assert a unity between
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supply and demand, and an Identity between production and
consumption. In all these cases, then, as with the primary
contradiction between capital and labor, the vulgar
economists produce apologia by means of which a
"contradiction is denied, by abstracting from
contradiction which really exists in production."®®
Smith and Ricardo were of course not unaffected by the
mystified appearances of capitalism which veil inner, real
relations; Marx's passages discussed in an earlier section
should be evidence enough of their occasional retreat into
the level of "appearances" to the misfortune of their better
"esoteric" practice. One can find in Marx's texts however
strong evidence that he felt that the underlying
contradictions of capitalism find their way into Smith and
Ricardo s work in a very different manner than with the
vulgar economists. As suggested above, where the vulgar
economists are not completely ignorant of contradictions,
they make great leaps of pedantry and pseudo-rational theory
to avoid their acknowledgement or to "reason them out of
existence". On the other hand Smith and Ricardo's work,
while often falling short of explicitly articulating
contradictions of capitalist production, is rich enough to
"evoke" or embody these contradictions in a way Marx thought
scientifically meritorious.
We saw earlier how Marx understood Smith's work to be
animated by a dual purpose—a "certain comprehensiveness"
which gives his work its "great charm". Smith's work
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and
attempts simultaneously to present things boldly
comprehensively as they appear to the agent of capitalist
production and to reveal the more profound, inner
connections underlying capitalist phenomena. These two
(contradictory) tasks interest Smith equally and are,
according to Marx, both justified: "The one expresses the
intrinsic connections more or less correctly, the other,
with the same justification—and without any connection to
the first method of approach—expresses the apparent
connections without any internal relation
. Tt nr,
sense fortunate that Smith himself was apparently unaware of
these dual directions in his work. Had he been aware of the
contradictions between them, he may have made some effort to
render them consistent; this is precisely the temptation and
the error by which the "vulgarians" diluted political
economy, as they wished away any part of capitalist reality
which would have made theoretical understanding- contradict
the mystified appearances they were committed to. As it
was, though. Smith's desire for comprehensiveness produced
in his work an uneasy, "charming" but always revealing
"consximmation" of appearance and reality. In Marx's view
Smith's contradictory commitment to presenting both resulted
in some unmistakably great advances in political economy,
though that commitment also contributed to his theoretical
shortcomings. In reviewing Smith's handling of the law of
value, Marx observes:
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It IS Adam Smith's great merit that itIS just in the chapters of Book I r TheWealth of Nations] where he passes fromsimple commodity exchange and its law ofvalue to... the origin of surplus value—that he feels some flaw has emerged. Hesenses that somehow—whatever the causemay be, and he does not grasp what itIS in the actual result the law issuspended .... His meri t is tha t he
emphasizes and it obviously perplexeshim— that with the accumulation of
capital and the appearance of property
in land.
.
.something new occurs. it ishis theoretical strength that he feelsand stresses this contradiction, just as
it is his theoretical weakness that the
contradiction shakes his confidence in
the general law... that he does not
perceive how this contradiction




Marx goes on to say in this passage how Ricardo is ahead of
Smith in that he is not confused by contradictions, viz., is
not confused as Smith is by the nature of labor power as a
commodity. But then Marx notes how Ricardo is "behind Smith
in that he [Ricardo] does not even suspect that this
presents a problem, and therefore the specific development
which the law of value undergoes with the formation of
capital does not for a moment puzzle him or even attract his
attention. Finally, Marx concludes the passage by noting
that "it is at the same time this deep insight of Adam
Smith's that makes him irresolute and uncertain, cuts the
firm ground from under his feet..." and which prevents him
from presenting a consistent theoretical view of capitalism
comparable to Ricardo's. What should be emphasized here is
the significance of Smith's puzzlement, his willingness to
entertain perplexity in search of an answer, his suspension
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as to stress
of the consistency of his theoretical view so
the contradiction he is grappling with, even though he
doesn't know how the contradiction is to be resolved or even
understood. in his treatment of the problem of value,
Smith's dual purpose—he wouldn't let go of the way things
appear, nor would he abandon the results a scientific
understanding of underlying connections had brought him--
allows a contradiction to remain in his theory (in Marx's
words, a "concealed association of ideas") which reflects an
actual contradiction of capitalism. It is in this sense
that Marx speaks of the kind of "mistake" Smith makes--
dialectical ly reflecting the tensions within a
contradiction to "rest... on a deeper, a true foundation".®*^
The mistakes of the vulgar economists rest on no such true
foundation, as their theories bear no sign of the real,
underlying truth of contradictions. Ricardo owed the
genesis of his more consistent understanding of the problem
of value to the tensions left unresolved in but made
apparent by Smith's treatment of value. The law of value is
not the only problem whose solution Smith contributed to by
bringing out (even though he failed to resolve or explain)
contradictions of capitalism within his theory. Marx
observed that in general, "Adam Smith's contradictions are
of significance because they contain problems which, it is




On occasion, however, Ricardo failed to
implicit challenge posed by Smith's "dialectical" raising of
P lem. In a later discussion, Marx points out how
Ricardo corrects some mistakes of Smith's, again In his
analysis of value, but then goes on to Ignore the larger
problem which Smith ralses-vlz., how the law of value seems
not to apply when materialized labor Is exchanged for living
labor. Ricardo therefore overlooks the other complications
in the law raised by Smith's oppositions and henceforth
treats the law as rehabilitated:
But Ricardo has by no means therebysolved the problem which is the realcause of Adam Smith's contradiction....
Ricardo simply answers that this is how
matters are in capitalism. Not only
does he fail to solve the problem; he
does not even realize its existence in
Adam Smith's work .... Since the
difference [living labor—materialized
labor] is only a matter of form, why
should a law apply to one and not the
other: Ricardo does not answer—he does
not even raise this question. . . .This
weakness in Ricardo's discourse. . .has
contributed to the disintegration of his
school, and led to the prooosition of
absurd hypotheses.-,.
But just as this aspect of Ricardo's work—his suggestion
that the value question was closedea..^^^ corrupted and
exploited by vulgar economists, so were aspects of Smith's
work. Much of the manipulation by vulgar economists of
Smith's work in fact can be traced to his esoteric/exoteric
ambivalence, which had been illuminating for economists such
as Ricardo and Marx. As mentioned earlier. Smith's constant
shift between speaking of things as they appear in
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capitalism and searching for their real, inner connections
merely allowed the vulgar economists to freely and
superficially pick and choose among the illusive elements of
appearance and the underlying reality, resulting in their
utter confusion between the two. Ricardo, on the other
hand, found this confusion dissatisfying, albeit revelatory
of underlying reality needing explanation, and made a
"determined break with the contradiction that pervades Adam
Smith's work with its esoteric and exoteric method of
approach" in order to get political economy out of its
r\i ^ ^ u •Hoping then to dispense with Smith's constant
reversion to the level of manifest appearances, the
perversity to which he was alerted by Smith's work itself,
Ricardo endeavored "to elucidate how far a science which in
fact only reflects and reproduces the manifest forms of the
process, and therefore also how far these manifestations
themselves, correspond to the basis on which the inner
coherence, the actual physiology of bourgeois society
rests. . .to examine how matters stand between the apparent
and the actual movement of the system."®^
Ricardo s work however exhibits the same tension
between the two sides of a contradiction that Marx found
valuable in Smith but which Ricardo himself thought he ought
avoid. Ricardo understood clearly enough the antithesis
between dead and living labor to dispense with the "trinity"
wages /prof i t /rent beloved by his predecessors and recognize




capitalist production. 's understanding of this
antithesis was deep enough for him to suggest contradictory
tendencies-the tendency in capitalist production to employ
as little labor as possible in order to produce the same or
a greater amount of commodities, and the tendency to employ
the largest amount of laborers as the surplus value grows as
the quantity of labor employed increases. The first
tendency puts workers on the street and makes a portion of
the population redundant, while the second absorbs them
again. Hence the worker regards the development of the
productive power of his or her labor as inimical to his or
her own interests, while the capitalist treats the worker as
an element to be eliminated from production. In Marx's
words, "these are the contradictions with which Ricardo
struggles..." in his treatment. However, while Ricardo
succeeds in giving voice to the two sides of this
contradiction, he fails to appreciate just how contradictory
these tendencies are, that is, contradictory in their very
nature, leading to inevitable historical conflict. While
Ricardo correctly understands the conflict in the threat the
development of production itself poses to the rate of
profit
,
There is, indeed, something deeper
behind it, of which he [Ricardo] is only
vaguely aware. It comes to the surface
here in a purely economic way--i.e.,
. . .from the standpoint of capitalist
production itself— that it has its
barrier, that it is not absolute, but
only a historical mode of production
86
corresponding to a definite limited
SaSlrem
'development of the materialrequir ents of production.
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in spite of whether a theorist realizes the full historical
development of contradictory tendencies, in spite of whether
a theorist even recognizes the contradictory nature of the
phenomena described, if he or she remains sensitive enough
to the real (contradictory) nature of phenomena, the
resulting theory can valuably "reflect" or "embody" these
real contradictions. This is the sense in which Smith's and
Ricardo's work is rich enough to "evoke" oppositions
otherwise unarticulated, and which lends their work a
dialectical character; it is also the sense in which the
vulgar economists produced only a poverty of theory, as they
sought to "reason" real contradictions out of existence.®®
In contrasting Mill, the would-be Ricardian disciple who
began the vulgarization of Ricardian theory, with his
"master" Ricardo, Marx hints at this sense in which a
theorist's engagement with real contradictions—as opposed
to their mystification in apologia--can generate a
theoretical foundation which embodies or dialectically
reflects the inner relations and contradictions of
capitalism, in spite of the theorist's lack of conscious
recognition of these contradictions:
With the master what is new and
significant develops vigourously amid
the "manure" of contradictions out of
the contradictory phenomena. The
underlying contradictions themselves
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testify to the richness of the lix/irirrfoundation from which the theory itselfdeveloped. it is different wi^h?hedisciple [Mill].
69
These considerations. then, suggest how Marx saw moments
in Smith and Ricardo's work that were at once both
progressive and regressive. Sometimes advance and
retrogression are contained In the same term, as we saw
earlier regarding Smith's f ixed/clrcuiating capital
distinction. Marx says explicitly how this distinction both
positively and negatively affects the understanding of
political economy:
In Smith's. .. [distinction between]
and "circulating
capital
, the progress consists in theterm capital", the concept of which isgeneralized, and becomes independent of
the special consideration for the
agricultural" sphere of application ofthe physiocrats; the retrogression
consists in the fact that "fixed" and
"circulating" are regarded as the over-




Rather more frequently Marx reads Smith and Ricardo as
embodying both advance and retrogression in the following
sense: In their work they simulataneously reflect and bring
into question the manifest and latent nature of capitalism.
As we saw above with the passages concerning Smith's "dual
purpose in expositing both the intrinsic connections and
the phenomena as they appear in capitalism, theory may
reflect and bring into question a viewpoint if it is richly
enough engaged with the reality of capitalism to juxtapose
that understanding to the manifest and mystified forms of
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appearance. But without that juxtaposition, "mere
reflection" of mystified appearances in no way contributes
to the progress of scientific understanding— "mere
^orms, and their pedantic
g'timation by pseudo-rational theoretizations
, are
precisely the misfortune of the vulgar economists. Rather,
for political economy to progress— in the sense of
questioning mystified forms towards reaching a "demystified"
understanding of the underlying reality-there had to be a
critical balance between the mere reflection or reproduction
of appearance and the understanding of real
interconnections. And for Marx this precise balance is
historically determined. Thus Marx could speak of how Adam
Smith's aim of comprehensiveness—detai 1 ing both the
apparent and the real interconnections, though Smith himself
of course was never really quite aware that this was what he
was doing—was historically " justified"— just as was
Ricardo's break with Smith's ambivalence. Political economy
at the time of Smith had not yet made any real progress in
developing its own critical, esoteric vocabulary for or
distance from the phenomena that were its object; hence
Smith could create the possibility for such progress in
political economy by trying "to describe its [bourgeois
society's] externally apparent forms of life for the first
time, to show its relations as they appear outwardly and
Partly he had even to find a nomenclature and corresponding




for the first time in the language and in the thought
process". S^l^h struck a balance between "reproducing
outward forms" and yet bringing them into question by
juxtaposing them contradictorily to esoteric understanding
of their real underlying relations.
There was enough of this tension embodied in Smith's
work to suggest to Ricardo the nature of the real
contradictions underlying the apparent contradictions in
theory, and to allow him to make scientific advances on the
basis of this understanding. Many of the aspects of the
real, inner relations of capitalism that Ricardo had
inadequately explained were similarly reflected in a
corresponding tension in his work. This is where Marx took
up and the vulgar economists left off. Marx took the
contradictions left unresolved or inadequately explained in
Ricardo, which represent real contradictions in capitalism,
as his own starting point, while the vulgar economists made
every effort to cover over, disguise, or further mystify the
tensions in Ricardo's work, and hence to remain ignorant of
the real contradictions in capitalism which generate them.
Thus Marx speaks scathingly of the vulgar economists who,
after succeeding in overthorowing the Ricardian school,
collect the "best" elements of political economy from
nonsensically disparate sources so as to piece together
ostensibly seamless theory— "in doing this contradictions do
not matter". What matters to them is not any singular
attention to capitalism's contradictions but rather the need
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to gloss over any suggestion that such contradictions exist.
In erasing these contradictions, their "systems are thus
made insipid, their edge is taken off and they are
peacefully gathered together in a miscellany" . 12 it is
exactly this "edge" in theory Marx refers to as a great
scientific merit, on the other hand, with Smith: "it is his
theoretical strength that he feels and stresses this
contradiction. .. [even though] he does not perceive how this
contradiction arises o • •
t
Similarly, Marx notes "it is at
the same time this deep insight of Adam Smith's [the
unresolved difficulties in the law of value] that makes him
irresolute and uncertain, [and] cuts the firm ground from
under his feet..." even as it prevents him from achieving a
consistent theoretical unity Thno mus for Marx a properly
dialectical science must not neglect the fact that the
greater generality or unity of a theoretical presentation
can sometimes neglect or sacrifice the "edges" of the object
studied, the historically determined ambiguity of particular
phenomena, or, particularly in political economy, the
peculiar elements of certain phenomena whose contradictory
nature has yet to be recognized or understood in its real,
inner connections. If a science is to remain sensitive to
these, it must maintain a dialectical tension between its
need for theoretical unity and the sometimes mercurial
reality of the phenomena it studies.
A couple of other aspects of this dialectical tension
in the work of Smith and Ricardo should be mentioned here.
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Because their work contains both truth and falsity
(mystified appearances on the one hand, underlying
contradictions in reality on the other), it is -rich enough
to make a critique worthwhile". This is a notion we see
developed in Adorno, who recognized that the critique of
ideology must have as its object material "rich enough" in
contradictions to bring out the moments of truth and
falsity. Marx saw in a corresponding way that the
shallowness and complete superficiality of vulgar political
economy put limits on what scientific value their work could
advance. Further, when theory dialectically contains
opposing tensions, as with the work of Smith and Ricardo,
their own theory suggests insights or understanding that
they themselves didn't acknowledge. Marx frequently speaks
of this factor concerning Smith: "Smith flees from his own
theory. ... , Now if Adam Smith had welded together the
snatches of thought which forced themselves upon him at
first in the study of the reproduction of that which he
calls fixed, and now of that which he calls circulating
capital, he would have arrived at the following result....'";
"If Adam Smith had continued his analysis to this point, but
little would have been lacking for the solution of the whole
problem." And with Ricardo: "In the critique of Ricardo,
we have to separate what he himself failed to separate.";
"Ricardo does not dwell on the conclusion which follows from
his own illustrations."; "Some of the observations that
occur in Ricardo's writing should have led him to the
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dastinction between surplus-value and profit. "76
We should take notice of one other characteristic of
political economy which Is Implicit In Marx. As we saw
earlier, the young Marx was highly critical of an idealist
tendency he saw In philosophy and political economy,
reserving the term "ideology" for this brand of idealism.
In this early analysis he took his contemporaries to task
for remaining at the level of the "ideal", forsaking any
recognition they might otherwise have had of the nature of
real, material conditions for their empty and meaningless
abstractions. Marx took this critique to heart in his own
analysis of political economy. The character of social
formations in Europe had changed drastically between 1779
and 1830. The claims the bourgeoisie made of itself at the
extreme ends of this period may have been similar in form,
but were drastically different in character. The
bourgeoisie when it was a rising class in fact could be said
to be "revolutionary" in their struggle against the landed
aristocracy; "universal" in virtue of the coincidence of
their interests with the interests of non-ar istocratic
groups, both united against those of the aristocracy;
"progressive" in their favoring the liberation of humankind
from the domination of the landed aristocracy. The measure
of truth in these claims was to be diminished as the
bourgeoisie lost its aura as the "end of history", replaced
the domination of feudalism with a new barbarism and
slavery, consolidated its interests to form a narrow class
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expense
capable of realizing its
of the developing working
formerly antagonistic
contradictions in these
less visible before 1830
;
to partial truth. These
were legitimate insofar
own interests only at the
class, and allied itself with the
unproductive professions. The
claims and assumptions were much
hence they had a plausible claim
liberating and progressive claims
as they were historicized to a
certain stage in the development of capitalism. They became
less legitimate as they were generalized and overextended to
be •natural truths" about all stages of capitalist
development. as it became clear the bourgeoisie had
developed into a narrow class with interests of its own
which are realizable only at the expense of the working
class
.
Marx saw a parallel change in political economy.
Smith, for instance, could take a correctly critical stance
against the clergy, legal profession, etc., as they were
"unproductive" in the sense that they were then allied with
the landowners and aristocracy and their interests therefore
conflicted with the development of capitalist production.
The vulgar economists, on the other hand, wrote at a time
when the bourgeoisie was already an entrenched class and had
allied itself with the unproductive professions. Their
analysis of, for example, productive labor, no longer had a
scientific, esoteric understanding and thereby descended to
the level of apologia. Hence Marx understood that an
adequate critique of political economy could not remain just
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must come to understand these
at the level of ideas, but
icieas in terms of how they operate in society, and in terms
of how a social formation and the changes it undergoes make
up the reality that forms the basis of those ideas, these
ideas, in turn, can only be evaluated against this social
reality and its contradictions.
Finally, how are we' to evaluate Marx's claim that,
alone among his contemporaries, his own work was rigidly
scientific? He took the vulgar economists to task in that
they subordinated any scientific problematic they might
claim to apologia for a particular class's interests. But
Marx attacked political economists, and philosophers on the
left as well, for the same error— the adoption of an
"exoteric" viewpoint in the place of any "esoteric",
scientific perspective. Nineteenth century socialists and
communists, Marx felt, replaced a scientific foundation with
"exoteric" values. Proudhon, for example, a "true
socialist", merely imported his own class-based, petit-
bourgeois values into his work, such as his distrust of
collective organization, adoration of the rural life, belief
in the sanctity of marriage and private property, etc.
These values animate Proudhon's viewpoint, rather than any
scientific foundation. According to Marx, then, theorists
of the left made the same error and were therefore as
unscientific as the vulgar political economists:
^i*^®^senth century socialists and communists. . .either
themselves adopt the standpoint of bourgeois economy or
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contest It fro. Its own standpoint . "78
influence of exoteric values in the work of Smith and
Ricardo, whom he admired for their scientific vlewpolnt-
their exoteric values didn’t replace scientific
understanding as the foundation of their viewpoint, as was
so with the vulgar economists. Marx saw his own work as
making a break with vulgar political economy and nineteenth
century socialism and communism inasmuch as these were
exoterically value- based viewpoints, while he took his own
thought as having scientific understanding as its
foundation. The question of whether this is the sort of
"epistemological break" Louis Althusser imagines the later
Marx to have made, and whether the dialectical nature of
classical political economy developed above is consistent
with Althusser's notion of a marxist science unencumbered by
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Marx, Capital, v. II (New York: International
Publishers, 1967), p. 225.
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Chapter III:
Althusser: Theory and Theoreticism
represent the foundinq
Zom^nt or
discipline, the foundingf a science--and hence a realevent, a theoretical revolution, simulta-neously rejecting the classical political
tdeoT^ Hegelian and FeuerbachianI logies of its p r e h i s t o r y - - t h
e
absolute beginning of the history of ascience? j
[ Reading Capital
, p. 15 ]
This explains to us why Marx could notpossibly have become Marx except byfounding a theory of history and aphilosophy of the historical distinction
between ideology and science.
[ Reading Capital
, p. 17]
Louis Althusser's work over two decades has had a great
impact on several fields of marxist theory. His
"interventions" range from his contributions within marxist
historiography and aesthetics, his much discussed
"symptomatic" method of reading Marx's texts, his variations
on marxist themes found in his use of the concepts of
overdetermination, effectivity, structures in dominance.
Generalities I, ll. III, the Bachelardian-inspired notion of
a problematic, etc., and, not least, his revival of
Of absolute
discussion of a marxist theory of ideology,
centrality to Althusser’s work on ideology is his
insistence, throughout his work but in a variety of
different forms, on ideology’s contradistinction to science;
but his is just where an evaluation of Althusser’s analysis
of Ideology gets quite complicated. Any proper evaluation
of Althusser’s remarks on ideology must take into account
several somewhat idiosyncratic aspects of Althusser’s work.
One must give an account of the accuracy and legitimacy of
Althusser’s reading of the role of ideology in the original
Marx texts, as Althusser insists a properly marxist theory
of ideology is only to be found on a close (and
"symptomatic") reading of these texts, and continually
measures his own claims against what he reads there.
Further, one can only speak with difficulty of any unified
Althusserian account# of ideology, as his own texts varv
widely—his early views are scattered throughout a variety
of essays in For Marx and Reading Capital (1961-1965) , the
important 1969 essay, "Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses" addresses itself to many aspects of ideology
not directly confronted in the earlier work, and the later
work Essays in Self-Criticism subjects his previous views on
ideology to some significant criticisms. The shortcomings
and virtues of the earlier positions must first be sorted
out before we can speak to the significance of his self-
criticisms and determine the legitimacy of the new analysis
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suggested there.
Throughout Althusser's work one finds as the
cornerstone of his "symptomatic" reading of Marx the
insistence on the "epistemological break" or rupture that is
to radically separate the work of the young and the mature
Marx. The concept of this break is the "indispensable
theoretical minimum" that signals "the mutation of a pre-
scientific problematic into a scientific problematic."^ The
pre-scientif 1 C, or "ideological" period is to include Marx's
Early Works" (1830-1844) and the "Works of the Break"— the
Theses ^ Feuerbach , and The German Ideology (both 18450.
Marx s "scientific" period subsumes the "Transitional
Works "--the Communist Manifesto , Pover ty of Philosophy,
Wages Price and Profit , etc. ( 1845-1857 ) —and the "Mature
Works" (1857-1883) . The works of the pre-1845 Marx are all
written under the shadow of an "ideological" problematic
—
either the liberal-rationalist (or Kant ian-Fich tean) period
before 1842, the communalist-rationalist moment (1842-1845),
or the Hegel ian-idealist problematic ( 1844 Manuscripts )
.
After 1845 Marx's problematic becomes a scientific one,
though the transitional works are said to sometimes lack
awareness of their own theoretical problematic or to
occasionally revert to earlier, "ideological" moments.
A minimal sense in which Althusser's "epistemological
break" provides a reading of Marx is obvious insofar as it
calls attention to the varied subjects and perspectives of
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the texts written before Marx formulated his sustained
critique of political economy. But in this minimal sense it
comes very close to being a truism, unobjectionable to most
commentators both before and after Althusser, to say that
Marx's very early works--say, T]^ C ritiqu e of Hegel '
s
Philosophy of Right or ^ Holy Fami ly—rather seriously
differ in perspective and object from the later political
economy.^ Of course this "epistemological rupture" does a
lot more work for Althusser than just this. To begin with,
the concept of the break is to establish how completely
different even the best of the classical political
economists' work is from the mature Marx's political
economy how they seemed to look for answers to questions
they couldn't pose, how they weren't aware or critical of
their own "problematic", how the labored in an ideological
world in contrast to the scientific world of political
economy that has Marx as its creator. Indeed, the
theoretical acknowledgement and appreciation of the
Althusserian break is indispensable for an understanding
even of the meaning of Capital ; for Althusser it is
impossible to "...establish the differential specificity of
the object of Capital with any precision without a critical
and epistemological reading which assigns the site where
Marx separates himself theoretically from his predecessors,
and determines the meaning of this break.
Althusser also sees the break as drawing an equally
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important distinction between Marx's early and late works.
The 1844 Manuscripts are Althusser's favorite target here,
as they are said (m several essays in For Marx) to be
animated by a humanist spirit or Ideology, later realized as
such by Marx and consequently condemned by him. Many of the
concepts treated in the Manuscripts --private property, the
movement of capital, the division of labor, money, the
alienation of the laborer, emancipation, etc.—may at first
sight seem familiar marxlst territory, but Althusser reads
them as having a debased and thoroughly unmarxist meaning in
that work, an emptiness which cannot become clear until
Capital
;
[These categories have] a meaning which
philosophical , and when I
philosophical l am using it in the same
that to which Marx later linked
an absolute condemnation . For rigour and
dialectic are worth no more than themeaning they serve and add lustre to.
One day we shall have to study this text
in detail and give a word-by-word
explanation of it; discuss the
theoretical status and theoretical role
assigned to the key concept of alienated
labor ; examine this notion's conceptual
field; and recognize that it does fill
the role Marx then assigned it, the role
of original basis; but that it can also
fill this role so long as it receives it
as a mandate and commission from a ^oTe
concept ion of Man which can derive from
the essence ojt Man the necessity and
content of the familiar economic
concepts. In short, we shall have to
discover beneath these terms imminently
awaiting a future meaning, the meaning
that still keeps them prisoners of a
philosophy that is exercising its last
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prestige and power over them ... beneathphilosophy;s relation of radicaldomination over a content soon to~be“comiradically independent , the Marx furthestfr^ Marx is this Marx, the MarjT on thebrink, on the eve, on the threshold
...So a recognition of the
£hj.J.osophy at work in the Manuscripts
necessarily returns us to o^ poInT'of
departure ; the encounter with political
economy, forcing us to ask the question:
what is the reality that Marx encountered
in the terms of this economics? Theeconomy itself? Or more likely an
economic ideology inseparable from the
economists' theories 1 .
Thus, for Althusser, not only does the presence of the break
put Marx's mature work into a completely different category
from that of classical political economics, but it reveals
how radically separated is the young Marx, characterized by
an ideological" perspective, from the mature Marx. It was
the theoretical labors of the break that "led him from
ideological theoretical practice to scientific theoretical
practice"; it took the emergence of Marx's scientific
political economy to generate "the overthrow of the still
ideological theoretical base on which he had lived (i.e.,
thought) until then."^
A third distinction Althusser draws out of his
"symptomatic" reading of the break in Marx's texts is to
allow a characterization of the sharp divergence of science
and ideology general , a divergence of great political,
practical, and theoretical importance for Althusser. Early
on in Reading Capital Althusser announces that his project
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of reading" Marx in no small measure depends on a thorough
understanding of how an ideological conjuncture is the
prehistory of a science, how ideology forms the social text
out of which a science must emerge, how ideology can
continue to engage and threaten a developing science. The
emergence of Marx's political economy out of classical
political economy is of course Althusser's favored example,
but he constantly reiterates that the supposed move from
Ideology to science displayed in this shift from classical
political economy to Marx is a general and necessary feature
characterizing the emergence of any genuine scientific
discipline from its "prehistory":
To grasp this necessity we must
grasp the very special and paradoxical
logic that leads to this production,
i.e., the logic of the condition! of tTie
production of knowledges, whether they
belong to the history of a branch of
still ideological knowledge, or to a
branch of knowledge attempting to
constitute itself as a science or already
established as a science....
Even the theoretically essential and
practically decisive distinction between
science and ideology gets some protection
from this against the dogmatist or
scientistic temptations which threaten
it— since in this work of investigation
and conceptualization we have to
learn... to treat the ideology which
constitutes the prehistory of a science,
for example, as a real history with its
own laws and as the prehistory whose real
confrontation with other technical
practices and other ideological or
scientific acquisitions was capable, in a
specific theoretical conjuncture, of
producing the arrival of a science, not
as its goal, but as its surprise. The
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force us to pose theproblem of the conditions of theepistemological rupture' whichinaugurates each science ... cons iderablyincreases our task. The fact that justas we are studying this problem we haveto think (in a conceptually novel way)the relation between a science and theIdeology which gave rise to it... wouldisconcert us, were we not forewarned ofthe nature of the object of knowledge,
which can only exist in the form ofIdeology at the moment of constitution ofthe science which is going to produce
knowledge from it in the specific mode
that defines it.r
Althusser s early remarks on ideology, then, scattered
throughout fading Capital and For are to be found
within the context of these three claims in the broader
Althusserian attempt to generate his "symptomatic" reading
of Marx's texts: the epistemological break which separates
the young and old Marx, the scientific revolution
represented in the shift of problematic from Smith and
Ricardo and other classical political economists to Marx,
and the general outline of the rupture that is to herald the
birth of a new science, and mark it off and protect it from
its pre-scient if ic (ideological) prehistory against which it
arose. Again, these arguments are all set against the
larger background of Althusser's project of providing an
ambitious "reading" of Marx, in behalf of which Althusser
devotes considerable and specific attention to several of
the more important Marx texts; it isn't until his later work
(viz., "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses") that he
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g s to consider (or recast) the question of Ideology in
terms of his own that are not intended primarily as
exposition of Marx's views on the subject. Before we come
to consider the science/ideology picture, supposedly
descended from Marx, which Althusser draws in these# early
essays, however, we must first observe— in keeping with one
of Althusser's own announced heuristics of textual
interpretatlon-what the "absences" in Althusser's essays
tell us. For all Althusser's abiding concern for paying the
closest attention to texts, for listening to their silences
as well as to what they say very loudly, for critically
discerning the sometimes discrete, various, or contradictory
voices through which an author speaks, there is a glaring
silence and omission in his survey of Marx on science and
Ideology. To appreciate the enormity of this omission we
must first remind ourselves of a few central aspects of
Althusser's approach. It was Althusser's work in the early
1960's which significantly contributed to refocusing the
marxist debate on ideology to rethink the concept of
ideology primarily in terms of its contradistinction to
science. To grasp this "theoretically necessary and
practically decisive distinction between science and
ideology" for Althusser it was necessary to closely and
carefully examine the rupture represented in the radical
break between Marx and the tradition of political economy he
came out of. But here is precisely where the Althusserian
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Althusser
project of reading Marx on ideology goes awry:
never seriously examines the roughly 2,000 pages of the
three volumes of Tlieories of Surplus Value , always intended
by Marx to make up the fourth volume of Capital , and hence
fails by the standard of his own desideratum of looking to
Marx's own critiques of the political economy of his time to
understand how a (new) science must break with and
contradict its ideological prehistory. The volumes of
Theories of Surpj^us VajLue are Marx's exhaustive
reconstruction and critical study of his predecessors and,
as suggested in the previous chapter, are rich with insights
into how Marx viewed the discipline and his own project in
that context; Theories of Surplus Value would naturally be
the first place to look if one insists important theoretical
concerns turn on and are to be discovered in Marx's critical
reviews of political economists. On the one hand, if one
accepts Althusser's broad schema of the "break" in Marx's
thought one can dismiss the import of Marx's views on
ideology (and science) in his works of the early 1840's
since, according to the way the "break" divides up the
texts, Marx before The German I.deo_logy had not yet
"over throw [n] ... the still ideological theoretical base on
which he had lived (i.e., thought) until then."^ The notion
of the break thus allows one to consider theoretically
insignificant because themselves ideological the ways the
early Marx thought ideology (eg., as descriptive of empty.
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meaningless idealist abstractions in writers such as Bruno
Bauer, Stirner, Proudhon, etc.) which I surveyed in the
first chapter. On the other hand, the schema of the break
makes all the more damning Althusser's neglect of Theories
of ^rplus Value as a text, as it was written in 1861-1863
and is thereforeswuarely within the period of "Mature Works"
(1857-1883) the time when, as Althusser would have it, Marx
was unquestionably writing science and not ideology. By
Althusser's own criteria— as a post-break work of mature
science from which can be gleaned Marx's considered views on
his own science and the ideology of its prehistory—Theories
of Surplus Value should be an irreproachable text, and yet
is relatively unmentioned by Althusser. Furthermore, in the
occasional passages where Althusser makes reference to
Theories of Surplus Value , he either misses some of the more
important aspects of Marx's views or uncritically
appropriates some of the less defensible and more
problematic claims suggested there by Marx.
The procedure I will follow, then in reconstructing and
analyzing Althusser's views on science and ideology will be
the following necessarily somewhat patchwork approach.
First, in light of my claim above that Althusser either
neglects or misreads Theories of Surplus Value as a
definitive text in studying this area of Marx's thought, and
out of fairness to Althusser, I will closely examine the few
passages in which he makes specific reference to this text.
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Through this survey I will bring attention both to the
valuable aspects of Marx's views in Theories of Surplus
Y^e (noted in the previous chapter) which Althusser
overlooks or ignores, and to some of the weaker claims
suggested there by Marx and taken over by Althusser. After
this preliminary discussion of Althusser's relationship to
this specific text, we will then be in a position to look at
some of the larger difficulties with Althusser's view which
are not so closely tied to the question of textual veracity
to Marx.
In one of two passages in Reading Capital in which he
addresses at any length the significance of Theories of
Surplus Value , Althusser takes note of how "Marx assesses
his debt to his predecessors and therefore estimates what is
positive in their thought (with respect to his own
discovery) in two distinct forms which emerge very clearly
in Theories of Surplus Value For Althusser one of the
ways Marx acknowledges the achievements of his predecessors
is by taking note of the occasional--and always very
isolated and non-systemat ic—concept they generated or
refined, and which Marx found to be useful in getting closer
to a correct problematic;
On the one hand , he pays homage to
one or another of his predecessors for
having isolated and analyzed an important
concept, even if the words that express
this concept are still caught in the trap
of linguistic confusion or ambiguity. In
this way he registers the concept of
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value in Petty, the concept of surplus-
He Physiocrats, etc.then makes allowances for isolatedconceptual gains, usually extracting themfrom the confusion of a stillinadequate terminology
.
g
Althusser then notes what he considers to be the two closely
related features of genuine (marxist) science made available
to us in Marx#'s discussion: the reduction of the phenomena
to the essence, and the production of "systematic theory"
which establishes the "internal connection" linking together
these revealed essences. Althusser's remarks on these
points are worth quoting at length here:
On t^ other [hand], he stresses another meritwhich does not involve any particular detailed gain(any concept) but the 'scientific' mode of
treatment of political economy. Two features seem
o him to be discriminatory in this respect. Thefirst, in a very classical spirit that might
perhaps be called Galilean, concerns the scientificattitude itself: the method which brackets
sensory appearances..., in other words, all those
economic categories from the 'everyday life' which,
at the end of Capi t a
1
, Marx says is the equivalent
^ religion'. The effect of this bracketing is
to unveil the hidden essence of the phenomena,
their essential inwardness. For Marx, the science
of political economy, like every other science,
depends on this reduction of the phenomenon to the
essence, or, as he puts it, in an explicit
comparison with astronomy, of the 'apparent
movement to the real movement ' . . .Howev"e^7 thTs^
partial reduction is not enough to constitute the
science. At this point the second feature
intervenes. A science is a systematic theory which
embraces the totality of its object and seizes the
'internal connection' which links together the
'reduced' essences of all economic phenomena...
Smith's unforgivable weakness was that he wanted to
think of as having a single origin objects of a
different nature: both true (reduced) 'essences',
and also crude phenomena not reduced to their
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tharr^r necess?tl-\esi%? ^ —
the exoterir (Which unTt'’"^




Of 'essences' and -^Hde' phenomena!!
"^^‘^"•^tlcity
essence phenomenon to the
u^itv of the
'concept), the Interna!^ essence (the systemat icity of theconcepts unified behind their concepts)/ theL
Marx'*
positive determinations which, inconstitute the conditions for the
.-^TaVVh^or^/^^^^^ resu//o/:
Several serious problems arise from these
interpretations Althusser adopts. m this passage several
things are tied together which either are not to be found in
this form in Marx's texts (and specifically Theories of
— Va]^, which Althusser here claims to be expositing)
or, whatever link they have to Marx, are weak arguments for
characterizing the authenticity of a science. The uses to
which Althusser puts the contrast between esoteric and
exoteric interests, the distinction between essence and
phenomenon, and the supposedly distinguishing character of
the "systemat icity" of a science are all suspicious here.
First of all, we should recall for a moment Marx's uses of
the terms "exoteric" and "esoteric" discussed in the
preceding chapter. 11 In brief, the "esoteric" refers to
interests of understanding and explanation internal to a
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discipline, while a discipline's purpose and method are said
to be jeopardized when they are directed and circumscribed
Y the exoteric interests of a viewpoint or purpose which
falls outside that science. For Marx of course the
intervention of exoteric interests could be witnessed most
clearly in the apologia for the interests of capital which
dominated the political economy of his time (as when, for
example, a primary interest in explaining and understanding
how surplus value is produced is superseded by the interest
the capitalist has in justifying his appropriation of that
surplus value) . However, the link in Marx between the pair
esoteric/exoteric and the pair essence/phenomenon isn't
quite what Althusser imagines it to be. As was indicated in
the previous chapter, Marx was well enamored of an
es sence / phenomenon vocabulary in discussing how genuine
political economy aims at demonstrating how the "real"
nature of the system is "hidden" or "concealed" behind
"appearances" or "surface phenomena in his oft-quoted
phrase, "All science would be superfluous if the outward
appearance and the essence of things directly coincided
But a commitment to the esoteric interests of a discipline
over any exoteric interests (as, say, those of the
capitalist in presenting capitalist appropriation of surplus
value as fair and just) must be read as a
requirement for the scientific functioning of a discipline.
A discipline's commitment to pursuing its esoteric interests
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does not guarantee that the real -essences- hidden behind
the -surface appearances- of -phenomena- will necessarily be
revealed; rather, this commitment makes the uncovering of
hidden -essences- possible-this is the point at which -the
real science of modern economy only begins-. Put another
way, from Marx's texts we don't get the notion that the
esoteric desiderata of a discipline guarantee the revelation
of "essences" of the underlying political economic reality,
rather only that the production of genuine science is
limited insofar as the "esoteric" in contravened by
external, exoteric interests. From the contexts of his
criticisms of political economy in Theories of Surplus Value
one gets the distinct impression that the motivating
heuristic behind the esoteric/exoteric distinction had far
more to do with Marx's concern in identifying the "external-
interests that could destructively intervene in the practice
of a science, rather than in identifying or constructing
some set of "esoteric" core precepts or interests that
would— in and of themse Ives—guarantee the legitimacy and
progress of a science. it is the contravening "exoteric-
interests, not some description of a discipline's presumed
first principles, that Marx is after here, (in his
subsequent self-criticism, Althusser admits he was
mistakenly committed to—and looking to Marx as a source
for a "guarantee of scientif icity" in his early work—For
Marx and Reading Capital .
)
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While Marx was often quite specific in identifying
intervening exoteric” interests, it must be admitted that
what he intends by the “esoteric” is often annoyingly
ambiguous. Quite often he seems to be using it simply as a
general term of approbation, as it applies to the practice
a discipline centrally and primarily concerned with
genuine understanding and explanation over and above the
direction and influence other, "outside” interests may lend
to a science. it might be suggested that the "esoteric”
core interests of a discipline could be read as the
commitment to a discipline's (primary) paradigm, or to one
of several competing paradigms within a discipline. in one
sense reading along these Kuhnian lines may shed some light
on the esoteric/exoteric contrast, in that one could speak
of the scientifically deleterious influence and effects of
extraneous interests upon one or another paradigm or
research program within a discipline#, without thereby
committing oneself to defending that paradigm as the real,
true core of the science or to believing that no better,
more explanatory paradigm will come along in the future. in
any case, success in locating and following the supposed
core "esoteric” interests of a discipline (whether one sees
these interests in terms of paradigms or not) , to the
exclusion of the presumably contravening "exoteric”
interests, is no guarantee of the scientific legitimacy of a
discipline. Rather, and here we touch base with Marx's
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core
criticisms of political economists, the dominance of
esoteric interests (or, a central paradigm) is really only
a minimal requirement for scientific practice. There is no
necessary scientific virtue resulting from adherence to
"esoteric" interests or a dominant paradigm. if one looks
at the history of a discipline as the shifting from one
paradigm (or "esoteric” core of interests) to another, one
need not see "progress" in the shifts to supposedly better
and better paradigms. The replacement of one paradigm by
another is regarded as reflective of progress in a science
only under the conventional presumption that science
lineally and continually progresses. Under such an
assumption a paradigm shift itself becomes by definition
proof of constant progress. in fact these shifts in a
discipline can often be explained as arising from other
factors, none of which need be put in terms of scientific
progress”. There is at least in Marx a frequent use of a
contrast between esoteric and exoteric interests in which
the focus is on the impact of external interests on the
pursuit of a science; on the other hand Marx does speak
—
occasionally—as though what the core”esoter ic” interests of
a science are should be clear to all. Althusser doesn't
bother to demonstrate what richer sense of the esoteric
there may be in the texts, but merely reproduces Marx's
language of the exoteric/esoteric contrast as if it were
straightforwardly illuminating and completely
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unproblematic. 16
contrast, weak in the first
place in Marx and simply reproduced but undefended and
unenlarged by Althusser, is linked in Althusser's
theoretical work to a serious notion of " sy s t ema t ic i ty
"
which stands in for him as another distinguishing feature of
a correct marxist scientific practice. We recall that for
Althusser exoteric interests within a discipline can be
satisfied at the unexamined level of "unreduced crude
phenomena" while it is the "esoteric" which alone "unites
essences" and is genuinely scientific. But what is this
"form of systematicity" of the "essences of theoretical
concepts" supposed to mean for a science? in Althusser's
words
:
A science is a systematic theory which embraces thetotality of its object and seizes the 'internal
connection' which links together the 'reduced'
essences of all economic phenomena. The great
merit of the Physiocrats .. .was that... they related
phenomena as diverse as wages ... etc . , to a singleessence, the surplus value produced in the
agricultural sector. It was Smith's merit that he
outlined this systematic while liberating it from
the agricultural presuppositions of the
Physiocrats ... [Marx] implies that it is not just
the form of systematicity that makes a science, but
the form of systematicity of the 'essences' (of the
theoretical concepts) alone, and not the
systematicity of interlinked crude phenomena
(elements of the real
) , or the mixed systematicity
of 'essences' and crude phenomena
.
While Althusser backs off praising "theoretical
systematicity" for its own sake as a mark of a genuine
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science, we see the reflection of a coherence theory of
(scientific) truth in his insistence that a systemat ici ty of
essences works as a standard of science: "The reduction of
the phenomenon to the essence (of the given to its concept),
the internal unity of the essence (the systemat icity of the
concepts unified behind their concepts): these, then, are
the two positive determinations which, in Marx's eyes,
constitute the conditions for the scientific character of an
isolated result or a general theory. But the "essences"
that are to be systematized at the theoretical level in a
genuine science are to be given by the "esoteric" core of
the discipline. As long as it remains unclear what the
esoteric core of a discipline is and how it is to be
generated and that is clearly underdetermined in Marx— it
appears rather circular to say s c i e n t i f i c i t y , viz.,
scientific knowledge, is established through the process of
systematizing the "essences" discovered by way of a
discipline's "esoteric" core of interests. It's simpler,
though certainly less ambitious, to read the
esoteric/exoteric talk the other way around, the way that's
much more straightforwardly present in Theories of Surplus
Value : It's important to identify the "exoteric" interests
which bring to a discipline a direction and influence that
can impede and contravene the possibility of scientific
progress; as far as the exoteric intervenes there's no hope
of systematizing the knowledge a discipline might otherwise
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have produced. m Althusser’s insistence that a generating
condition of a science (say, political economy) is the
presence of systematizing theory uniting the essences of
economic phenomena given by esoteric Interests, we see
Althusser# 's predisposition to emphasize the break which for
him produces, or sees in its entirety, the totality of
economic essences. In the history of political economy, as
in the pattern of Marx’s work, we are supposed to witness a
radical break which separates ideological thought from
genuine science, which seems to appear full blown in these
histories and forever distinct from ideological
predecessors, once the economic "essences" given by an
esoteric core of disciplinary interests are somehow
immediately systematized.
Further grounds for objecting to Althusser's notion of
"systematicity" aren't difficult to discover. it only takes
a cursory look at some practices that have at some time laid
claim to being genuine sciences to demonstrate that these
notions of "systematicity" and the "esoteric", as it is
contrasted with exoteric interests, can be no more than
minimal requirements for the possibility of a science.
Astrology, for instance, perhaps owing to what astronomy it
makes use of, has advanced claims to its status as a
"science"; one could seemingly make the case that some
evidence for its sc i ent i f i c i ty could be found if one
described its "theoretical precepts" as systematized. Of
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course Althusser would argue that in this case it wouldn*t
be theoretical "essences” that were systematized, but the
fuzziness of his concept of systemat icity is clear if it can
be enlisted as an argument for the scientific nature of
something such as astrology. To take an example that has
enjoyed a more plausible claim to enfranchisement by the
academy, however, we need only look at the Behaviorist
school which enjoyed its greatest respectability perhaps
thirty years ago. Behaviorism can certainly claim to have
Its own core of "esoteric" concerns or central# tenets
which, if one overlooks Behaviorists more primarily
concerned with its applications, it can reasonably be argued
that Behaviourists# try to protect their collectively held
"esoteric core" from the influence of (at least some)
external, exoteric interests. Behaviorism is a particularly
apropos and disturbing example here, as it seems part of its
early appeal as a field within a discipline had precisely to
do with its construction of a set of tenets or theoretical
des ider a t a--read core "esoteric" interest s--wh ich were
defended all the more strongly in these years in spite of
their lack of experimental validation.
Althusser's insistence that a genuine science must be
based completely on a "systemat icity of essences" is linked
with his view that good science is always consistent and
coherent, having made a clean and total break with its
contradictory ideological past. For Althusser the discovery
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of this systematicity of essences first allowed the
conception of "...Political Economy in the true form of
scient if ici ty , i.e., as the unified system of concepts which
expresses the internal essence of its object. ..."20
Certainly one can amass a certain amount of textual evidence
for such a view in Marx--wi tness many of the passages
examined in the previous chapter in which, for example,
Ricardo is praised for his dismantling some of Adam Smith's
contradictions and seeing through to the real essences
—
viz., "to elucidate how far a science, which in fact only
*
reflects and reproduces the phenomenal forms of this process
[the determination of value by labor time] , corresponds to
the basis on which rests the inner coherence, the actual
physiology of bourgeois society ... and in general to examine
how matters stand with the contradiction between the
apparent and the real movement of the system. However,
Althusser insists on looking only at passages which
corroborate his own view of a unif ied , non-contradictory
science, and completely ignores passages which allow, if not
invite, a different understanding of a science and its
history. Althusser completely ignores, for instance, the
passages in which the ways in which Smith and Ricardo were
"both behind and ahead" of each other give a picture of
anything but a lineally progressing science. More
important, Althusser does nothing with the passages where
Marx describes how he sometimes reads a dual message in
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smith or Ricardo's writings, and finds a rich and revealing
dialectic between the power, on the one hand, of the images
of the "externally apparent forms of life" and, on the other
hand, their occasional glimpses into the "inner physiology
bourgeois society." it is this tension in their work
which often makes their texts come alive for Marx. Smith
and Ricardo's work in this sense was rich enough to reflect
and reproduce the contrast between the "real" and the
"apparent" movement of the system-^ of which were, for
Marx, simultaneously existing dimensions of capitalism.
Of Smith, for example, Marx observes:
23
intrinsic connectionexisting between economic categories or the obscuretructure of the bourgeois economic system. On theother, he simultaneously sets forth the connection
as It appears in the phenomena of competition andthus as It presents itself to the unscientificobserver ;]ust as • to him who is actually involvedand interested in the process of bourgeois
production. One of these conceptions fathoms theinner connection, the physiology, so to speak, of
the bourgeois system whereas the other takes the
external phenomena of life, as they seem and appearand merely describes, catalogues, recounts and
arranges them under formal definitions. With Smith
both these methods not only merrily run alongside
one another, but also intermingle and contradict
one another. With him this is justifiable. . .since
his task was indeed a twofold one. On the one hand
he attempted to penetrate the inner physiology of
bourgeois society but on the other, he partly tried
to describe its externaly apparent forms of life
for the first time, to show its relations as they
appear outwardly and partly he had even to find a
nomenclature and corresponding mental concepts for
these phenomena, i.e., to reproduce them for the
first time in the language and in the thought
process. The one task interests him as much as the




any Internal connect connections without
This is not Of course to say that ^ text In which the
"level Of surface appearances" intermingles or is confused
With the "real movement of the system" is by reason of this
intermingling" any richer; we have enough evidence in
criticisms of lesser political economists to dispense
with the Idea that there must be anything intrinsically
interestinq in tpvfc i-Kr,4.y xts that move between a level of
"appearances" and a level of "real movement of the system".
Yet Marx understood that in authors such as Smith and
Ricardo the level of appearances which is a function of the
system of capitalist exchange can be juxtaposed—of ten in
manifestly contradictory forms-to a body of theoretical
understanding in a way that becomes very Important for the
historical development of political economy, viz., in a way
that at once recollects the "reality" of appearances as they
must occur with capitalism and suggests a theoretical
exposition of the real movement masked by these appearances.
(In fact, the form Marx gave to Capital can be understood as
an attempt to do both of these things.) As Marx says of
this tension in Ricardo's work, "The underlying
contradictions themselves testify to the richness of the




Whether an author at all recognizes the presence of
these contradictory levels In a text has nothing to do# with
the effect this presence will have on the historical
development of a science, most often Marx admits neither
Smith not Ricardo were aware of these contradictions
reflected in their work. But they were quite strikingly
there for Marx, who read them out and took up, as it were,
where the voice Smith and Ricardo gave to these
contradictions left off. The model that emerges out of
these passages in Marx-and we must keep in mind Theories of
Surgl^ Value is his sustained review of his discipline-
suggests, in contrast to Althusser's reading, the
development of a discipline in this non-unified, non-linear
fashion. 26 As against Althusser's radical break of science
from Ideology, Marx's analysis of classical political
economy reveals how it may be that a theorist heavily
committed to a distinctively ideological perspective can
give, under particular historical conditions, the best voice
at the time to the contrast or contradictions between, in
Marx's preferred metaphor, "essence" and "phenomenon". m
this sense, the reflection or reproduction, however
unbeknownst to an author, of real contradictions in a text
in an exceptionally clear way can be read as an early
articulation of a problematic. That is, such a conflicting
text or theory can illuminate to successors in a discipline
the contradictions unrecognized by the author. As we will
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see shortly, Althusser often speaks of how Marx (at specific
points in his earlier and transitional texts) was unaware of
the problematic he was then formulating, and of how this
unarticulated problematic was yet rich in insight for those
who would later "read it out". But he nevertheless refuses
to recognise the import Marx saw in reading his predecessors
the same way—viz., in appreciating the rich problematic
presented to him by Smith and Ricarco's contradictory
luxtaposition of ideological "appearances" and the
beginnings of insight into what Marx considered the real
movement of the capitalist system.
This rough model for the history of a science's
development can be easily applied to other disciplines. One
can imagine, for instance, a physicist of the 1890's and
early 1900's thoroughly committed to defending classical
physics against the theoretical and experimental "gaps and
lacunae" which were beginning to open cracks in classical
physics at the time and which of course eventually led to
the development of Einsteinian physics. A physicist
exceptionally driven to defend traditional physics, in
feeling the need to answer the apparent contradictions
^^ising in the field, could be read by his or her successors
as giving at the time the best picture of the then only
emerging contradictions between the two physics— in other
words, as prefiguring the problematic that led to a new
physics, the attention given to the gaps and lacunae in the
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traditional system-that (retrospectively) serves to give a
strong voice to posing a new problematic. The insistence on
defending or reconstructing traditional physics to answer
the new problems could therefore (inadvertently) contribute
to classical physics' overthrow. This situation echoes the
perspective Marx developed in regard to Smith and Ricardo.
In contrast to the "vulgar" or "apologetic" theorists, who
glossed over, ignored, or completely denied the emerging
contradictions in political economy, much of Smith and
Ricardo's worlc retains enough of the tension of these
contradictions to signal— if one reads between the lines of
their texts as Marx did— the need for a new problematic.
They, much like classical physicists in the 1890's, were
working with a vocabulary and a set of ideological
presuppositions within the discipline that were inadequate
to accommodate and explain the movement of the emerging
capitalist system. However much against their will the
tension of these contradictions worked into their texts, or
however ideologically committed they were to the value of
the capitalist economy, insofar as they gave a voice to
these contradictions, we must see them, as Marx did, as his
predecessors in generating a new problematic adequate to the
political economy of advancing capitalism. Althusser's
neglect of this perspective, and of the essential text for
determining# Marx's understanding of this relationship, is
perhaps nowhere more obvious than in one other of the few
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passing references to Theories of _SurpU,s Value in Reading
Caeit^. In reviewing some of Marx's criticisms of Smith
and other economists' use of general economic categories,
Althusser unabashedly admits that it would be worthwhile to
look at this text to further uncover Marx's relation to
earlier economists;
like t^not^that t la I should
stuL theae 1
I Would be of great Interest toudy s long critiques of Marx's in order to
from Smith°^-
hand what distinguishes Marxth in this crucial matter and on the other^ l^eF^ ^ essential difference—
incredible explains Smith'soversight', ' blindness ',
' misconstruc-
forgetfulness' which are at' the root ofthe absurd dogma' that dominates all modern
Ma?x°fMf'
finally, in order to find out whyrx elt the need to begin this critique four orive times over, as if he had not got to the bottomor It.
25
After these few passing references, Althusser quickly gives
of Surplus Value and prefers to consider the
18^ Introduction to be the definitive text for looking at
Marx's understanding of his science: "The third chapter of
the 18 5 7 Introduction can rightly be regarded as the
Discourse on Method of the new philosophy founded by Marx.
In fact, it is the only systematic text by Marx which
contains, in the form of an analysis of the categories and
method of political economy, the means with which to
establish a theory of scientific practice, i.e., a theory of
the conditions of the process of knowledge, which is the
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object of Marxist phi losophy
.
"27
worthwhile for someone such as Althusser, who defines
ideology so much in terms of its relation with science, and
who insists Marx's texts ought to be a primary source for
framing this discussion, to have made an effort to examine
more closely Marx's critiques of political economists in
Theories of Surplus Value .
one feature of Althusser's attempt to demonstrate a
sharp distinction between science and Ideology has to do
With his notion of a problemat ic— a discipline's theoretical
underpinnings, the set of questions it sets itself, the
answers it may presume (or try to "guarantee" for itself),
or the questions it avoids or leaves unposed. How the
respective problematics distinguish a science form an
Ideology for Althusser is stated clearly enough in For Marx :
An ideology (in the strict Marxist sense of theterm the sense in which Marxism is not itself an
ideology) can be regarded as characterized in thisparticular respect by the fact that its own
problematic is not conscious of itself. When M'arx
tells us (and he continually repeats it) not to
take an ideology's consciousness of itself for its
essence, he also means that before it is
unconscious of the real problems it is a response
(or non-response) to, an ideology is already
unconscious of its 'theoretical presuppositions',
that is, the active but unavowed problematic which
fixes for it the meaning and movement of its





roblems with this feature supposedly
science from ideology become immediately
For one, Althusser's own account of the
131
formation and scientific nature of Marx's work undermines
such a principle of "awareness of one's own problematic" as
mark of the scientific. in his commentaries on Capital
and particularly its predecessors the Grundrlsse and the
1812 In troducU^, Althusser finds it a sign of. Marx's
genius that, even where Marx himself is not yet conscious of
the problematic he is developing or working with, his texts
are rich enough to invite the reader to begin to articulate
and develop that unstated problematic. In Reading Capital ,
for instance, Althusser observes that "...the difficulty
Marx seemed to have felt in thinking in ( penser dans ) a
rigorous concept the difference which distinguishes his
object from the object of Classical Economics...” requires
"that we pose the new philosophical problems required by the
disconcerting nature of its new object Later, in
reviewing the studies carried out in the first half of
Reading Capital , Althusser reminds us that
...we examined Marx through his own judgement ofhis predecessors, the founders of classical
Political Economy, in the hope of grasping Marx
himself in the judgement he pronounced on his own
scientific prehistory. Here too we stumbled on
disconcerting or inadequate definitions. We found
that Marx did not really succeed in thinking the
concept of the difference between himself and
Classical Economics, and that by thinking this
difference in terms of a continuity of content, he
either projected us into a merely formal
distinction, the dialectic, or into the foundation
of this Hegelian dialectic, a certain ideological
conception of history. We have assessed the
theoretical and practical consequences of these
ambiguities; we have seen that the ambiguity in the
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^
1!°^ affect only the definition of thespecific object of Capital , but also and at thesame time the definition of Marx's theoretical
ear^Pr^Vh^^^- between his theory and
an^ihp scienced the theory of the history of science.
In other words we have it from Althusser that Marx's work
(and we should keep in mind# that Althusser is discussing
post-break texts) is regarded as scientific, even ^ Marx at
times failed to correctly pose his own problematic. This is
to be part of the richness and brilliance of Marx's work—
that it suggests much more than Marx was able to correctly
and explicitly work out. The double irony here is that what
Althusser praises in Marx he refuses to acknowledge in Smith
and Ricardo, and even refuses to acknowledge Marx's own high
estimation of the same sort with regard to his better
predecessors. Marx often praised Smith and Ricardo's work,
and praised it as scientific advance, not uncommonly in
contexts in which it is clear Marx understood them to be
"unaware of their own problematic"—viz., unaware of the
presuppositions embodied in the foundations of their work.
To remind ourselves of one such passage of those reviewed in
the previous chapter, Marx admired Ricardo's effort to
detail the logic of capitalism, his "eye solely for the
development of the productive forces", regardless of the
consequences of that logic, but the presuppositions— the
problemat ic--of his own treatment were unavailable and
unexamined by Ricardo himself.
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Both Marx's appreciation of what can he read right
below the surface of Smith and Ricardo's work-their
unavowed problemat Ic-and Althusser's own reading of the
richness of the problematic suggested but unformulated even
Marx's "scientific" texts suggest that an "awareness of
one's own problematic" does not distinguish Ideology from
in the way Althusser wants. Furthermore, however,
there are not many good reasons for thinking that an
awareness of problematic has historically characterized
progress in sciences. Kuhn and others have pointed out, for
instance, that much of what we consider progress in normal
science is made possible when critical reflection on
foundational problematics is held in abeyance. of course
there's much to be said from a marxist point of view for the
importance of an "awareness of one's problematic" or
reflection on the presuppositions of a discipline--
particularly when we are concerned with the human sciences.
Althusser, however, wants this to be a criteria separating
all the sciences from ideological imposters— i.e., real
science from non-science. Such a reading of the problematic
IS unfortunately undermined not only by substantial claims
advanced in much contemporary philosophy and history of
science, but also Althusser's own appreciation of the
subtleties in Marx's texts and a more careful reading of






Another feature, first elaborated in Althusser's
and Humanism" but present throughout his later
work, by Which we are to distinguish science fro™ Ideology
has to do With a so-called "practico-social" function. Many
Althusser seems to argue that scientific knowledge is
a disinterested category of understanding-u is ungulded by
interests other than pure understanding. m contrast, we
to recognize ideology as overdetermined--hence
,
corrupted-by the social or practical function it plays:




eological) past, we can say thatla i gy, s a system of representations i 9istinguished from science in that in it' thepractico-social function is more important than tSetheoretical function (function as kLwledge)
Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is seemingly guided
by no interests other than understanding, and may therefore
be corrupted insofar as it engages any interests considered
Ideological: "Indeed, it is a peculiarit
ideological conception, especially if it has
scientific conception by diverting it from its t
that it is governed by 'interests' beyond the






these claims advance a very un-marxist separation between
theory and practice. This is all quite odd, given
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Althusser's position in and claims to the Marxist tradition,
one ^ust be immediately curious as to how marxist
theoretical work written after, let's say, the Frankfurt
school, could take over as unproblematic these notions of a
(scientific) knowledge that is completely disinterested.
Althusser seems not only to presume such a category of
knowledge is possible, but that It is desirable as an ends,
not least to marxist science. First of all we ought to
consider that Marx never adopted such a simply functionalist
method of discriminating the scientific from the non-
scientific—viz., that a theorist is Ideological and thereby
non-scientific if his or her work can be used to serve the
interests of capital. Here again Ricardo is a good example.
Marx recognized his scientific contributions in political
economy as a critic of the Physiocrats and landed wealth,
which came out of his exposition and defense of the logic of
capital as against those interests. Furthermore, Marx also
understood how Ricardo's work was taken over by the "vulgar
economists" who succeeded him. Marx took this fact not# as
an opportunity to criticize Ricardo's work in a
functionalist way for the interests it came to serve but
rather to show what it was of scientific value and merit
that the later "apologists" had missed, ignored, or
manipulated in Ricardo's work. This much we have
straightforwardly out of Marx's critique of classical







the nature of Marx's
an functionalism is
own work of political
Even if „e were to Ignore for a moment the approbative
spirit of Marx s critiques of Smith and Ricardo discussed
above. It makes no sense to think of Marx as having rejected
or condemned his predecessors in political economy m
Virtue of the pract ico-social function of their work, since
Marx at once saw his own work as having a practico-social
function ^ as being scientific. Regardless of the terms
one chooses to describe how Marx envisioned this practico-
social function Of his work (liberation of the working
class, a change In "consciousness" resulting from the
scientific demonstration of the expropriation of surplus-
value that fosters real social change, a systematization of
values furthering proletarian resolution of class conflict,
etc.), there is no evidence in Marx that he considered the
practico-social effects or function of his work as being in
any way in tension with its scientific character. On the
contrary, one reason he thought his work would realize that
practico-social function was that his work was more
scientific# (than that of other classical political
economists, his contemporary 'vulgar apologists', etc.].
Whether one thinks Marx to have produced a moral theory, a
theory of justice, or some sort of strictly "scientific"
theory of political economy presumably unrellant on and
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untouched by any moral or value considerations, Althusser
greatly demeans Marx's work and purpose by insisting on a
radical independence and separation of marxist/scientific
theory from concerns of theory's "practico-social" function
and effects.
once again, however, another of Althusser's positions-
that the "practico-social" role of ideology marks a sharp
distinction between it and science-is undermined by other
elements present in his own texts. As argued earlier,
throughout Althusser's work he most often Insists that
science is an entirely different thing than ideology, that
"real" science has no part of ideology. But in his later
work he hedges quite a bit on this in attempting to maintain
a description of certain theoretical work—not considered by
Althusser as sufficiently marxist—as ideological. Whereas
before "theory" always referred to (genuine) science—and
not Ideology—now Althusser admits that some categories of
things, such as "ph 1 losophy"— for example, the work of
Sartre--fall under an intermediate description as
"theoretical ideologies": "Unlike the sciences, philosophy
has an especially intimate relation with the class tendency
ideologies; these, in the last instance, are
do not belong to theory ('theoretical
ideologies' are in the last instance 'detachments' of the
practical ideologies in the theoretical field). What
Althusser is facing here is the difficulty one has in
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describing as Ideological ^ the features of theoretical
work (Which may sometimes require a very subtle and
sophisticated "reading" to be recognized, ^ the "practical
ideologies" he takes as much more transparently readable.
(Marx. was of course faced with the same problem in
describing the -popular ideologies- "through which men
become conscious of and fight out the class struggle" and
the ideological features of classical political economics.)
Althusser-s answer, which is no solution at all, goes like
this: Ideologies are "practical" and "do not belong to
theory ; what-s to be said of -theoretical ideologies-?;
They are in the last instance -detachments- of the
practical Ideologies in the theoretical field." in other
words, Althusser attempts to maintain the rigid distinction
between science and Ideology by condemning all work which
might have a pretence to being theory as not really science,
since what "theory" it may lay claim to Is only a
(detachment" of the practical ideologies.
The circularity of this way of maintaining such a rigid
science/ ideology distinction is clearly seen in Althusser's
discussion of his "ideological" competitors, for example
John Lewis and J. p. Sartre. While perhaps overdrawing the
ideological aspects of Lewis' and Sartre's notions of
"liberty" and "transcendence" ["...Theologians took up the
same category again and used it in systems whose function
was to serve the interests of the Church and feudal state.
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one
(The Church is a State Apparatus, and the number
Ideological State Apparatus of the feudal state.) is there
any need to say more?”],38 Althusser is at least correct in
observing that their ideas have a "practico-social"
function. The work of Lewis and Sartre is certainly
philosophy, and— in Althusser's 'own words—also thoroughly
Ideological, and is certainly theory. But how then does the
question of whether an idea has a "practico-social function"
or not to demarcate science (theory) from ideology? it
seems that Althusser is playing a game of reserving to
(correct) marxism the name "science" by simply asserting
that other ideas that might claim to be theory (marxist or
otherwise) are not really theory, and therefore not really
science, in virtue of the fact that they are mere
"detachments" of practical ideologies.
If/ on the one hand, Althusser insists on the claim
that only ideology and not science has a practico-social
function, on the other hand we must remind ourselves he
constantly undermines this criteria as a means for a
distinction between science and ideology by virtue of some
other, more clearly marxist claims he is committed to. For
instance, in paying homage to Lenin, Althusser affirms that
The class struggle has not only an economic
form and a political form bu_t a
theoretical form. Or, if you prefer: the same
class struggle exists and must therefore be
fought out by the proletariat in the economic
field, in the political field and in the
theoretical field , always under the leadership
140
theo^lti?r/*fieTdT the '^conSenVraT'edstruggle is called philosophy. class
...Words are weapons in the c 1 a c; e
th\s7s lar? and sincenis IS p t of the class struggle as a wholeand since the highest form of the class
political class struggle, ufollows that these words which are used in
Lrugglef3/ in the political
These words, and Althusser's reconsidered
definition of philosophy as "class struggle in the field of
theory are completely consonant with a marxist
understanding of the social role of knowledge and ideas, but
are entirely inconsistent with Althusser's repeated claim
that It IS Ideology and not marxist science which has a
practico-social function. Marxism, like Althusser's example
of theology, must also be seen as having a practico-social
function, but on the side of a different class. The error
in this perspective within Althusserian marxism is
unintentionally displayed by Althusser himself in a critique
of all philosophies that ostensible engage in "pure
contemplation, pure d j. s j. n t e r e s t ed speculation":
"'Speculative' philosophies have a political interest in
making believe that they are disinterested or... not really
practical and political
Althusser, like Marx, used "ideology" to refer to many
different things in a variety of different contexts. Among
ideologies that infect theory (viz., "theoretical
ideologies") he lists humanism, historicism, empiricism.
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three “ideologies of history" (pseudo-distinctions between
essence/phenomenon and necessity/contingency, and the
problem' of the action of the individual in history), and
the "philosophical Ideology of the Subject". As popular,
political, or petty-bourgeois ideologies Althusser speaks of
libertarian anarchists. Trotskyists, anarcho-syndicalists,
student, libertarian, neo-Luxemburg ist , conformist and
reformist (within a party such as the Italian Communist
Party), and Guevarian ideolog ies . ^2 As institutional
ideologies he speaks of legal ideology, the ideology of the
n-edla, the church or school system, and family, trade union,
communications, and cultural Ideological state
Apparatuses. 42 Sometimes, most often when discussing some
of the more specific ideological forms (such as intra-party
political ideology) Althusser speaks as though ideology may
be manlpulatively constructed by one group or class for
unwitting consumption by another: "(The) reproduction of
labour power requires... a reproduction of its submission to
the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of
submission to the ruling Ideology for the workers, and a
reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling
ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and
repression, so that they, too, will provi(3e for the
domination of the ruling class 'in words'. (More on
'ruling ideology" in a moment). But the body of Althusser's
texts falls on the side of understanding ideology as a
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syste. Of representations which, regardless of how
consciously manipulative piecemeal attempts to produce
Ideology may he, must, in order to function properly as
Ideology, m large part be believed by all classes,
including those who benefit most from it. That Ideology is
"unconscious" in this sense-in the sense that even the
beneficiaries of ideological "representations" must
subscribe to them-comes out of his view that ideology ("in
general") is a general system of belief, a way of cognizing
the world: "...[An] ideology is a system with its own
logic and rigour of representations (Images, myths, ideas or
concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a historical
existence and role within a given society. ”‘*5 Hence,
understanding Ideology in this general sense as the way in
which one cognizes one's relationship (however "imaginary"
this relation may be) to the world (viz., to the forces and
relations of production) commits Althusser to admitting that
ideology is an inescapable component of social organization:
^Qg.y is a£ suc h an org anic part ofevery soci^ totality . ~ HTTaTan ocTiT isecrete ideologies as the very element andatmosphere indispensable to their historical
respiration and life
And I am not going to steer clear of the
question: histor ical materialism
cannot conceive that even a communist socieTv
ever do without ideology, be it ethics
.
art or ' wor Id—ut looTT^ Obviously it is
possible to foresee important modifications in
its ideolog ica 1 forms and their relations and
even the disappearance of certain existing
forms or a shift of their functions to
neighboring forms; it is also possible (on the
premise of already acquired experience) to
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conceivable i-hs/





« ui- i-ijtfL , only the existenrp pnHthe recognition of its necessity enable us ^oact on Ideology and transform ideology into aninstrument of deliberate action on history?,
^
Despite the tensions among these various uses of
"Ideology", „e ought to appreciate in this last passage one
way in which Althusser's work has moved away from one of the
constraints of more orthodox interpretation and has served
open up this direction of thought for recent marxist
scholarship. That is, in insisting that ideology must
forever be a part of even the classless society, Althusser
moves away from an "ideology from above" vlew-that
somehow all of what counts as ideology is cleverly and
manipulatively constructed, or commissioned by, members of
the ruling class for unwitting consumption by the exploited
who labor for them. The much more fruitful view, initiated
in large part by Althusser and advanced by later
commentators, pursues the way Ideological forms must have
power even over those (viz., members of the ruling class)
who most directly benefit from ideology . It should be
noted that this approach is entirely consistent with Marx's
understanding of how many political economists (excepting
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ways unaware of
the "vulgar apologists") were In significant
the ideology they themselves were under the power of even
as they helped construct it. That ideological beliefs can
be deconstructed to reveal their nature as apology for the
power structures they support does not imply that the
beneficiaries of this power need have any greater insight
into the apologetic nature of ideology than members of any
other class. Ideology, as the "excresence" of the social
organization of production, is, as it were, there for
everyone to believe.
This direction of reading ideology is further
seen in Althusser's emphasis on how ideology is
"unconscious"
:
In truth, ideology has very little to do with
consciousness', even supposing this term tohave an unambiguous meaning. it is profoundly
unconscious , even when it presents itself in areflected form (as in pre-Marxist
philosophy'). Ideology is indeed a system of
representations, but in the majority of cases
these representations have nothing to do with
'consciousness': they are usually images and
occasionally concepts, but it is above all as
that they impose on the vast
majority of men [sic] , not via their
' consciousness '
.
...Ideology, then, is the expression of
the relation between men and their 'world',
that is, the (overdetermined) unity of the
real relation and the imaginary relation
between them and their real conditions of
existence
.
• ••It follows that this action can never
be purely instrumental 7 the men who would use
an ideology purely as a means of action, as a
tool, find that they have been caught by it,
implicated by it, just when they are using it




ideology is its captive too if i-h'^' u ^
fi v"“°"
c°uid be sun,med°ipcynically as a myth (such as Plato’s
advertisinal f®h
°'' ‘®=hniques of modern
IK
fabricated and manipulated fromthe outside by the ruling class to fool those
with r?ass°'‘""^=' «°dld disappear
^ 1,
Masses. But as we have seen that evenin the case of a class society ideologrisactive on the ruling class Itlelf and
th^t*''^de^o^
'"ouldlng,...it is cleara ide 2222 Ils a system of mass
ll^esen^tionsi i£ Indiipil^-a b 1e^ n -flf|2cie^ If men are to be formed, tT^nsfHrm'idTa^ equipped to respond to the^emands ofthe ir conditions ^of existence.
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While Althusser emphasizes the
ideology on the ruling class, the
unconscious workings of
more general point must
not be lost--that the form of ideology is "profoundly
unconscious”
.
One other feature of Althusser's work which has helped
move marxist commentary away from an "ideology from above"
doctrine is his understanding of how ideology is not to be
equated with "error" or the "false", most forcefully
presented in the "Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses” essay and in "Elements of Self-Criticism". But
this positive effect on marxist scholarship came out of
Althusser's work, as it were, in spite of itself, and in the
context of a rather incomplete "self-correction". While
throughout the ISA essay none of Althusser's positions on
the divergence between science and ideology criticized above
146
are examined and though he there refers tni-'ri.tfis CO Ideology as
imaginary m a way that distinctly contrasts to what
Althusser wants to count as (marxist) science's truth, he
begins m this essay to Intimate how ideology, with all its
imaginariness", has within it an important connection to
(partial) truth and •reality". Now ideology has a "material
existence" which allows reflection of the "real":
admit that they [ideologies] do make allusion to reality,
and that they need only be 'interpreted' to discover the
reality of the world behind their Imaginary representation
of that world (ideology = i 1 luslon / alluslon ) . While it
not men s real conditions of existence" but their
"relation to those conditions of existence which is
represented to them" through ideology, Althusser insists
there is a reality to this relation:
•••All ideology represents in itsnecessarily imaginary distortion not theexisting relations of production (and theother relations that derive from them)
,
^ 3ll the (imaginary)
relationship of individuals to the
relations of production and the relations
that derive from them. What is
represented in ideology is therefore not
the system of the real relations which
govern the existence of individuals, butthe imaginary relation of those
individuals to the real relations in
which they live.^^
Though terms such as "imaginary" and "distortion" are still
present, and present in the unexamined context of his
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positions on the science/ ideology distinction from Reading
Capj^^ and For Marx, what is valuable here is the way
Althusser suggests ideology can be tied to the "reality" of
real conditions of existence, of the truth that is reflected
in it. Reading ideology in this way avoids the pairs
science/truth, ideology/falsity that animated too much of
earlier marxist theory, and allows for a theory of ideology
that doesn't subsist on an overly rigid notion of science as
the theoretical corrective to its supposed opposite,
ideology, but can be broadened to understand science as
theory and ideology as something more than
incorrect theory--that is, to understand ideology in its
more various forms. Notwithstanding these suggestive
directions in the ISA essay, Althusser did not seriously
come to examine or question his earlier work on ideology
until "Elements of Self-Criticism", and there with only
mixed success. One of the consequences of Althusser's sharp
science/ ideology distinction was that he occasionally spoke
of ideology as a unified, seamless thing, in referring to
the hegemonic ruling class ideology, as though ideology
wasn't itself made up of many contradictions: "If the ISA's
'function' massively and predominantly by ideology, what
unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning,
insofar as the ideology by which they function is always in
fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions,
beneath the ruling ideology
,








c ass ; ...The unity of the different Ideological
Apparatuses is secured, usually in contradictory
by the ruling Ideology, the ideology of the ruling
But in the "Elements" Althusser admits this
unate consequence:
Thus I disregarded the difference between theregions of ideology and the antagonistic classtendencies which run through them, divide them,regroup them and bring them into opposition.The absence of "contradiction” was taking itstoll: the question of the class struggle inIdeology did not appear. Through the gapcreated by this "theory" of ideology slipped
theoret icism : science/ ideology
. 52
It is precisely this " theoret icist " direction which is the
focus of Althusser's criticisms of his previous work on
ideology. in the few pages of the "Science and Ideology"
section from the "Elements" essay Althusser describes his
theoreticist error:
In the end, and in spite of all my
precautions, I conceived and defined this
break in the rationalist terms of science
and non—science ... in terms of an opposition
between science (in the singular) and ideology
(in the singular).
,
...In this way a very important but very
equivoca l--and thus mis leading--not ion was
brought into play, based on its contrast with
that of science, a notion which appears in The
German Ideology , where one and the same term
plays two different roles, designating a
philosophical category on the one hand
(illusion, error) and a scientific concept on
the other (formation of the superstructure):
the notion of ideology. And although The
German Ideology encourages this confusion,
Marx did after all overcome it, and so made it
easier for us to avoid the trap. But this
equivocal notion of ideology was brought into
play within th e rat ional ist context of the
antithesis between truth and error. And so
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ideology was reduced to error
wit°^Tv'en^n
^
^ ^ ^^sudul0nt MsT'viQ'happearance ’-ucirx st
This confessional self-criticism, however, is
unsatisfying for many reasons. Althusser allows that he had
taken this misleading notion of ideology over from a
confused Marx of The Germ^ Ideology . Hence this small
"error” circularly confirms the grander theory— the Break:
The pre-Break Marx was ideological (not scientific), so
notions of the nature of science and ideology deriving from
that text are suspect, viz., themselves ideological.
Throughout the rest of "Elements" Althusser continues to
defend the Break, and in precisely the same terms cast the
first time around. At one point Althusser even says that he
only misunderstood the specific form of ideology that the
scientific Marx broke with, not the dimensions, nature, or
existence of the Break;
This break was the one which Marx made not
with Ideology in general, not only with the
existing ideological conceptions of history,
but with bourgeois ideo 1 ogy . . . . Th i s is the
event" which, behind the rationalist facade
of the contrast between "positive truth" and
ideological illusion, gave this contrast itsreal historical dimension. i certainly
sensed" that what was at stake in this debate
was the break with bourgeois ideology, since I
set to work to identify and characterize this
ideology. . .
.
Behind this disguise of error as
ideological, there stood a fact: the
declaration of opposition between truth and
which is objectively one of the symptoms
of the birth, of the appearance of a science
(when this really is what has taken place).
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Nowhere in these self-criticls.s do we find Althusser giving
any serious attention to wh^ he might have made such a
mistake, or to reexamining the Marx texts to ask what there
was there to mislead him or to provide Insight into why the
"error” is an error (and here Tl êories of Surplus Value must
come to mind). Althusser still relies on the notion of the
Break cast in the original terms of the split between
science and Ideology and still employs his former vocabulary
in insisting on the exclusive sclent if id ty of marxism.
Althusser essentially ends up granting to his theoretical
preferences a "guarantee of scientificity"—viz. , legitimacy
(If not monopoly) as a science—wh ich guarantee he earlier
described as a mark of the ideological, not the
scientific.
***********
Recent marxist work on ideology has of course been
enormously influenced by Althusser's treatment of the
subject; both the advances he suggests and the weaknesses in
his work have been taken up by later commentators. It is
with an eye to these advances and weaknesses just surveyed
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CHAPTER IV:
marxism and ideology after ALTHUSSER
in the first two Chapters I reviewed what I consider to
b. the signlflcantlY different conteKts In which Marx spohe
Of. or alluded to. the "Ideological.. m his early teKts
Marx spoke of an "Idealise" that takes a change strictly In
realm of ideas" to be sufficient for changing material
conditions; similarly Marx denigrates French political
thought separated fro. the particular class conditions It
thought Itself to he descrlhlng. Further, Marx criticized
the "German Ideologists" who thought that the development
and nature of philosophy, religion, morality, etc, could be
understood apart from the processes of reproduction of
societies in which these forms of thought arose. In his
later work Marx emphasized the "false appearances" central
to capltallsm-such as the illusion that exchange relations
held strictly between things rather than between the workers
whose labor Is embodied In them--and the Inadequacies of
political economic theory which conflates the Interests of a
particular class with those of all classes and falls to come
to terms with the contradictions of capitalism.
The critical perspective Marx adopts in all of these
contexts, combined with his insistence that one not overlook
the particular historical and social conditions in which
specific forms of thought arise, have led some commentators
to believe there is a theory of Ideology to be discovered in
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social determination of knowledge (the "genetic-
interpretation) and the identification of ideology with
•false consciousness". it will be useful to look at how
these Claims are advanced before turning to recent
commentators who reject the identification of Ideology with
false consciousness (along with the "genetic" social
determination of thought often used in support of such an
identification)
.
Marx's views on the social determination of knowledge
are often objected to on the grounds that Marx's materialism
commits him to a simple causal relationship between the
material base and- ideas or thought. The economic base, so
the argument goes, causes the production of ideas in their
superstructure! forms-in law, philosophy, morality,
religion, economic theory, etc.—and determines their
content. Thus thought can be distorted according to its
class-based nature—hence "false consciousness". Critics of
Marx who rely on the base-superstructure model as evidence
that he held thought to be a strictly mechanical reflection
of socio-economic conditions don't seem to be bothered by
the fact that Marx himself used the terms "base" and
superstructure" only perhaps half a dozen times throughout
all of his writings. The textual evidence put forth in
support of the claim that thought for Marx was
mechanistically determined by the economic base most often
relies on Marx's more aphoristic remarks scattered
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throughout his works. For instance, in The German
one finds the familiar passage,
Ideology
If in all ideology men and their
circumstances appear upside down as in acamera obscura, this phenomemon arises
I'ist as much from their historical life
process as the inversion of objects on
the retina does from their physical life
process... we set out from real, active
men, and on the basis of their real life
process we demonstrate the development
of the ideological reflexes and echoes
of this life process. The phantoms
formed in the human brain are also,
necessarily, sublimates of their
material life process, which is
empirically verifiable and bound to
material premises....^
Or in the Grundrisse:
When the worker recognizes the products
as being his own and condemns the
separation of the conditions of his
realization as an intolerable
imposition, it will be an enormous
progress in consciousness, itself the
product of the method of production
based on capital and a death-knell of
capitalism . . . .
^
2
Or the Communist Manifesto:
. . .your bourgeois notions of freedom,
culture, law, etc. . . .are but the
outgrowth of the conditions of your





These imaginary expressions arise,
however, from the relations of
production themselves. They are
categories for the phenomenal forms of
essential relations.,
4
Of course Marx never troubled to elaborate the base-
superstructure metaphor, nor to spell out more explicitly
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how he demarcated ideological thought from "consciousness"
But nowhere does Marx say, either implicitly or explicitly,
that ideology is to be identified with thought in general
.
It is just this sort of identification one would need to
make in order to argue that, since all thought is
(mechanistically) socially determined, and all such socially
determined thought is distorted or false, all consciousness
IS distorted or false. » Furthermore, any interpretation of
Marx's texts that views his aphoristic remarks, such as
those above, on the social determination of knowledge as
evidence in support of the claim that Marx identified
Ideology with socially determined or class-based thought
(and hence distorted), must completely ignore the different
ways he used ideology suggested earlier. To recall one
instance, Marx criticized Stirner, the Bauers
, etc., because
their doctrines were obscurantist and inadequate insofar as
they replaced consideration of real material conditions with
their constructed realm of ideas; thus their idealist
thought is (falsely) inverted—change in the realm of ideas
IS mistaken for change in reality. On the other hand Marx
considered Smith and Ricardo ideological inasmuch as the
explanations they sought for capitalism were intertwined
with their advocacy of its logic. Smith and Ricardo were
not seen as ideological on account of any falsifying
inversion of the sort Marx charged the German ideologists
with committing. Nor do the connections between science and
ideology Marx found in Ricardo's work apply as an
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explanation of the ideological nature of the work of Bauer,
Stirner, e;^_ai. m short, an adequate examination of these
two different contexts in which Marx spoke of ideology
underscores the fact that the German "True Socialists" and
the English economists were read as ideological for very
different reasons. Further, in neither case did Marx base
his critique of their thought as ideological by invoking its
socially determined nature or by asserting its consequent
"falsity". While admittedly his analysis of the True
Socialists' "false inversion" suggests an appearance/reality
opposition, one must keep in mind Marx was criticizing their
idealism which displaced consideration of real material
conditions with a realm of "fantastical" ideas.
It must be noted at the outset that Marx himself never
used the term "false consciousness"; it was first introduced
by Engels in 1890.® This fact, however, has not kept some
commentators from assembling a variety of Marx's aphorisms
—
again, removed from the contexts in which he wrote them— to
pin the view on him that ideology was equivalent to
(mechanistically socially determined) false consciousness, a
method of approaching Marx's texts which can only ignore the
parts of his works which are a sustained treatment of
ideology. one commentator, John Plamenatz— in a book
known and wel 1—received in the non—marxist
literature—seems content to state "Marx often called
ideology 'false consciousness'" without troubling to cite
any such references to Marx at all.® One author, however.
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D
who as less cavalier with Marx's texts and who Is less
inclined to build a case out of a few isolated aphorisms,
yet who represents the predilection in non-marxlst
literature to read Marx as Identifying Ideology with false
consciousness, is Martin Seliger.
At the beginning of his book Seliger offers his
rationale for claiming ideology was for Marx "false
consciousness" in spite of the term's absence in the texts;
It seems that Marx himself did not usethe phrase ' false consciousness
' . Thismakes no difference as far as his
conception of ideological thought is
concerned, since instead of 'false',
Marx used 'incorrect', 'twisted',
untrue', and 'abstract' besides nouns
like 'illusion', 'block' (Sparren), idee
fixe, etc. We may thus take 'false
consciousness to denote Marx's views as
well....g
By thusly making "false consciousness" a synonym of ideology
for Marx, Seliger comes up with half of what he terms Marx's
dogmatic" theory of ideology. Marx's veiw here, according
to Seliger, asserts a "determinist bond between economic
base and ideology"; throughout all of Marx's work runs the
supposed insistence that "thought is a mental reflex of
material conditions, whatever its subject matter, and
whether it contemplates action or guides it, thought is
distorted"— this is the purported "necessary falsity of
conditioned thought". 1° Seliger is of course unable to
produce any passages in Marx that equate "consciousness"
with "ideology" or socially conditioned thought with
"distorted" thought. Hence he bases this claim that Marx
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held them to be identical on Marx's remarks concerning
division between mental and physical labor and the as
opaque contradictions manifested in capitalism:
the
yet
[According to Marx] all hitherto knownforms
^
of consciousness have been
'false', that is, incongruent (althouah
to varying degrees) with the objective
conditions of production and yet
conditioned by them. According to Marx
and Engels it cannot be otherwise, since
for them, false consciousness is a
corollary of that most elementary
division of labor, into mental and
physical ....
The distortion of consciousness, we are
told, is a function of the division of
labor, and the latter, we learn, will be
obviated only when the proletariat
abolishes itself together with private
ownership and wage labor. Logically,
therefore, false consciousness must be
the concomitant of all known history and




In support of this claim that Marx understood universally
distorted consciousness as "necessarily arising out of these
socio-economic conditions", Seliger simply recapitulates
many of Marx's general statements having to do with the
mistaken popular beliefs, myths, dogmas, or theories he saw
as connected to (mystified) capitalist relations (for
instance, the "appearance" of commodity exchange as an
exchange of things rather than a nexus of social relations).
In the service of this claim he rehearses passages from The
German Ideology on the "false inversions" of idealism and
from Capital on the falsity of appearances, and claims the
parallel between them is a reflection of Marx's continual
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belief that thought is false-at least until capitalism is
destroyed. Seliger labels this position the "programmatic
or dogmatic conception of ideology" and hopes to show that,
notwithstanding the few— for Seliger, ostensible—deviations
from this view he finds in Marx and Engels' work: "...they
not only stand logically committed to it, but the statements
made at all stages in the programmat ical and theoretical
contexts of their work point in that same direction ^ 2 yet
Seliger reads Marx's texts closely enough to realize that,
if this "dogmatic definition" of all consciousness as
socially determined and hence distorted is claimed to run
through all of Marx's writing, some explanatory account must
be given of the passages and texts that don't seem to equate
consciousness with ideology or false thought. For Seliger
very nearly the only exceptions in Marx to this dogmatic
definition are Marx's comments on the value of his own
science" . Seliger handles thise claims of Marx's
to his own thought as "undistorted consciousness" as
exceptional evidence, but evidence nonetheless for an
"evolutionary" view, latent in Marx, according to which
consciousness, otherwise universally distorted, could
gradually free itself from mystifications as it began to
unravel the contradictions of capitalism, Seliger insists,
however, that this view only surfaces occasionally in Marx's
work, and then only "in principle" so as to privilege his
own thought as having a claim to scientif icity and truth:
"...Marx and Engels' express belief in the objectivity of
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their 'positive science' has almost alone provided secure
ground for attributing to them the further "evolutionary"
view that men's perception of reality, which is conditioned
by reality, can also conform with it. "13 This supposedly
only occasional appearance of the possibility of undistorted
consciousness in Marx, against the purportedly ever present
dogmatism attesting to the universal distortion of
consciousness, ultimately leads Seliger to assert the
"unreconciled existence in Marx's theory of two standpoints
about the result of socio-economic conditioning". Yet the
textual evidence offered in behalf of the latent
"evolutionary" view-based almost entirely on Marx and
Engels' assessment of their own work— is in Seliger 's view
insufficient either to bring into question his claim that
the dogmatic position dominates Marx's thought or even to
substantiate a reading of Marx's texts that admits to his
having addressed the question of ideology in- different
senses. Thus in Seliger 's view,
...they [Marx and Engels] never ceased
to reiterate the view that dependence
[of consciousness on socio-economic
conditions] issues in distortion.
Rather than holding different views on
the subject at different times, as is
often asserted— they held the same
variety of views at all times—and this
indicates their failure to think the
matter through systematically.^^
It is precisely this "alteration of views" and absence
of any "systematic treatment" running through Marx's work
that should have alerted Seliger to the shifting contexts
that characterize Marx's analysis of ideology. Yet Seliger
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idealists
juxtaposes remarks from Marx's critique of German
with, say, remarks from Capital on the misconception of the
nature of labor arising from capitalist exchange, in his
attempt to demonstrate that Marx's work continually presents
an "alteration of categorical assertions about the possible
falseness and hence the possible correctness of thought, and
Its inevitable falseness, which repeats itself in the
various phases of Marx's writinas" .
. Seliger admits Marx's
writings have different "phases", but he refuses to consider
whether these different phases might have anything
meaningful to do with interpreting the texts. Seliger here
displays a rather perverse approach to textual
interpretation. Any passage from Marx which Seliger finds
genuinely ambiguous is immediately dismissed as "it does not
so much permit various interpretations as impede the
deduction from itself of a consistent standpoint."^®
Furthermore, Marx's "deviations" from the "dogmatic"
standpoint that is, when Seliger allows that Marx suggests
that "consciousness" may not necessarily be false in virtue
of its social determination—are simply that— isolated
deviations which do not really count against the dogmatism
and constancy of the "false consciousness" position.
Seliger makes no attempt to understand the different
treatments in the various "phases", as it were, in Marx's
work. As I have tried to show in earlier chapters, the
critique Marx delivered of the German ideologists was of a
significantly different kind than his later critique of
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poaitica: economlsts-MarK did not take issue with Smith and
Ricardo because of any ideaiist illusions or false
inversions, nor did he ever understand Bauer, stirner,^
in terms of any scientific advancements they made in the
context Of their ideological political-economic advocacy,
Sellger misunderstands Marx's texts Inasmuch as he Isolates
passages of Marx from the thought Marx was analyzing; he
makes no attempt to give an account of Marx's critique of
the German ideologists and in turn of political economy, and
then to examine what parallels or divergencies there are
between them. m this sense Sellger's approach is, oddly
enough, similar to that of some orthodox marxologlsts who,
treating Marx's texts as scripture, assume there must
therein exist a consistent reading of class, base-
superstructure, ideology, etc., to be divined by the careful
reader. Moreover, Sellger's gloss of these different
contexts is all the more precarious since, inasmuch as he
claims Marx's "dogmatic" assertion of the "falsity" of
consciousness is only contravened in the texts by his
occasional, solipsistic claim to further the 'positive
science' of political economy, specifically in Theories of
Surplus Value. In one of only three brief references in his
book to Marx's treatment of the classical political
economists, Seliger intimates any different account of
ideology therein suggested only underscores the dominance of
the dogmatic" standpoint: "The occasional praise they
[Marx and Engels] bestowed on the classical economists is by
169
no means unimportant, but Is actually supplementary evidence
of their deviance from the dogmatic standpoint ^ ® Qn the
contrary, as we've seen, Marx's treatment of classical
political economy, rather than underscoring the supposed
insignificance of any treatment other than one which
Identifies ideology with socially determined consciousness,
stands on its own as revealing a significantly different
dimension in an understanding of the ideological—and the
scientific
.
As we will examine further later on, the relation
between ideological thought and its critique by a
privileged science or theory is not an issue unaddressed or
unproblematic in Marx's texts. Since Seliger views this
problem in terms of a relation between the 'positive
science' laid claim to by Marx and Engels and their account
of necessarily false or distorted consciousness, one might
think Seliger would have all the more reason to focus on the
texts where Marx most explicitly attempted to come to terms
sclent i f i ci ty and the ideological nature of the
discipline of political economy. Unfortunately Seliger
never moves beyond consideration of the early Marx on
"ideological inversions" and the later Marx only in the
specific contexts of false appearances, say, of exchange of
labor-power; this is a way of approaching the texts that
legitimizes the false consciousness reading by its complete
neglect of Marx's views of the science of political economy.
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Before moving on to the positions taken against this
false consciousness reading, it will be useful to reconsider
a claim that Seliger used to generate the interpretation of
ideology as false consciousness-i
. e
. , the necessary social
determination of consciousness, purported to be found in
Marx. Seliger puts this claim straightforwardly: "...Marx
added to the problem of determination his variation of a
likewise old theme. He maintained in principle that in
societies as we know them, the dependence of ideas on the
relation between economic and social conditions affects
adversely the truth-value of ideas "19j-uea . Raymond Geuss '
recent book provides a useful focus for discussion of this
supposed "genetic" understanding of truth; Geuss' criticisms
raise the issue of whether any such "geneticism" has anyting
to contribute to an understanding of Marx's reading of
ideology
.
In the introduction to The Idea of a Critical Theory
Raymond Geuss states that the book focuses on a claim made
about the work of Marx. The central question raised by
Geuss has to do with whether Marx's work demands significant
epistemological revisions in the way knowledge about society
has been traditionally conceived. According to this claim
Marx's theory of society, if properly construed, does
clearly give us knowledge of society, but does not easily
fit into any of the accepted categories of 'knowledge'....
rather Marxism is a radically new kind of theory; to give a
proper philosophic account of its salient features requires
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revisions in traditional views about the nature of
.now:ed,e,..20 ^euss ta.es as a foil for thisclai. the
views of several members of the Frankfurt School-but
primarily those of Habermas—and announces that their
attempted rehabilitation of 'reflection' as a category of
valid knowledge is the test case for the claim. Hence the
largest part of Seuss ' argument is directed to a reading of
their notion of ideology and its critique:








is what prevents the
of society' which
the work of Marx,
myself to only
references to




society from correctly perceiving their
true situation and real interests; if
they are to free themselves from social
repression, the agents must rid
themselves of ideological illusion. Can
' Ideologiekritik' form the basis of a
critical theory as defined by the three
theses? [viz., that critical theories
are aimed at producing enlightenment and
are inherently emancipatory, that
^^itical theories have cognitive
content, and that critical theories
differ epistemologically from theories
in the natural sciences!
j 22
Geuss asks whether there can be an epistemologically
enriching way of understanding a relation between the
falsity" or "error" in a form of consciousness and its
functioning to support or legitimize oppression that avoids
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the pitfalls of •geneticism". Drawing on the connections he
takes the Frankfurt School to draw between psychoanalysis
and Ideologiekritlk. Geuss offers several versions of this
supposed relation between error and the Herrschatt it is
presumed to legitlmlEe and finds them all unsatisfactory.
One of these versions comes out of Freud's distinction
between Irrtum, wahnidee, and illusion. An illusion is a
belief which may or may not be false, but which is held by
the agent because it satisfies a wish. For Freud, an
example of an illusion is the belief of a middle class girl
that a prince will come and marry her. Geuss draws an
analogous sense of illusion- for what he terms this "genetic"
approach to ideology critique. In criticizing this
conception he claims,
If ideological error is taken to be like
the illusion from which the middle class
girl in Freud's example suffers, the
same argument would seem to apply. One
doesn't show that the belief is false by
showing that this person holds it
t>6cause it satisfies one of her wishes.
The way to criticize the belief is not
to show that she wishes it to be true,
but to show how inherently implausible
it is, and we do that by
'
'normal
empirical means'. To this it might be
objected that the point here is not to
show that the belief is false, but to
criticize the agent for adopting an
inherently implausible belief for which
she had no evidence. But it requires no
major revisions in our epistemology to
treat cases like this either; why is
even the positivist estopped from
criticizing agents for holding
implausible, empirically unsupported
beliefs? ... It can't in itself be an
objection to a belief that it satisfies
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revisions
a wish or desire, or even that it isaccepted because it satisfies a wish ordesire.
22
ut ideology critique does apply and suggest
in traditional epistemology in the case of "illusion" in
this sense, viz., if illusion occurs when "the belief is one
for which the agent could have adequate evidence, but which
IS accepted by the agent because it satisfies some wish. "23
What about a case in which the { im) plausibility of a belief
(about human interests, social reality, what a family
structure free from domination would be, etc.) couldn't be
discussed or determined unless the reasons one currently
holds a view about it are exposed or brought to
consciousness? (As in Freud's example-surely the
realization of the wishes which contribute to the hope of
marrying a prince are as significant a part of the
explanation/process of coming to terms with the belief as
any .empirical facts" about the availibility of unmarried
princes in Vienna.) For the subject matter of ideology
critique, exposing the reasons making one hold a belief may
be seen to influence the plausibility of the belief, viz.,
when the illusive/distorting mechanisms or motivations for
holding the belief aren't to be separated from the
consideration of the plausibility of the belief. In such
cases the "evidence" can't be judged "plausible" or
"implausible" while (and precisely because) the mechanism of
the wish contributes in this way to generating the belief.




such belief, or giving force to it,
significance/accessibility of the "evidence" for or against
a belief. Hence ideology critique. in pointing up these
mechanisms, makes itself relevant to the substance o]
belief.
if such a
Geuss then asks if these criticisms also apply to
"cases of illusion involving beliefs for which there could
not be adequate evidence"-viz
. , non-empir ical claims
involving attitudes, preferences, or normative beliefs:
But if 'wishful thinking' just means (aswe have taken it to mean) accepting a
belief because it satisfies some wish
(other than the wish to accept well-
supported beliefs), there is no reason
why we might not have some evidence for
a belief accepted because of 'wishful
thinking'
, as long as the evidence is
not the reason we accept it. So to
agents for indulging in
wishful thinking is not necessarily to
show that their beliefs are to be
rejected as false. This line of
argument can't be carried over to
preferences, attitudes, and non-
empirical beliefs, because with them one
can't distinguish their truth or falsity
from the motives the agents have for
accepting them. Still, this may mean no
more than that non-empir ical beliefs are
not true or false at all (since they are
not ' observationally ' true or false)— it
certainly doesn't imply that we show
non-empirical beliefs, attitudes,
preferences, etc. to be false by
impugning the motives of those who adopt
them.
24
As I will discuss later, however, interesting
ideologies contain an admixture of "truth" and "falsity" and
"empirical" and "non-empirical" (viz., normative) claims;
hence it makes little sense to presume a critique of
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Ideology aimed at proving a belief system "false-. it is
particularly concerning the "non-emplrlcal"-as opposed to
"empirical "-beliefs and desires or wishes one has for
holding such beliefs that a critical account of that
relationship can Influence the Individual's assessment of
the beliefs. In this sense ideology critique doesn't aim to
prove beliefs "false" by "Impugning the motives" of those
who hold the beliefs; rather, this sort of ideology critique
on the contrary can illuminate the content of the
individual s beliefs by showing how one's (wishful)
commitment to them can be part of their content. Reading
ideology in this way then doesn't Involve a "geneticist"
conflation of the truth content of beliefs with the reasons
why such beliefs are held. Well-founded arguments against a
"false consciousness" reading of ideology, which we will
examine shortly, should not be confused with Seliger's and
Geuss; imputation of some sort of "geneticist" error in any
theory of ideology that takes psychoanalytic or motivational
factors seriously.
we ve looked at a few authors who read Marx as
committed to an identification of ideology with false
consciousness and in their view an implausible (because
mechanistic and deterministic) account of the social
determination of knowledge. A number of recent marxist
commentators on ideology have rejected this false
consciousness position, reading it either as an inadequate
176
® ti i on of Msrx ' s i"ovt-ona tex s, or, regardless of its
^®J-^tion to Marx ' <5 wor’i' _ _ . ,rk, as an implausible or indefensible
account of the nature of ideology. 25 .As the remarks above
and the earlier survey of the different senses in which Marx
understood ideology suggest, this conflation of ideology
with false consciousness is insensitive to the full range of
Marx's views and is, as these later commentators argue,
problematic in its own right. However, of the recent
commentators who similarly reject the false consciousness
interpretation, many work back into their own accounts an
opposition between (scientific) truth and (ideological)
falsity suspiciously similar to the true consciousness/false
consciousness opposition they want to reject as part of a
marxist theory of ideology—or, they diminutively relegate
questions of "morality" and "interests" to the realm of the
ideological. We have already seen how these issues reflect
on Althusser's work; we are now in a position to examine the
work of several marxist-or iented authors writing after
Althusser: Bhikhu Parekh, Jorge Larrain, Colin Sumner, and
Joe McCarney. As a first step in exploring these positions,
it will be useful to examine the ways these authors
*^^i^icize and attempt to set themselves apart from the false
consciousness reading.
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Parekh offers an interpretation and critique of Marx's
theory of ideology which avoids many of the errors committed
by the commentators mentioned earlier. His interpretation
of Marx is superior, in my view, in no small part because of
the importance Parekh correctly places on Marx's evaluation
of the nature of classical political economy as the primary
text for understanding Marx's views on the relationship
between science and ideology. This is in contrast to other
commentators who, as noted earlier, inordinately base their
reading of Marx on the critique of idealism in The German
Ideology or the appearance/reality metaphors of Capital.
Marx's sustained critique of classical political economists,
particularly in Theories of Surplus Value, offers the
richest insights into his understanding of the scientific
and ideological nature of a discipline. The benefits for
reconstructing a theory of ideology Parekh realizes from an
appreciation of Marx's critique are several.
Parekh rejects as a correct interpretation of Marx the
view that he sought to adopt "the proletarian point of
view", only by means of which the inner nature of capitlaism
can be fully comprehended. According to this
interpretation, Marx did not hold that only the proletariat
could grasp the truth about capitalism, that truth is
somehow relative to class, or that the proletarian view
yields higher truth, but rather that one cannot help but
aanalyze capitalism from the point of view of a particular
class, and that the adoption of the perspective available
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within the pnoletanlan point of view is none ii.eiy to
truth. Parekh takes as representatives of
various versions of this view such interpreters of Marx as
Lenin, Lukacs, Gramsci
, Althusser, Ernst Bloch, lucIo
Oollettl, and Adam Schaff, Against the effort to find
evidence for this interpretation in Marx's texts, Parekh
finds other remarks of Marx's "far greater in number and
weightier in their significance, where he takes a very
different view."l as we saw, a great deal of such evidence
counting against a "proletarian point of view"
interpretation can be found in Theories of Surplus Value,
where Marx time and again praises political economists such
as Ricardo for their attempts to explain capitalist
production without regard for the Interests of a particular
class, and takes issue with those who offer explanations of
capitalism narrowly partial to class interests. In any
case, Parekh views the "proletarian point of view"
understanding of truth as in the end incoherent. Parekh 's
alternative reading of Marx In this regard distinguishes
...between Marx's political support of
the proletariat, and his epistemological
appreciation of its point of view. His
political support of it was derived from
his belief that it was the only class
capable of promoting the interests of
mankind. . . .As a scientist Marx was not a
class theorist, but a 'free agent of
thought ' . He aimed to study the
capitalist mode of production and human
history from the most comprehensive and
self-critical point of view possible.
Accordingly, he studied them not from
the proletarian point of view, but from
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“hole.critically constructed out of all thestandpoints available to him, includingthe proletarian.
2 (emphasis added)
According to Parekh, then, Marx allied himself politically
with the proletariat -not because he has made a [prior]
commitment to the proletariat, but because... it alone
represents the universal and emancipatory interests of
mankind [sic]. "3 por Parekh in other words Marx's political
commitment to worker interests is a function of his prior
commitment to specific human interests; the proletariat's
historical position as a "negative" class makes it the
vehicle for the realization of these broader, non-class
specific interests. As Parekh quotes Marx, "the
emancipation of workers is important not because 'their
emancipation alone is at stake but because the emancipation
of the workers contains universal human emancipation
^
The general interests of the species, Marx's real
commitment, are served by the fullest development of the
productive forces, which, in Marx's view, are historically
realizable only through the proletariat; hence Marx's
essential attachment to emancipatory human interests commits
him to a historical allegiance with the proletariat. In
addition and complementary to this political role Marx
assigns to the proletariat, for Parekh Marx places an
epistemological significance on the proletarian point of
view. Again, on Parekh ' s reading this epistemological
significance does not entail nay proletarian monopoly over
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the truth (or over the production of legitimate science), or
even any sort of guarantee that the proletarian point of
View is more likely to yield the truth in a given
discipline. Rather, the proletarian class lives under
conditions of existence which allow it to raise questions
which the dominant class cannot or will not, given its stake
in representing its own experiences and defending its own
i^tsrests . The proletariat
...is epistemologically privileged in away that the established class is not.
It is, as we saw, a universal class and
interested in human liberation.
Besides, it is a national and organized
class, and hence capable of viewing
society as a totali ty . . . i t has distinct
experiences which reveal aspects of the
social order that remain ooaque to the
dominant class.
5
Thus the point of view of the proletariat offers
insights not available to or typically suppressed in theory
from the point of view of the dominant class. Parekh makes
it clear, however, that the proletarian point of view is
just one among several viewpoints, the better insights of
which Marx sought to assimilate into scientific theory which
was not narrowly defined in terms of any one class. For
Parekh Marx was not a "class-theorist" (as suggested by
Lsnin, Lukacs
, Gramsci , etc. ) but a "free agent of thought"
whose scientific" inquiries profoundly benefited, but were
not undertaken from, the proletarian point of view". In
Parekh ' s view Marx was only able to construct a scientific
view inasmuch as he was able to appreciate the intellectual
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and scientific merits of each particular class point of view
without narrowing his theory's range to reflect any one
P ticular class. This eclectic approach allowed Marx a
scientific point of view richer than the viewpoint of any
one particular class and therefore capable of criticising
the view of each class:
It IS this broader conception thatenables him to take a crlt/cal viel ofrne proletarian perception of it^;interests, and to expose its narrow
its political and
stand onthe shoulders of both the bourgeoisieand the proletariat, catch a glimpse ofthe immanent new order, and use it tocriticize both.
6
We will see later whether this "epistemological privilege"
which Parekh reserves for Marx's viewpoint can be retained
in light of McCarney's criticisms.^
Parekh is equally critical of commentators who read
into Marx a strongly mechanistic or "geneticist"
understanding of the social determination of knowledge. As
we saw with Seliger, some commentators argue that Marx's
(mechanical) understanding of the social determination of
knowledge is the basis on which Marx (supposedly) condemned
ideology as "false". Parekh claims such a relationship
between a "mechanical" social determination of knowledge and
the consequent "falsity" of bourgeois ideology is just not
to be found in Marx. Nevertheless, in behalf of this view,
many interpreters have taken passages Engels penned after
Marx's death to support a mechanistic or strictly causal
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1
reading of the relationship between base and superstructure
and, in particular, of the relation between Ideas or thought
and the economic base, and then presume this mechanlclst
understanding can be attributed to Marx. Parekh argues that
"there is no evidence to support this view' that Engels'
usage of the term "ideology" was any different than Marx's
understanding of It, and further claims that, m fact, one
simply misreads Engels if one reads him as holding a
mechanistic Interpretation of Ideology. Parekh doesn't
pursue at length an alternative exegesis of these works of
Engels which are often taken to underscore a more
determinist approach, but he reviews a number of passages to
illustrate how Engels used the term in the same ways as Marx
suggested (for Parekh, either as Idealism or as apologia).
He does however quote the famous Engels passage.
Ideology is a process which is indeed
accomplished consciously by the so-
called thinker consciously, indeed, but
with a false consciusness
. The real
motives compelling him remain unknown to
him, otherwise it would not be an
ideological process at all.
8
which IS sometimes taken to provide support for a mechanical
reading of ideology as unconscious apologia. Parekh insists
that in this passage— indeed throughout the rest of this
letter Engels is rather identifying ideology with the
idealism criticized in The German Ideology. For Parekh, in
general, an understanding of ideology as idealism or
apologia covers the different context which both Marx and
Engels addressed and offers a reading of otherwise troubling
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passages which does not conflate ideology with socially
determined false consciousness. But he specifically offers
two further explanations of what Marx himself might mean
When he speaks of individuals being unconscious of their
real Intentions in order to save Marx from the charge he
posited some sort of 'unconscious determinism'. Parekh
Marx to refer to
. . .unarticulated assumptions
. .
. [which!delimit their horizon, prevent them fromoticing certain aspects of theirsubject matter, focus their attention onsome others, and so on. This is a
1
straightforward




Further, Parekh observes that when individuals talk
about themselves and their society, the content of what they
want to say is specific, while it is most easily expressed
in genral terms. He therefore takes Marx's remarks which
some interpret as supporting "unconscious determinism" to
merely underscore how this general form misleads and how it
IS consequently easy to ignore its limited and specific
content. As an example of this we have Marx's remarks on
the concept of "freedom". "Freedom", as a general concept,
loses most of its meaning. in analyzing a more specific
notion of freedom (which is otherwise obscured by the
general cocept), Marx concluded that bourgeois freedom was
defined in negative terms and emphasized economic freedom
above all (viz., Marx pointed out historical situations when
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such liberties posed a threat to economic freedom)
. m
Parekh's words, "when Marx asks what an individual (or a
group) really wants, he intends to know not his (or its)
real motive or will, but the essential content of his (or
its) general and abstract demand. This in no way implies
unconscious determinism."^*^
Parekh admits that while "Marx is ambiguous concerning
the precise relationship between the class and
consciousness, he says little to support the determinist
interpretation", (the "determinist" interpretion meaning the
claim that there is a strict causal relationship existing
between social class and consciousness which in turn
determines the truth value of class-based beliefs).
Parekh downplays some of Marx's more ambiguous passages
which might by themselves be liable to a determinist reading
by pointing out how Marx used a variety of expressions
typically translated as 'determine', 'condition', 'shape',
'mold', and 'form' in describing the relationship. On the
basis of the multiplicity of terms used in contexts of class
and consciousness, Parekh concludes, "it is therefore wrong
to fasten on the term 'determine', which he uses only on a
few occasions '. makes a similar claim about Marx's
numerous "reflection" metaphors. Rather than a mechanical
function, Parekh takes Marx's sense of "reflection" to
suggest an "activist" or autonomous consciousness:
Marx invariabley refers to thinking as
an activity of 'producing' ideas, and
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Int -producers- of ideas,r Marx an idea or a theory is
,
if it -corresponds to- orreflects- the social reality. He usesthe term -reflection- in a logical, nota causal, sense. To reflect reality isto be true to, correspond to, and not tobe caused by it. The significance ofthe metaphor of mirror is that themirror faithfully reflects the object infront
^




Another reason Parekh gives for rejecting the
mechanicist social determination of knowledge and the
corresponding generation of false consciousness has to do
with Marx-s acknowledgement of the occasions on which
individuals are able to "rise above their classes". Here we
find mention of the Chartist movement, supported by sections
of a middle class whose interests would not be furthered
were the movement successful. Furthermore, Parekh
recognizes that Marx never discounts the ideas of the
classical political economists because of their respective
classes, nor intimates that their truth or falsity is to be
merely a function of the class which produced them. While
Parekh connects ideology (as apologia) with the
universalization of a partial or narrow social point of
view, he clearly distinguishes Marx-s critique of such a
limited" point of view from the mistaken reading which
reduces this critique to a mechanicist claim about the












tbTT.T'"l\ facthat men take certain general beliefsfor granted and think within theirframework, and wished to explore why
in savlL^?A r is involvedpng that men mistake the familiarfor the natural, and the limits of theirworld for the limits of the wo^ldItself. The best proof of Marx'srejection of determinism lies in thefact that he systematically explored howmen can be made conscious of, andthereby helped to rise above, theirbasic assumptions.
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Hence, Parekh strongly rejects any "geneticist"
that Marx understood truth as a function of the social
determination of ideas:
imputation
take ideas seriously, insiststhat they must be judged in their ownterms and not dismissed on the basis of
their creator's social background,
acknowledges that they are influential
provided that they do not go counter to
people's needs and the immanent
tendencies of the social order, and
rejects the concept of relative truth.
Again, Marx says little to support the
widespread view that, for him, ideas are
the epiphenomenal products of the
unconscious promptings of interests
wishes. It is a mystery how
concepts of unconscious determinism
fS’iss consciousness should have come
be fathered upon him, for he rarely uses







In my view, Parekh ' s criticism and rejection of these
several not uncommon interpretations of Marx— that Marx's
science rests on the adoption of the proletarian point of
view, that the proletarian point of view is non-ideological
,
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that Marx.s understanding of ideology rests on a
.echanlstlcally oonstrued theory of the social determination
Of knowledge, or that Marx’s theory of the social
determination of knowledge commits him to the view that
bourgeois ideology is "falsfa"-gy IS r ise — rest on a sound and close
attention to Marx's texts. of greater significance as a
positive contribution to an understanding of Marx's theory
of Ideology, however, are two claims Parekh draws primarily
from Marx's review of the classical political economists. I
argued In the second chapter that Marx's most sustained
treatment of the nature of a science and Ideology Is to be
found in his analysis of the discipline of political economy
in his Theories of Surplus Value: this text is typically
neglected by marxist commentators on a theory of ideology.
Parekh's close attention to this text, then, avails him of
two important insights into Marx's understanding of
ideology. Science and ideology cannot be rigidly
distinguished, or too neatly separated—all thought retains
an ideological component; the question of what makes a
discipline scientific, and how it may be ideological cannot
be addressed outside of an appreciation of the historical
specificity of its practice. Parekh puts these two insights
to use not only in reconstructing Marx's view of ideology,
but also, as we shall see, in providing an immanent critique
of Marx's conception of his own work in political economy.
As I discussed in chapter two, the early political
economists formost among them Smith and Ricardo—wrote at a
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tln.e When the bourgeois ideological co™.lt»ents which they
were enamored of could claim some measure of historical
truth. The bourgeoisie could claim to be the
representatives of the real interests of all humankind, to
be the expression of universal human interests, to allow the
replacement of the archaic feudal class with "free",
"autonomous", and "self-determining" Individuals, to havl
made a historical breakthrough to a new and "higher" form of
social organization, to achieve a human "liberation" not
possible under previous forms of barbarism, to present the
developing capitalist system under which It rose to power as
the highest and most rational form of production, etc., all
with a degree of truth. None of these claims were lies or
completely false, but they became less true—and harder to
"scientifically" defend—after 1830 when the contradictions
of capitalism became more and more manifest and the
bourgeoisie had more successfully entrenched itself as the
dominant class whose Interests could only continue to be
realized at the expense of the interests of the subordinate
classes. But before 1830 when Smith and Ricardo wrote,
political economists could at once remain committed to these
bourgeois ideological beliefs and still provide reasonably
plausible explanations of political economic reality, as the
contradictions between them had yet to make themselves
present. Practitioners of the discipline could remain
committed (though perhaps unknowingly or unquestioningly
) to
these ideological beliefs and still produce theory with
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significant explanatory power because the economic reality
they were seeking to explain dla not yet obviously
contradict the bourgeoisie's own claims for itself. Thus
there was a tension in pre-1830 political economy which made
it both scientific and ideological, but not yet a critical









a complex structure of
was rigorously scientific,
an ideologically biased
Although Marx himself doesp this way, he seems to suggesta dialectical account of the nature anddevelopment of classical politicaleconomy. For him classical economycontained an internal contradiction
between its telos or 'ideal nature' andIts assumptions or 'actual
presuppositions'. its telos was
scientific, its assumptions were
Ideological. In Marx's view the history
of classical economy is the history ofthe dialectic generated by its
contradictory character. it constantly
strove to discover the truth about
capitalism; however, its ideological
assumptions constantly prevented it from
fully realizing its objective.
Throughout its history it was involved
in the self-contradictory position of
pursuing objective knowledge on a biased
basis, securing scientific content
within an ideological form. It is a
of its scientific integrity and
penetration that it constantly kept
the boundaries set by







detecting and overcoming them.
17
As Parekh brings out, Marx's review of political
economy illustrates how one cannot speak of how a discipline
is scientific (or how it is affected by ideology) without
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analyzing the historically specific conditions in which a
discipline is practiced. Ricardo, for instance, renamed
ideologically committed to treating certain developing
crises Of capitalism as marginal phenomena, given his
interest in understanding capitalism as a rational and well-
ordered system of production; yet he was nevertheless able
to provide scientific accounts with a plausible degree of
explanatory power. His successors in political economy,
however, writing at a time when these crises were
increasingly manifest, could only insist on the marginal
nature of crises at the expense of the explanatory power of
their theories. Thus, for example, Marx regarded some of
Ricardo's claims about the marginal nature of crises of
overproduction as having a claim to being scientific insofar
as they could retain a degree of explanatory power, while he
regarded some of the same claims when exposited by Ricardo's
vulgar" successors as falling more on the side of ideology.
To explain how essentially the same belief about the
marginal nature of crises of overproduction is plausibly
scientific at one time and at a later time (after 1830
) is
substantially ideological, one must, according to Marx, look
at the historically specific conditions in which political
economists practiced and for which they attempted to provide
explanations. One cannot speak of the scientific or the
ideological character of a theorist's work as though it
existed in a social or historical vacuum; it is the
historical conditions a theorist is attempting to explain
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that Illuminate their scientific and ideological character.
The application of the terms 'scientific- and
"ideological" is historically grounded in a further sense.
What makes a body of thought scientific and Ideological is
not something intrinsic to the theorlsfs methods, is not
completely the degree to which he or she is committed to a
set of values or ideological beliefs, etc. Rather, what
makes a theory more scientific than another at any given
historical period is a superiority in explanatory power.
Significantly, part of this "superiority in explanatory
power" involves a theory's capacity to recognize and bring
out the ideological character in competing theories and how
these may limit their explanatory range. A theory's
capacity to offer this critique of earlier or competing
theories by no means implies that it Itself is free from
ideological commitments: rather it can simply be said to
have superior explanatory power (and hence be regarded as
scientific relative to the other theories) Insofar as it is
able to illuminate the ideological elements in competing
theories and how these elements affect the depth of their
explanations. If a theory can do this, and offer at least
as good an explanation of phenomena as these other theories,
it is regarded historically as the more scientific body of
thought. As Marx continually stressed, Smith and Ricardo
had deep ideological commitments of their own; but since
their work sought explanations for economic reality which
earlier or competing theories had ideologically ignored.
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.israpresented, or .ystided. It .ust be regarded as
at least until their own biases are illuminated
and consequently better expaantions offered by a later body
of theory.
Parekh traces this hlstoricaily evolving sense in which
a theory or discipline can be said to be more or less
scientific to a notion of "critical coherence", which Marx
is said to have adopted from Hegel's immanentist theory of
truth. Marx used this theoretical principle not only to
evaluate the work of his predecessors, but also in his own
self-assessment. In Parekh 's words, this principle is one
"of coherence because it requires that a theory must cohere
with the other theories of the subject; and it is a
principle of critical coherence because it requires that a
theory must not uncritically conform to others, but
criticize them, expose their limitations, extract and take
over their rational insights and show that it represents
their immanent truth. arrcm-r,Again, the clearest model for
understanding Marx's views here is to be found in his
analysis of those who preceded him in political economy.
There we find no claims to a "guarantee of scientif icity"^^
which could strictly demarcate science and ideology or non-
science, but an account of how a satisfactory theory must be
built on and must address itself to competing theories:
• •
• [Marx] did not approach his
predecessors with the dogmatic
conviction that he had discovered the
truth and that they were all muddle-
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headed fools. Rather when heexamined his predecessors he d?d not
Sosed°%hf'"”'?" criticized ?he^!exposed their limitations, abstractedand highlighted their insights, and
c^ose t
sometimes almost gSt
Marx'S historical critique .
avail^b]^^'"'?!.
first, that theailable theories of capitalism wereinadequate, and a new one was needed-
from^tA theory was freihe defects he had pointed out inothers; and third, that his theory wasan organic continuation of its rivalscorrected and completed them, andincorporated their immanent truth. inthis way, like Hegel, Marx used the
corrnh
theories as independent
oborations of his own .... indeed heseems to have thought that only a theorywhich offers a critique of the previoustheories and shows why a 'break' withthem is necessary can ever be fullv
satisfactory. ^
After devoting most of his book to reconstructing a
theory of ideology in Marx along these lines, Parekh then
steps back and offers some criticisms of Marx. Primary
among them is the claim that Marx failed to apply to his own
work the understanding of science and ideology which he
developed in analyzing the classical political economists.
This failure can be seen in a tension running through Marx's
work between, on the one hand, his insight sketched above
that what counts as science is theory that can illuminate
social biases in rival theories, avoid or overcome these
biases itself, and hence provide richer explanatory power,
and, on the other hand, an occasional disposition to talk of
breaking with and completely overcoming any fundamental
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Ideological assumptions of a horizon of thought. The former
position commits Marx to the view that a better theory
incorporates the Immanent truths of rival theories by means
of a rigorous critique of them; such a theory has a claim to
eing scientific only until another theory comes along that
can offer a critique of Its ideological character and
thereby provide greater explanatory power. In his review of
political economy Marx is suggesting that a theory is
scientific not because it somehow "overcomes" ideology or is
immune to its influence, but because it can offer a critique
of the ideological character of rival theories, along with
greater explanatory power, even though it may bring in its
own ideological commitments. This contradicts his other
voice, which alludes to a theorist's ability to completely
overcome fundamental biases and do away with ideology. (As
we saw earlier, this other voice finds its way into Theories
of Surplus Value when Marx speaks as though the "esoteric"
elements could be easily and neatly separated out from the
exoteric" elements within a discipline)
. The charge
against Marx, then, is that he failed to apply his
understanding of how a science develops historically to his
own work; privileging his own work as free from ideology
violates the historical model for a body of theory's claim
to development as a science which he constructed regarding
classical political economy. As Parekh puts it.
Contrary to Marx's claim, his historical
materialism did not save him from
195
airly large ideological contern-
enlTrely
entitles *
social biases, and are notd to put themselves on aqualitatively different plane what is
an^'se^f^^^' ^®lf-conscious
b7tsel st7lV
' over icnow whatia s ill remain in his thought- onlvthe posterity can identify them Hence
?h:n°“?ho"!T less Sitnan those he criticizes, he has nomeans of knowing this. He can, at bis?only know that he is free from their




Parekh suggests that this tension
explained by— though certainly not
rationalist wish Marx harbors to
in Marx is perhaps
thereby justified— the
believe that "the
constitutive characteri<5i" i r'<= m-f • n •uiidrdccerist cs of the prevailing horizon of
thought can be unambiguously and fully identified" and that
"the truth always wins over ideology" . ^ ^ As we saw in
chapter two, such a belief contravenes Marx '
s
more
considered judgment of how a discipline develops and
establishes a claim to being scientific.
As sketched above, one of the ways a body of thought is
regarded as scientific has to do with its ability to pick
out ideological biases in earlier or competing theories,
offer a critique of them and avoid these biases itself. As
Parekh realized, and holds against Marx, no body of
thought--including those considered scientific inasmuch as
they offer such a critique of other theories' ideology--can
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clai. a guarantee that it doesn't have other biases o, its
own. For Parekh. any theory .ost certainly win, ^ut can
regarded as scientific until another theory comes
along and offers a corresponding critigue of its ideological
btases. What's troublesome in this account of science and
ideology, however, is the apparent presumption that ideology
part of a body of thought only as "biases" which
succeeding theories-vi.
. , at least the more scientific
ones-seek to "overcome". Though Parekh doesn't directly
address the question of what role "values" or "interests"
play in social science. he seems to subsume tham under
Ideology-and therefore to consider them as something good
scientific theory should avoid as ideological biases. In
Parekh 's reconstruction these values or Interests don't seem
to be part of the evolving base in a body of thought—viz.,
the immanent truth in a tradition that is (ideally)
continually criticized, Improved on, reformulated, but in
some degree retained. Values are, rather, something that is
criticized in other theories, while the theoretical
desideratum is to eliminate them as ideology from the body
of theory. In one passage at the close of the book, Parekh
criticizes Marx for allowing his own conception of which
human values are defensible and "good" to work its way into
his theory:
• • • J-ike the ideologists he csstigates,
he takes for granted a certain
conception of good life and desallows
those that fall outside it. Further,
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thr criticism ofbourgeois society ic;
'critical' than othersand this IS not easy to show. m ?hiultimate analysis Marx's theory ofcriticism rests on a definite conceptionOf human well-being. Even if Marx had
incapable of conclusive demoLtra^o^The human well-being can be defined inseveral different ways, some mo^epersuasive than others, but none capable
involves elements of oersonal
subi^cr'^’d""^ ce?:rnr"ajective dimension.
23
on the one hand, Parekh is quite correct in criticizing
Marx for not acknowledging or defending his own conception
of human well-being. On the other hand, there's no reason
to reduce values to "personal preferences" or to regard them
as falling outside the realm of knowledge in the human
sciences because they are "incapable of conclusive
demonstration". Parekh 's reconstruction of Marx's
conception of science and ideology needs to be extended or
taken further to allow values-not ideological "biases"
scientific theory would seek to criticize in other theories
and completely overcome itself— to be part of the evolving
"kernel" in the human sciences. it's not clear that
Parekh 's account would allow that, as he presumes "ideology"
to refer to biases good scientific theory is always striving
to overcome, and doesn't seem to allow that scientific
social theory could embrace values it quite self-consciously
seeks to defend, and defend in a partisan way. An extension
^®tekh ' s account of science and ideology whoch would
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allow the discussion of human values-crl t Icited
,
reformulated, but defended and retained In some form-as
part of the evolving •kernel of truth In the human sciences
is particularly important given the active discussion in
some marxist circles of their role in social theory-such as
the discussion of how human needs are to be construed, or of
What role moral theory can legitimately play in marxlst
science
.
The value of Parekh - s interpretation as an accurate and
sensitive reading of a theory of ideology in Marx should be
clear enough by now. Parekh reads Marx's conception of the
social determination of knowledge, ‘however confused,
objectionable, or inadequately thought out it may be, as
distinct from his account of ideology. Against a variety of
commentators, and on the basis of a close reading of Marx's
texts, Parekh convincingly argues that Marx never held that
his science depends on the adoption of the proletarian point
of view, that the proletarian point of view is non-
ideological, or that the social determination of knowledge
renders bourgeois ideology "false". As a positive
contribution, Parekh extracts from Marx an understanding of
how what makes a discipline scientific and what makes it
ideological cannot be addressed outside of an appreciation
of the historical and social specificity of its practice--
viz., that what we would consider "science" is the body of
theory that offers at least as much explanatory power as
earlier or competing theories, and offers a critique of the
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while
Ideological commitments of these other theories
distancing itself at least €from these Ideological
commitments. This view of how a disc ,scipline develops
historically cuts off any rigid distinction between science
nd ideology. But in the service of extractino t-h •'-'j. g is quite
Plauslbel picture of the relationship between science and
ideology m Marx, and in this contribution to a marxist
anding of how a science develops historically, Parekh
overlooks the broader range of uses of "ideology" in Marx
and too narrowly constraint;Y trains the concept to its role in
scientific theory.
This weakness In Parekh arises from his wish to find
one overarching, unifying definition of ideology which would
cover the full range of its application In Marx's texts.
Again, closely focusing on Marx's account of the Ideological
character of political economy in Capital and Theories of
Surplus Value is not only not a mistake, but Indeed makes
use of the two texts indispensable for coming to terms with
Marx's views on the relationship between science and
Ideology within a social scientific discipline. But, as my
survey in the first two chapters of the wide range of ways
in which Marx understood ideology throughout his career was
meant to demonstrate, there is no preponderance of textual
evidence which could naturally give rise to a single
definition of ideology which unifies these various




as id iiau a eological--.3 ..,3 .... ..3 3.e
shortay-.o.3.aers .o be a falsely p.sea antithesis In—1st co™.entaty on a theory of l.eolo,y-.i.
. . that
between l.eolo.y concelvea as an epistemological contrast to
science, and ideology conceived as an in^ •intrinsic element of
the fabric of social formations . 25 «s noi- d kA te above, Parekh
IS well aware that no crude oppositon between science and
Ideology Is to be found In Capital or Theories of Surplus
Value. however, he overgenerallzes elements of Marx's
treatment there In a way that reads Ideology
eplstemologlcally"-vlz.. the "essence" of Ideology he
finds there Is something whose real significance Is to be
found only at the level of theory. Parekh as much as
announces this at the very beginning of his book: "i am
primarily interested in exploring the ways in which, In
Marx's view, the social theorists become Ideologists, and
only incidentally in his acrnnni-na count of the way an ideology
gains dominance in society. That the ordinary men should




How Parekh 's confining ideology to an
epistemological significance at the level of theory abuses a
marxlst notion of Ideology „in become apparent if we look
more closely at the he defines ideology thorughout his book.
As mentioned earlier, Parekh reads Mars to use
'ideology' to mean both idealism and apologia. The
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-eologis. as ..eaMst aea^s .n a currency o. ,ene.aa and
abstract Ideas. The idealist supplies a content to these
otherwise e^pty conceptualizations on the basis of the ideas
and conditions of existence of his or herii-Lfc. own class,
society, or historical period. it is as +-i-«-i-t IS these ideas are
generalized over all classes, societies, and historical
periods that Marx's second usage—apologia— "grows out of
the first" ; ^7
into ^!!e Investigationsth Ideological (idealist)writings, Marx discovered that they wSreall apologetic in character. They had auniversal form, but a particular socialcontent, and did little more ?ha?n
experiences, modes ofthought, values and interests of aparticular group of society in anabstract and universal language. TheIdealists may or may not have wished tobecome apologists. since theyconcentrated on abstract ideas, Marxcontends that they had no alternative
ut to give the general ideas ahistorically spedific content and becomethe apologists of the group from whose
experiences the content was derived.
Since the apologia seemed to Marx to be
a necessary corollary of ideology
(idealism), he extended the termideology to mean apologia as well.
2 8
Though Parekh sometimes speaks as though he means ideology
as Idealism and ideology as apologia to be distinct
phenomena, throughout the body of the book he speaks of
apologia as growing out of idealism in that all ideology as
apologia involves idealist abstraction or
overgeneralization. 29 But viewing all ideology as idealist
(or as apologia growing out of idealist abstractions) can
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on:v be aone at tbe cost ot ne.Iectin, o. a.scount.n, so.e
Of the other Instances of phenomena Marx described as
ideological, As pointed before. Marx certainly saw a co»on
tendency toward Idealist abstraction animating aany of the
G©nTian id©oIoQis"ts n+-hc»vi r-.-.gis . other cases just don't fit Into this
Some of the vulgar economists after 1830, for
instance, had no need to Invoke idealist abstractions m
their unabashed defenses of capitalist production, and Marx
certainly considered the work of these "hired prize-
fighters" as thoroughly ideological. Similarly, m The Holy
Family Marx took members of the French bourgeoisie to task
for the ideological import of their misconceived
materialism. 3° One only distorts or glosses over the
complexities of Marx's account if one forces a similarity of
content detected in several ideological phenomena he
described to become a trans-hlstorical
, trans-cul tural
essence to be found in all ideology. As McCarney points
out, there's no reason to assume a dominant class cound not
adopt an ideology with a radically historicist character
with a cyclical or millenarian view of history;31 there's
every reason to assume, given the wide range of phenomena he
surveyed, that Marx never thought that any one particular
trait such as the currency of idealist abstraction
characterizes the ideological in all periods and cultures.
Inasmuch as Parekh sees a common idealist element in the
examples of ideology Marx treated, he ignores the
complexities of the texts and consequently limits the
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there
applicability of an understanding of ideology present
to future forms of ideologies.
A further, and more severe, weakness can be seen in
Parekh.s account if „e examine more closely the definition
Of Ideology as apologia which Parekh uses. His standard
reading of ideology as apologia defines ideology as ..a body
Of thought systematically biased towards a specific social
3-UP...32
glance this reading appears somewhat
ambiguous. Does it refer to a body of thought that is
intentionally biased towards specific group's interests!
Does it refer to a body of thought that in its social
results or conseguences in fact preiudlclally furthers a
specific group's interests! Or is it said to be biased in
the sense that it takes for granted, generalizes, or
absolutizes a narrow or limited point of view-the norms,
perspectives, conditions of existence, or forms of thought
of a specific class or social group! Parekh makes it clear
that for Marx a body of thought need not be (yet may be)
intentionally biased in order to count as being Ideological.
Here Parekh notes Marx's treatment of the vulgar economists,
who were patently partisan, and other writers such as Smith
and Ricardo who "may be genuinely disinterested and
impartial, and yet for various reasons end up developing the
apologetic bodies of thought ...[ such wrl ters ] unwittingly
develop apologetic systems of thought. "33 farther, lest any
functionalist reading be let in the door, Parekh insists
that the "systematic bias" of an ideological body of thought
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is not to be attributed to any social consequences It „ay
have
:
...although an ideology generally servesthe interests of a social group IHswrong to define it in terms of inters?as IS commonly done. Such I ^
shifts the emphasis from tL ^ogica?
ou?a?lvr
® thought to Itsp tative consequences That it alsoserves the interests of a particularsocial group is its important bu?derivative characteristic
34
Regarding the third Issue raised above, we must discount any
assertion that aii Ideology generalises, absolutizes, or
universalizes an otherwise narrow point of view over an
entire society or historical period since, as we saw shortly
before, not all instances of ideology treated by Marx
Involve an idealist move of this sort. Furthermore,
claiming that all Ideology must involve idealist abstraction
curtails the range of phenomena a theory of ideology can
accommodate. But Parekh's interpretation of Ideology as "a
body of thought systematically biased towards a specific
social group" can be more sympathetically read if we
understand its "systematic bias" as meaning that such
thought takes for granted or prejudicially presupposes a
point of view favorable to the interests of a particular
group, if we read "favorable to" in a logical sense of the
content of thought rather than as "in fact furthering the
interests of " .
The real problem for Parekh here becomes apparent if,
while granting the revised version of "systematic bias"
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as a
above in which "idealist abstraction" drops out
universal component of the ideological, we then ask whether
there are any ideological phenomena discussed by Marx, or
which his account could read as Ideological, which are not
"bodies Of thought systematically biased towards a specific
social group". The answer is no, but only as long as we
reamin at the level of theory-vlz., as long as we look only
at figures such as the German idealists, political
economists, French socialists. politicians, etc, for whom
there is a more or less identifiable body of apologetic
thought. But Marx did not limit the domain of the
ideological to formal theory. ifs of course true thea the
critique of bourgeois ideology as represented in theory and
science was a consuming interest for him, and much of his
later treatment of ideology was devoted to an analysis of
its presence in the discipline of political economy. Again.
Parekh's treatment of Marx's view of the ideological in
political economy is Important and useful as far as this
represents one aspect of Marx's Interest in Ideology. But
Marx also, and throughout his career, continued to speak of
the Ideological at the level of the "ordinary individual".
On the one hand, Parekh is surely not to be blamed for
examining ideology as an epistemological category— i.e., in
focusing on how it works its way into theory and the
sciences--for in this he closely follows, and valuable
exposits, Marx's views in Capital and Theories of Surplus
Value. On the other hand, Parekh errs in generalizing this
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epistemological role of ideology at the level of theory over
of Its possible forms, in subsuming relevantly different
particular forms under a forced general form. .sParehh
says in the introduction to his booh, he is only Interested
in how social theorists become Ideologlsts-that explanation
Should then explain how "ordinary individuals" entertain
ideological beliefs with relative ease. This only results
in covering over the other forms Ideology can take.
If we step away from Parekh ' s exclusively
epistemological concern with the Ideological as present at
the level of theory, then, as some of the passages above
indicate, it becomes clear that the ways "ordinary
individuals" come to entertain ideological beliefs need not
have a systematic form, nor must these ideological beliefs
take the form of a "body of thought". For example, while
Marx often analyzed clerics' role in propagating ideological
beliefs by tracing their rhetoric to the "systematic" body
of bourgeois ideology, at other times he seemed to speak of
the role relltious imagery plays at the level of the
individual without connecting this effect closely to any
systematic body of thought. There's a clue here about how
Ideological effects can be registered on the cultural level
in a way dlsanalogous to the relatively sophisticated way
ideology forms a body of thought at the level of theory. To
explore the nature of Ideology at this level we'll need to
examine some features of the transmission of ideology within
the culture industry.
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AS we Will see shortly, it will be useful to look at
McOarney's account of Marx's position as a partial
corrective to Parekh. McCarney. unlike Parekh, is sensitive
to the Significant differences among Marx's "case studies"
of Ideology, and resistant to any epistemological turn in
commentary on a theory of ideology in Marx. Though not
without Its problems, McCarney's Interpretation, in
insisting Marx grounded his notion of ideology in class
struggle, plausibly disputes readings which seek to find an
"essential" epistemological feature in all ideological
thought. In the meantime, however, we need to examine some
of the contributions of other commentators.
******
Like Parekh, Colin Sumner rejects the claim that there is
a strict economic determinism in Marx's works with which
some commentators hope to adduce a false consciousness
interpretation. Rather, Sumner takes the view that while
Marx held that the economic structure
was the basis and dynamic of all social
formations, he did not argue that
everything non-economic was an immediate
and direct product of the economic. His
conception of the economic structure as
"the real foundation" was that it
assigned "rank and influence" to other
forms of social practice.
60
As with Parekh, for Sumner there is no inconsistency for
Marx in maintaining on the one hand that all knowledge or
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belief is socially conditioned, and on the other hand that
thought IS not causally determined by the economic base or
by class interest. But in order to distinguish and separate
the social determination of knowledge from the false
consciousness thesis, where Parekh had simply argued that
Marx never used •'ideology" as synonymous with
"consciousness", Sumner produces several passages as
evidence for the claim that Marx in fact distinguished
between forms of consciousness and ideologies. In one of
the most telling of these passages Marx speaks of
...morality, religion, metaphysics and all the rest of
ideology as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding
to these. . . . "61 o, .Sumner reads this remark as exemplifying a
"historical-conceptual" distinction between ideology, which
refers to specific elements of thought, and concludes: "I
am left with the impression that, given a determinate level
of the productive forces, a clear distinction can be made
between general modes of thought ("forms of consciousness")
and specific elements of thought ("ideologies"): neither of
which are necessarily false. "62 Though Sumner goes on to
label these categories "spontaneous" and "philosophical"
consciousness, a distinction I hesitate to say Marx would be
happy with, his initial use of the distinction is plausibly
employed to illustrate how Marx, rather than conflating
them, separated the notions of ideology and consciousness
and considered neither necessarily false.
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Here Sumner takes a different angle than Parekh.
Sumner wants to claim not only that Marx never identified
Ideology with false consciousness, but also that he never
held that Ideology is made up of "representations which
conceal real social relations"; Sumner feels that those
commentators who take the latter line have been confused by
the same more or less ambiguous passages in Marx that led
others to the false consciousness thesis—such as the camera— passage or the remark about the "mere phantoms" in
brains. sumner, to speak of what is "hidden" by
this "concealment" is too close to asserting the necessary
falsity of consciousness. In any case he doesn't feel this
rsading is faithful to Marx;
However, I do not think that such
statements [as those from The German
Ideology above] warrant a conclusion
that ideologies always mask and thereby
sustain social structures. If Marx and
Engels drew such a warrant, why were
they constantly concerned to develop the
radical spontaneous consciousness of the
European working classes? ... [Marx]
demonstrated in Capital that the
capitalist economic system worked in
such a way that, of itself, it concelaed
its own constitutive social relations.
Whether one looked at it with a true or
false consciousness did not matter, it
still presented itself in such a way
that left its inner structure
undisclosed. Therefore, it is not false
consciousness (nor the ideological
classes) that conceals the nature of
capitalism, nor did capitalism fail to
produce people who could, wholly or
partly, see through its apparent form.^
64
One might presume, on the basis of remarks early in the
book such as that above, that Sumner is embracing a notion
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the
ogy on the basis of appearance/reality
distinction familiar in Capital . Thus the above remark
seems to indicate that thought is Ideological which falls to
penetrate the phenomenal forms of appearance in capitalism,
and consequently falls to reveal and understand capitalism's
real constitutive social relations. Here Sumner seems to be
distinguishing his view from the false consciousness thesis
simply by declining to call consciousness false which grasps
only the phenomenal appearances presented by capitalism,
while he seems to associate such consciousness with the
ideological just as he associated "science" with the correct
and non-illusory understanding of capitalism's constitutive
social relations. other remarks of Sumner's seem to develop
further the appearance/reality distinction from Capital
which some commentators take as the basis for Marx's
understanding of ideology:
An ideology-in-itself is one thing,
discrete and real, and its phenomenal
form, equally real and much more
discrete, is^ another. The phenomenal
form, that which presents itself to the
sense, has to be produced before it can
exist and, therefore, the conditions,
contexts and structure of that
production will be the immediate
determinations of the phenomenal form.
In considering the appearance of an
ideology we must therefore always pay
full attention to both the conditions of
existence of an ideology and its
conditions of appearance. Things,
including ideologies, are rarely what
they seem to be.^^
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But later on in his argument Sumner explicitly states that




of Ideology; he even more explicitly disagrees with such
commentators "who see science as the knowledge of latent
reality and Ideology as the description of apparent
reality. hese several varying Indications in Sumner's
text initially make It unclear whether he is embracing or
rejecting a (false) appearance/ ( true ) reality metaphor In
reconstructing a theory of ideology. or whether he is
allowing or disallowing the possibility of a science which
reveals real constitutive relations behind phenomenal
appearances. This confusion can be cleared up a bit by
noting the destinction Sumner Introduces between '’modes of
appearance" and "modes of signification". Sumner reads the
theory of commodity fetishism Invoked to support a theory of
ideology as stating that
•..people in economic practice will tendto be misled by the fact that
commodities appear to have intrinsic
exchange-values and see the relations
between commodity values as relations
between things rather than as relations
between people in different productive
practices. Thus, it is said, ideology
equals the mystif icatory appearance of
things and science is necessary to
uncover the real relations. Modes of
appearance, in general, are thus seen as
illusory or ideological, and hidden
relations as the truth of the matter
’ 67
Sumner then presents several now familiar arguments against
the view that such "appearances" are "illusions" or "false
consciousness" and therefore linked with a theory of
ideology; in short, he argues that such "forms of appearance
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are thus not conceived by Marx as illusions but as the
aspects Of a phenomenon as it appears within the social
relations of a particular practice "68 ,According to Sumner,
then, consciousness of an appearance (say, of exchange,
isn't "false" because such an appearance or phenomenal form
IS "real". Nor, consequently, is the economic science.
Which reveals the relation between this appearance and its
real constitutive relations, to be opposed to the purported
ideological consciousness of this appearance, as truth is
opposed to falsity—precisely because there's nothing
"false" in consciousness of such appearances whose
underlying reality is revealed by a science. But Sumner
then claims that the "objects" of a theory of Ideology are
not the "modes of appearance" discussed in Capital , but
rather "modes of signification". This distinction between
"modes of appearances" and "modes of signification" is at
the very least a highly problematic one. Furthermore, the
claims Sumner advances against the theory of "commodity
fetishism" as a basis for a theory of Ideology—viz., that
consciousness of such appearances is not "false" and that
It's mistaken to view science as knowledge of latent reality
and ideology as merely the description of apparent reality--
apply as equally strong objections against Sumner's
interpretation of a theory of ideology which reads "modes of
signification". Now that we have established how Sumner
wants to reject the identification of ideology with false
consciousness, either as a correct reading of Marx or as a
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plausible account of ideoloav in i +•a gy m its own right, these
further positions taken by Sumner can be addressed.
As suggested earlier, Sumner rejects any notion of
ideology which takes the account of commodity fetishism in
CaEital as its basis. Sumner rejects such an approach not
because he rejects Marx's understanding of the fetishism of
commodities, but because he doesn't accept the claim that it
is the "appearances" within capitalism which are the source
of ideology:
I do not think that Marx saw deceptive
appearances as necessarily illusory orunreal. Forms of appearance are, forMarx, merely the visible side of aphenomenon as it is observed from the
standpoint of a specific social
pract ice ... Forms of appearance are thus
not conceived by Marx as illusions but
as the aspects of a phenomenon as it
appears within the social relations of a
particular practice. These appearances
are real mani festat ions . . . . l t is
precisely because they are real that
they tend to be observed regularly and
signified as the realities of the
But the point is they are not
their own significations. The basis of
® f i cat ion is the social structure
wi'thin which people signify appearances
^J^d that structure is not necessarily
identical in its conditions of existence
to the structure of the appearances
.
Things, apparent or imperceptible, have
to be signified to become signs and the
processes of signification can be
subject to different determinations to
the processes generating the things to
be signified.--
by
Sumner draws this distinction between "modes of appearance"
and modes of signification" in the following way. He takes
Marx in Capital to be analyzing strictly the "economic
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formation of society .... all other things being equal"
Sumner believes that since MarKis only "merely analyzing
the abstract. inner logic of the capitalist economy, the
modes Of appearance dealt with by Marx are in themselves
purely features of the economic structure or relations",
While "modes of signification" are "distinct phenomena with
their own distinct conditions and mechanisms and are by no
means determined onlv htrY by the economic structure of
society". "^0 These second-order "modes of signification"
include political and cultural practices, and productive
forces such as abstract scientific theory. Sumner gives a
rough idea of the distinction he intends here between "modes
of appearance" and "modes of signification" in noting as an
example that feudal economic and social relations were not
identical with the conditions underlying their myst if icatory
signification within religious ideology. But the denial of
some sort of identity (reflection?) between the economic
base and superstructural social formations certainly does
not commit one to any such distinction between "appearances"
(which are not "false" because they're real) and their
recognition in thought as "significations". As though Marx
had never shown how commodity exchange "appears" as a
relation between things when in fact it is a nexus of social
relations, Sumner hypothesizes some bizarre sort of
'economic simples' which are the "visible sides to
phenomena that appear in Capi tal . Furthermore, in Sumner's
own words, these "modes of signification", mysteriously
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appearance, are
inseparable from and Independent of modes of
things such as political and cultural practlces-science
,
for example. But of course there could be no question about
the fact that Marx spoXe of the science of political economy
as Ideological in Capital, and throughout Theories of
its intended fourth volume. At ti,!;ir^^
tries to get around this enormous textual difficulty by
suggesting that his distinction between "appearances'' and
"significations" was always implicitly present in Capital .
or at least was hinted at by Marx but left undeveloped:
The capitalist economic formation haschanged its forms of appearance and hasalso necessitated developments which
sianif
autonomy of modes ofg ication more and more important.Perhaps these are the real conditionswhich enable me to say emphatically thathe distinction between forms ofappearance and modes of signification isa vital one. in any case, it was alwaysthere in Capital
, albeit in an implicitway. Forms of appearance are notIdeologies. They merely act as one ofthe components fused with others in theformation of an ideology. Therefore,
the theory of commodity fetishism isonly a theory of the social appearance
of commodities and no more than acontribution to the theory of the
signification of commodities in social
practice .... Correspondingly
, it nowneeds no more than a scientific thoery
of the economy to reveal the nature of
capitalist social formations; it needs a
scientific theory of the social
emergence and production of ideology
Marx thought that such a science was in
principle possible; it is the task of
modern Marxism to develop it ‘71
At other times, however, Sumner takes the line that the
apparent distinction Marx makes between science and ideology
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fact was not meant to be an eplstemologlca: one nor did
It have any real philosophical significance, because the
distinction for Marx was really only a political one: ..The
logic of his position in CaEltal is that such a distinction
is very much a political one (disliked ideas are
Ideological), and, Indeed, he himself often used it in a
manner". 72 y ,In short, Sumner rejects a reading of
any science/ideology distinctinn htr r'lc,-yy u ST inctio by claiming either that the
distinction between '.appearances., and '.significations.'
implicit in Capital undermines any reading of a distinction
between science and ideology. or that whatever evidence
there is in Marx supporting such a distinction is simply
evidence for a political distinction.
Sumner -s greatest weakness comes out of his reading of
the purported science/ideology distinction and the supposed
modes of appearance/modes of signification distinction he
bases his theory of reading ideologies on. As noted above,
Sumner doesn't take Marx as seriously proposing any
substantial distinction between science and ideology.
Sumner announces that this reading distinguishes Marx's (and
derivatively Sumner's) position on science from three groups
of commentators, among them
1) Those who see science as truth and
ideology as falsehood.
2) Those who see science as the
knowledge of latent reality and
ideology as the description of
apparent reality.
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3) Those who see science as a result ofcareful method and ideology asreceived commonsense
.
73
we must also recall that Sumner rejected the notion of
commodity fetishism, and hence the Interpretation of
ideology as ..false consciousness., based on it, precisely
because such readings embrace claims such as ( l )
,
( 2 ) , and
(3) above-vlz., claims that strictly oppose truth/latent
reality/science to falsehood/apparent reality/ideology.
According to Sumner, the reading of '.appearances., as "false"
IS enlisted In this misconstrued opposition. As a way of
understanding ideology which avoids these confused
oppositions Sumner then replaces "modes of appearance"-
whlch for him are typically misunderstood as "false" with
modes of Signification". If we speak of "modes of
significations" rather than "modes of appearances" then we
avoid the mistake of opposing a truth-rendering science to
"false consciousness" or an ideology made up entirely of
falsehoods which are verldlcally read out by the science.
But whatever these "modes of significations" are taken to
refer to and again it's not at all clear that they can be
plausibly distinguished from the sources of ideology Marx
addressed in Capital— it becomes quite clear as he spells
out what his "reading of significations" amounts to that
Sumner relies on the same opposition between truth/science
and falsity/ideology that he earlier rejected. Sumner
argues that his account of ideology doesn't oppose science
to ideology because he insists both are "modes of
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ignafication
. The catch is, science accurately signifies.
His disclaimers against a science/ideology distinction are
rendered meaningless when science Is granted a monopoly on
accurate signification, all the more so as he even
appropriates the vocabulary he rejected In the "false
consciousness" or "commodity fetishism" interpretation
(viz., "latent and "apparent" reality, etc.):
Like
_
any science, Marxian theoryexplains why things appear as they doSuch explanations, therefore, are notradically different from ideologies.
Indeed, they depend for their existenceon significations of appearances (albeitaccurate ones). The latter are
^
necessary conditions of existence of ascience. The sufficient condition for ascience is a philosophical consciousness
which accurately signifies the
abstractions, or latent realities, which
are necessarily connected to the
concrete or outer realities. These
abstractions, like the descriptions of
the apparent, are reflections of
existing social relations..,,
7 4
This revived dichotomy between a science which truthfully
reads latent realities and ideology which distortingly
reproduces apparent, false appearances is even more
straightforwardly proclaimed in another passage shortly
after the one above:
Science, then, for Marx, is accurate
ideology or, more precisely, a series of
ideologies which adequately approximate
to their real referent in all its
aspects. It is distinguished from
ordinary ideology in that (1) it must
take a conscious, discursive form, (2)
it approximates adequately to all
aspects of the phenomenon studied, and
(3) it contains a description of the
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mechanism which causes the inner asoects
the outer aspecti ofthat phenomenon.
75
In other passages Sumner uses less telling language, and
again often alongside disclaimers insisting he is not
invoking a distinction between science and ideology nor
attributing any such distinction to Marx:
Science for him was really only a ratherspecial type of ideological formation
(or complex signification) rooted insocial practice, and as such it losesthe reified and mysterious character
granted to it by bourgeois socialrelations which set it on high apartfrom everyday practice and the commonman. Thus, the distinction for himwould not be between ideology andscience, but between levels of




But of course the claim that science and ideology
aren't rigidly demarcated as between truth and falsity but
only as between different "levels of approximation to an
object and its mechanism" just doesn't wash if science
always comes out as "accurate levels of approximation" and
Ideology always as inaccurate or inadequate levels of
approximation. Thus all talk of his account of "modes of
significations" replacing "modes of appearances" and thereby
avoiding the attribution of falsity to ideology and its
diametrical opposition to the truth of science is empty.
Sumner s account relies on precisely the same opposition
between truth/science/under lying reality and
falsity/ideology/apparent reality as present in a crude true
consciousness/ false consciousness interpretation.
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doesn ' t in any way
Substituting "modes of significations"
avoid or undermine the distinction as long as the accurate
significations^^ or the explanations of significations that
'accurately approximate an object and its mechanism" always
count as science while the inaccurate accounts of
significations a priori count as ideology.
Jorge Larrain, in both of his books dealing with
Ideology, also argues against the contention that ideology
is false consciousness, and that such false consciousness is
the necessary result of the social determination of
knowledge. In arguing that "it is not the general fact of
determination that constitutes the distortion of ideology",
Larrain covers much the same textual ground as Parekh and
Sumner viz., citing passages underscoring how Marx saw
consciousness as socially determined, but did not link
general forms of consciousness with ideology, nor social
determination with distortion or falsity. Furthermore,
Larrain takes care to refute authors such as Seliger who
seek to identify ideology with socially determined false
consciousness in Marx's writing by a very selective use of
the texts or through a systematic misreading of a variety of
passages. Apart from the strong textual case Larrain
presents against a false consciousness reading of Marx, he
offers several other objections to identifying ideology with
false consciousness. Larrain argues that the ambiguity of
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"the trerm "false consciousness;"aousne s may convey the notion that
Ideology is a construct of the individual consciousness;
here Larraln echoes the Althusserlan criticism of "false
consciousness" that warns against the reduction of Ideology
to individual consciousness. Another objection raised is
that the term "false consciousness" tends to make ideology
appear as a "mere intellectual or epistemological problem"
which can be corrected by criticism-as long as ideology (or
false consciousness) is seen as only an intellectual
problem, the connections between ideology and any elements
in social reality are neglected. Finally—and this seems to
be Larraln 's main objection to false consciousness
throughout the book—he objects to the expression "false
consciousness" because it is too general and does not
specify the kind of "falsity" or "distortion" which he
thinks should be associated with Ideology. If Ideology were
read as false consciousness, it would become synonymous with
error and the concept of Ideology would lose its critical
force. In Larraln 's words,
The problem with false consciousness is
that, apart from being an ambiguous
expression which eludes a reference to
its social basis, it is not specific.
There is no doubt that for a negative
concept of ideology to exist ideology
must be a distortion, but the problem is
to specify in what respect and to be
able to show the particular character of
the distor tion . . . The concept of false
consciousness, on its own, is ambiguous:
it does not clarify its dependence on
real social problems and fails to
determine the character of its falsity;
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therefore, it is not an adequatedefinition of ideology.
Here we have the beginning of a problem for Larrain.
First, Larrain of course claims "false consciousness" is an
inadequate rendering of what account of ideology there is to
be found in MarK, and he wants to dissociate it from the
theory of ideology he extrapolates from Marx. He insists
that his own account of ideology-and indeed any account
that IS consistent with Marx—must be "negative"— it must be
able to pick out the quality of distortion in ideology.
Hence Larrain 's problem is to maintain a concept of ideology
which IS "negative"—which picks out error or distortion—
but which does not presuppose a science with privileged
access to truth. Larrain fully recognizes this difficulty
in his discussion of the relation between science and
ideology
:
First, as I have already shown, Marx did
not conceive of the relationship between
science and ideology as the opposition
between truth and error. But even if
this is clear, one cannot escape from
the fact that any negative concept of
ideology is bound to be presented as
different from science, or, at the very
least, presupposes the possibility of a
non-ideological point of view.
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However, in developing an account of the relationship
between science and ideology that avoids associating
ideology with false consciousness, Larrain continually
relies on many of the appearance/essence metaphors he
earlier linked with false consciousness, as when he speaks
of "the distinction which Marx later introduced between the
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phenomenal forms or appearances and the essential or Inner
-latlons Of material reality. Snoh a distinction demands a
different, more sophisticated, concept of science which, by
means of abstraction, penetrates appearances to uncover
their inner relations 80
This appearance/reality
opposition is often present in Larraln's formulations of his
definition of ideology: -The general requisite for Ideology
to exist continues to be the concealment of contradictions
in the interest of the dominant class. But this is now
expressed in the form of a consciousness which fixes
phenomenal forms. thus concealing the real contradictory
social relations."®^
In both of his books Larrain contends that ideology
must conceal social contradictions, and, furthermore, that
concealment must be in the interest of the dominant class.
Whether this negative" concept of ideology can be made
consistent with the kind of relationship between science and
ideology he suggests is another question altogether, and now
deserves some attention.
It will be recalled that Larrain tried to strike a
balance between what he descirbed as the extremes of two
dominant marxist interpretations of ideology. He saw the
extreme of the 'negative' conception of ideology as the
false consciousness reading; the 'positive' interpretation,
which he saw as coming out of Lenin, reads ideology non-
pe joratively
, allows for the possibility of a "proletarian
ideology
, and downplays conflict between science and
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Ideology. Though Lenin wants to formuiate a negative
conception of Ideology, he also wants to avoid what he
understood as the errors at the extremes of both
Interpretations. Leaving aside the question of faithfulness
to the Marx texts, what troubled Larrain in the false
consciousness interpretation was simply its ambioultv
. m
his words, the understanding of Ideology as false
consciousness is faulty because of its "lack of specificity
and vagueness ... [which] does not determine which sort of
falsity ideology is concerned with."®2 eAgain, Larrain wants
a concept of ideology which is "negative" enought to pick
out the quality of error or distortion in ideology but which
doesn't unjustly bestow upon a science privileged access to
truth; his only problem with the "falsity" of false
consciousness is that it's too generic to specify the sorts
of errors of thought that are ideological. He ends up
formulating what he takes to be an adequately negative
account of ideology on the basis of the appearance/essence
distinctions Marx drew in Capital . Not all phenomenal forms
or appearances are ideological, but only those which conform
to Larrain ' s definition of ideology—viz., those that
conceal contradictions and do so in a way that serves the
ir^^sr®sts of the dominant class. Of course, it is left un
to science to "penetrate these appearances to uncover their
inner relations", i.e. , the underlying reality that makes up
the concealed contradictions. For Larrain, only thought
uninvested with ideology can offer a critique of ideology:
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In order for the proletariat to be able to destroy ideology
in general, its own thought must be free from Ideology 83
There are several problems with Larrain's 'negative'
definition of ideology which can be sketched here.
Larrain's account (like Parekh's and Sumner's, simply does
not discuss Whether thee can be any legitimate role for
normative values within social scientific theory. Larrain
IS careful, as is Sumner, to register disclaimers that
science cannot be the polar opposite of ideology, because no
science can be free of the sorts of values which both
authors would want to otherwise label as ideological.
Larrain backs away from any strict opposition between
science and ideology not because he allows any legitimate
role for normative values in scientific theory, but because
he insists normative values as Ideology always in fact work
their way into a science—hence science and Ideology are
always conjoined, but coincidentally . ' In his view Insofar
as a body of thought is a science, it is not ideological nor
does it embrace values. A science takes on an ideological
character Ihsofar as it is "used by Ideology"—viz.,
inasmuch as Ideological thought dresses Itself up as that
science
:
As we know, ideology is the negation of
the inverted character of social
relations in reality. To be effective,
though, it has to negate that negation;
it has to justify it by resorting to an
unimpeachable criterion which is found
in science.
Hence it is not science itself that
provides the basis for ideology. It is
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bourgeois ideology which invests itselfwith the appearance of science. Herelies the fundamental mistake of thetradition which presents science asideology. it sees the basis of ideologyin scientific rationality itself, but inoing so, it suppresses class
contradictions as the real basis ofIdeology. it is thus itself
ideological. Science is not in itself
Ideological; but it may be ideological
• to claim that it is.
84
It's clear here that what part ideology—and under the
category of ideology we must include normative values which
Larraln obliquely treats-plays in science is deleterious.
The upshot of Larrain's remarks on this relationship between
science and ideology is that science and ideology or values
can never be completely separated in any body of thought, but
where values or ideology can be recognized as such, they
should be exorcised.
Two other related problems derive from Larrain's
insistence that thought is ideological which conceals
contradictions in the interests of the dominant class.
Larrain seems to take the dogmatic view that contradictions
and the ideology that disguises them must always be
transparent to science or social theory. Non-ideological
science or social theory must by definition be able to see
through to the underlying contradictions, otherwise it would
be ideological thought. But as we saw in Marx, a body of
thought can be a contribution to scientific understanding
even as it is ideological (and even as its ideological
character may "veil contradictions"). Marx respected the
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Smith and Ricardo even though for him there was no
question that their work reproduced ideological beliefs of
their time; while developing contradictions of capitalism may
have been for the most part ideologically ..veiled- m their
thought, their work was yet rich enough to begin to bring
these contradictions into sharper focus. Smith. s work, as
Marx pointed out, was contradictory, but these contradictions
in theory resonated with real contradictions in capitalism.
In vulgar political economy such contradictions were brushed
over and did not find their way in any form into theory. The
point is that some contradictions, depending on the nature of
historically specific and changing social reality, cannot be
theorized in thought, much less resolved, until they begin to
be articulated and resolved m reality. Marx was sensitive
to this fact in evaluating the work of Smith and Ricardo.
Larraln doesn.f dwell on Marx . s review of classical political
economy, and misses this point in Theories of Surnln...
Larrain, given his definition of ideology as thought which
conceals contradictions and of science as thought which,
rather than concelaing them, is capable of "penetrating to
their essence", cannot allow theory to be anything other than
thought which sees through all ideology. This dogma is
further revealed in his treatment of Freud and Durkheim.
Larrain dismisses Freud, for instance, for his insistence
that forms of authority and repression are necessarily an
inevitably imposed on the psychical structure of the
individual .85 such a psychological conception of ideology
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since he
doesn't fit Larraln's definition of ideology,
conceives Ideology alongside a conception of science which
must by definition be able to read out the true nature of
contradictions, however concealed. Thus harrain's account
disallows any conception of the source of Ideology which
doesn't understand Ideology as transparent (and hence
"resolvable") for the science that reads it.
Joe McCarney's The Real World of
distinguished from much of recent commentary in that it
attempts to read Marx's notion of ideology as other than an
essentially "negative" concept: There is nothing, McCarney
claims, in Marx's original notion to establish ideology as
necessarily defective, distorted, or unscientific thought.
The mistakenly negative reading of ideology has arisen, we
are told, from the fact that Marx most often spoke of
Ideology with specifically bourgeois ideology as his target.
According to McCarney, however, to put it somewhat simply,
the more general concept operative in Marx's thought has it
that thought is ideological if there is an "intelligible
inter-connection" between it and the class interests it
serves. What this "intelligible inter-connection" involves,
and how it fares as a reading of Marx, can best be fleshed
out if we look at the two interpretive deviations McCarney
measures his reading against— reading a marxist theory of
ideology as "general social theory" or as "epistemology".
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a theory of
McCarney sees the misappropriation of
Ideology to meet the demands of "general social theory" as
arising out of a mistaken commitment to the social
determination of "forms of group consciousness". m the
non-marxist version of this error frequently found in
mainstream sociology, Ideology is seen "as a form of
consciousness whose distribution is distinctive of a social
group and which arises in some genetically Intelligible way
from the common situation of its members. Ideologies may
then be individuated in terms of the groups to which they
belong. "8"^
Marxist version, ideologies are
those forms of consciousness whose 'subjects' or 'bearers'
are the primary groups, social classes. This understanding
of ideology sees it "as a particular kind of socially
determined thought: The primary function of the concept is
to collect forms of consciousness in terms of their
origin. "88 McCarney is careful here to distinguish the
thesis that ideology serves class Interests from the claim
that It IS determined by class Interests. The former claim
is central to McCarney 's reading of Ideology; the latter
constitutes a kind of "genetic fallacy" foreign to Marx's
original thought. Here, in rejecting geneticist readings of
the "social determination of ideas", McCarney is in
agreement with Larrain and Parekh, as discussed elsewhere.
More than is common in much of the literature, moreover,
McCarney is exceptionally clear in explicating the
difference between the geneticist fallacy of evaluating the
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truth or worth of ideas purely on the basis of their origins
within a class, and the genuinely marxist project of
articulating the social conditions which influence the
formation and propagation of ideas.
Where supposedly marxist theoreticians have been
tainted by some version of the geneticist account enlisted
in the service of social theory is in their misuse of
ideology in a "general theory of social cohesion". McCarney
Views these commentators, and here he has Gareth Stedman-
Jones, Nicos Poulantzas, and Althusser particularly in mind,
as erring in their preoccupation to discover how Ideology is
an instrument of social cohesion. For McCarney this misses
the point of Marx's concerns, as "for Marx, ideology has no
special role to play in a theory of what it is that holds
social formations together"; Marx's theory is to be properly
understood as concerned with the intelligible link ideas
have in the arena of class struggle. 89 Ideology thus
becomes for these men a "mode of cognition" (an "imaginary-
one at that) rather than a dynamic element of the social
reality of class struggle. Poulantzas and Stedman-Jones are
faulted in their misguided attack on Lukacs ' work on
ideology, which McCarney sees as entirely consistent with
and an expansion of that of both Marx and Engels.
Althusser is said to have compounded this error by, in
addition to being equally preoccupied with the socially
cohesive role of ideology as a "mode of cognition" invested
in its "bearers", claiming for his own theoretical
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preoccupations an origin In the Manx texts. This
"dislocation" from the genuine (and presumably consistent)
marxist tradition (Marx. Engels, Lenin, Lukacs) carried out
by Althusser (and Stedman-Jones, Poulantzas, et_^, j,is
steps) arises from the reification of the notions of
"science" and "ldeology"-a reification made necessary by
the overemphasis on concerns of social theory, to the
neglect of the role of ideology in the class struggle.
According to McCarney, these later theorists have
...assumed [ideology] to be a mode ofinquiry whose methodology is defectiveand which needs, in order to becomescientific, to develop moresophistication in this respect. ButMarx's conception cannot be pinned downin such a way. it has, to put it nostronger, to be understood in relation
to a practical and social dimension.
The extent of the differences may beexperienced in other ways. They are
implicit from the start in Althusser's
overriding concern with the character of
the distinction between ideology and
science. It is a concern which arouses
no sympathetic chord in Marx.... Even
more significant are the essentialist
assumptions about the nature of meaning
that seem to underlie its use: it is as
if 'ideology' and 'science' were
^®taphysical sntities whose essences
have to be extracted by the theorist and
displayed in their fundamental
opposition.
Thus, for McCarney, the predilection of social theorists to
insist on a science/ideology distinction of great
theoretical import, and the consequent reification of these
terms, obscures the very heart of the classical marxist




The other main misdirection McOarney sees In marxlst
interpretations of Ideology has to do with the preoccupation
with epistemological concerns: "For Marx. .. Ideology is not
an epistemological category ... it has no necessary connection
With what is cognitively suspect or deficient 92 ,
Mccarney. the general directions of twentieth century
political philosophy and sociology, the misreading of the
early Marx texts (particularly The^ermajWdeology
, and the
pejorative connotation to ideology Inherent in the
Althusser-inspired science/ideology distinction all
contributed to the epistemological rendering of Ideology.
All of the various approaches that McCarney classifies as
laboring under "the burden of epistemology" give a
pejorative reading to Ideology by virtue of contrasting it
to "science", "truth", or non-defective thought. As to the
question of what support for this there may be in the early
Marx texts, McCarney goes into considerable textual detail
in an effort to show how the supposedly epistemological or
cognitive "defectiveness" Marx sees in (particularly) German
Idealism ought not to be taken as a generic characterization
Of Ideology in the abstract. 93
sustained argument of the book, Marx is only Interested in
characterizing ideas as ideological insofar as they have a
role in class struggle. In his earlier texts he focused on
the role of "idealist" influences in class struggle; in his
later texts evolving bourgeois ideology became more his
target. In neither case, we are reminded, should we mistake
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the particulars of these forms of ideology for universal
atrributes of all forms of ideology. As McOarney later
insists, we must put the thoroughly critical terms of MarK ' s
analysis of bourgeois ideology alongside the contexts in
which Marx seems to speak of ideology, and of proletarian
ideology, in at least neutral terms 94 We can then
appreciate how proletarian ideology— in contrast to the
Althusserian view— is to be understood positively insofar as
It plays a role in bringing about the resolution of class
struggle
.
In sum, then, McCarney ' s argument goes like this. Marx
thought of ideology in terms of the intelligible link a set
of ideas has with the arena of class struggle. The
Ideological targets of the early Marx had an idealist-
Hegelian character; the later Marx was more concerned with
developing an analysis of bourgeois ideology, much the less
German. The specific qualities of sets of ideas Marx
thought ideological are not to be thought of as categorical
characterizations of ideology in general; the only
trademark of ideological thought is the role ideas play in
class struggle. If a constellation of ideas can be shown to
have a role in the struggle between classes, then it is an
important task to ferret out the "intelligible inter-
connections" which must thereby exist between those ideas
and the hegemony among classes. Later commentators have
f^iisd to appreciate this desiderata of understanding
ideology, either by inflating its "socially cohesive" role
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to fit the topography of twentieth century general social
theory, or by Inventing a rigid science/ ideology distinction
Which bestows upon marxlst science a special oversight with
regard to truth and identifies ideology with cognitive
defect or error.
Having reviewed its basic directions, we can now focus
critical attention on McCarney
- s interpretation.
Though McCarney is on the whole very thorough-going in
dicussing the Marx texts he surveys, one cannot help but
notice an error of omission. Again, McCarney is very much
interested in refuting commentators who see a vast
difference in focus between the early and later Marx on
Ideology and insist on one or the other version as
definitive. The prospects of inserting any wedge at this
point between The German Ideology and the later writings
seem hopeless."; "...the tone and character of the
references to ideology are remarkably homogeneous throughout
the period [of Marx's "95 • •Lui u iirej. In reviewing the Marx texts
in the first two chapters, I have agreed with McCarney in
that it is mistaken to construct such a radical shift in the
texts. But in McCarney • s well-founded effort to deny a
radical divergence between the early and later texts, his
insistence on viewing Marx's thought on ideology as
consistent throughout", along with his argument against
later commentators' epistemological obsession with
science", lead him to neglect the specificity of the later
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even seems to admit this:
Marx's concerns. At times he
"...little notice is taken of the general category of
•bourgeois Ideology on the one hand, and the Ideology of
the political economist on the other "96 ,, ^Yet It is just
here where McCarney s interpretation is lacking on two
counts. For one, it is precisely the later Marx's primary
attention to analyzing the "ideology of the political
economist" that puts the issue of the relationship between
science and ideology squarely within the Marx texts
themselves. it was Marx's abiding interest in the
scientific nature of his own work, and in detailing the
ideological aspects of the political economy of his
adversaries, that give this issue an origin in marxism.
And, as I have indicated in the second chapter, Marx's
reflections on the scientific character of his work are by
no means unproblematic--his distinction, already weak,
between the "esoteric" and "exoteric" commitments of a
discipline, for instance, cannot be taken over easily by a
reflective and self-critical marxist social science.
Furthermore, and this is McCarney 's second failing on this
-in the face of the dramatic rise of social science's
status since Marx's day, one must summon a virtually
intentional myopia not to see the heightened importance of
the relation between ideology and the social sciences—and
this importance is surely present regardless of whether one
looks to (or even finds) the origins of the issue in the
later Marx texts. Neither an interest in appraising Marx's
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later reflections on science and ideology (and admitting
their prominence in the texts), nor in evaluating the
ideological functioning of twentieth century social science
need put one in the camp of those who, for McCarney, choose
to see ideology solely in terms of its (ostensible)
epistemological distinction to science. For fear that talk
of the relation between science and ideology leads to
Viewing ideology uni-dimensionally as an epistemological
concept, the negative other of science, McCarney fails to
give credence to the role the issue has in marxism even as
It IS separable from any such epistemological inflation.
Another serious problem with McCarney • s book emerges if
we apply to his own reading a well-developed criticism he
maxes of other interpretations—viz . , that the original
marxist theory of ideology is crippled if it is made too
"narrow" by constricting it to fit one or another particular
aspect or form of ideology. Thus Larrain's treatment is
criticized for limiting ideology just to the "concealment of
contradictions". 97 similarly, Parekh is taken to task for
defending the "universalizing and de-histor icizing" asoects
of ideology as characteristic of ideology in general:
. . .all attempts to capture bourgeois
ideology in terms of some distinctive
strategic content are likely to fail
before the ever-fresh revelation of its
actual variety and versatility. . . .To
insist, as he [Parekh] does, that the
social order can only be ideologically
justified by being universalized and
dehistoricized is to do less than
justice to the actual complexity of
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But Mcoarney stretches the logic of his own position of
insisting that the intelligible inner-connections between
Ideas and the class struggle define ideology to end up in a
narrowness of his own: McCarney's belief that ideology will
cease to exist when the classless society prevails forces
him to neglect contradictions within classes and
individuals.
In the first place, against the Althusserlan view that
ideology in some form will remain in the classless society,
McCarney straightforwardly argues ideology will then
disappear
.
The discussion has already noted
Althusser's rejection of the 'utopian
idea' of a world from which ideology has
disappeared and his denial that
historical materialism can conceive of
even a communist society in those terms.
It should be now be clear in what way
this view is mistaken. For not merely
is historical materialism able to
conceive of such a situation, but its
feasibility is an integral part of the
doctrine of the founders. The real
world of ideology is class society and
class conflict, and it disappears from
the historical stage with the close of
the epoch which is characterized by
those conditions.
99
This ease with which McCarney imagines all things
ideological to instantaneously disappear after the
revolution is fed by two predilections which form a subtext
of his argument throughout the book: There are no elements
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that .a.e up the Ideological that are not available within a
strict Class analysis, and those things that are
constituents of the Ideological can be relatively easily
read off from class. 100
unmindful of
any complexity In determining the "Intelligible inner-
connection" between ideas and the class struggle by means of
a presumably straightforward class analysls-the complexity
that exists, to take just two notorious examples under late
capitalism, m determining just exactly how classes are
constituted, and In explaining the Ideological "intelligible
inner-connections" when, say, workers' "forms of
consciousness" in multiple ways appear to contradict
workers' real interests. McCarney's intelligible inner-
connection Is easier to arrive at with blatant ruling class
ideologists (as Marx found it easy to read in Maithus), but
so much less transparent within "mixed" ideologies, about
which McCarney has very little to say. In any case he seems
unaware of what problems the active (and surely unsettled)
debate within contemporary marxism about the constitution of
classes and the contradictions manifest between "forms of
consciousness" and real workers' interests pose for his
analysis. McCarney's antipathy to any crack in traditional
class analysis (say, from concerns of ethnicity,
nationalism, or patriarchy) is clear in his rejection of
Parekh's attempt to allow a reading of ideology that might
embrace these elements in addition to class. While Parekh
suggests that the "group towards which an ideology may be
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biased need not... be a class
include a professional group,
race or a subgroup within a
such move
:
in the narrow sense, and may
a nation, a social order, a
class," McCarney rejects any
=
point to note about this istnat at significantly extends Marx's
there is anything clear and
usage, it is thatIdeologists are inseparably bound toclasses in Parekh's 'narrow' sense astheir spokesmen' and 'representatives'.
Marx gives no reason to suppose that onemight qualify as an ideologist throughsupporting a group such as academics,
unless that support were part of somelarger
^
tendency affecting the class
situation. it is the possibility ofgiving a class analysis that must
ultimately license talk of ideoloav
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The other serious fault evident in McCarney 's
understanding that ideology will disappear with classes is
that It disallows any story—which Freud only began—about
the tension between the human individual and the social
subject as part of an analysis of the concept of
ideology. jn this discussion McCarney begins by
registering his complaint specifically with Althusser's
notion of the "imaginary" relationship inherent in ideology,
and the inevitable opacity between the subject and his or
her real conditions of existence, which (for Althusser)
would outlive the dissolution of classes. But rapidly the
argument devolves into a dismissal of any approach to
ideology that might give a significant role to 'unconscious'
forces. A theory of ideology which posits as necessary any
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or unconscioussuch imaginary, 'u , relationship between the
individual and society is said to involve
••.an assumption of an inescapableeasure of tension between the humanindividual and the social subject asense of the incompatibility of two setsof needs. Society is obliged to imposeIts constraints on the development ofindividuals, and the fulfillment oftheir potential would threaten thefoundations of its existence. it is as
if some .old Adam, or noble savage had
perpetually and ruthlessly to be
suppressed, and a clear view of the
process on the part of its victims would
be inimical to its smooth operation^ 103
But It is precisely that invest igat ion— of the ways in which
"a clear view of the process on the part of its victims
would be inimical to its smooth operation..—which is an
enormously important task for a marxism adequately informed
by Freud. 104 McCarney never stops for a moment to consider
whether social theory that takes seriously psychoanalytic
components could have elements of truth. Rather he simply
dismisses the "assumption that the life of reason and the
demands of social existence are necessarily incompatible., as
having a pedigree of "conservative social thought., and as
implying a "political immobilism.. by its presumed pessimism
towards improvement of the human condi t ion . 1°5
Finally, an underlying contradiction in McCarney ^s work
weakens his interpretation on a major scale. We should
recall McCarney 's criticism of Althusser and others who seek
to epistemologically privilege science over ideology. Many





McCarney. however. falls into the same error he charges
these others with-namely, his theory posits a privileged
category of knowledge with special access to the truth.
This category is of course not called 'science'
epistemologically superior to 'ideology'. McCarney
'
s
privileged category arises from "the standpoint of the
proletariat" which has an analogue In the scientific
enterprise, allowing it alone to penetrate the "phenomenal
forms and appearances of bourgeois society to the reality
behind". His remarks are worth noting at length here;
The proletariat is, by virtue of itslocation in the mode of production, in aprivileged position in certain respects.
From that location unfolds a perspective
which enforces an awareness of somebasic social realities, and this
awareness is of great epistemological
significance. The process by which the
proletariat is impelled beyond the
phenomenal forms of bourgeois society
has an analogue in the scientific
enterprise itself, in so far as that too
involves the penetration of appearances
to the reality behind. This is not to
be taken merely as a suggestive
metaphor. The point is rather that the
sense of its situation naturally
available to the proletariat contains in
embryo the possibility of a scientific
account of society. The central
scientific concepts may be seen as
refinements of insights characteristic,
in the first place, of spontaneous
proletarian consciousness. it is
necessary to be specific here. What the
proletariat is made aware of by virtue
of its life experience are such
realities as the existence of social
classes, of conflicting class interests,
of exploitation and of its own status as
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a commodity. The concept of class
sclen?i?ic'^
perhaps the most obviousi t f precipitate of these
ho?dfn^ relationshiplds between the workers' awareness of
concept of surplus
between their awareness of
market and the conceptof labour power. With these concepts isunlocked the entire scheme of theMarxist analysis of capitalist society
Thus, it may now be said that
spontaneous proletarian consciousness
provides the basis for science just inthe sense that a rational reconstruction
of a scientific account of society could
be given which would exhibit itsinsights as the starting point. it is
in this way that one should understand
the familiar claim that the science of
society is based upon or presupposes the
class standpoint of the proletariat.^*^®
Something has gone radically wrong here. True, McCarney
doesn't make ideology cognitively defective in contrast to
the truth of science, but he does what amounts to the same
move. Proletarian ideology, alone among all class
ideologies, has a special union with scientific truth. in
other words, while ideology isn't the false to science's
truth, proletarian ideology—unlike all other ideologies
—
joins with, or generates, a genuine social science with
special epistemological access to the truth. McCarney
explicitly says as much, but apparently without even
noticing the similarity to the epistemological
science/ideology distinction he wants to reject:
All class ideologies are, of necessity,
involved in claims to knowledge about
society. What distinguishes the
ideology of the proletariat is that in
its case the cognitive content is
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supplied by science This idea thatscience and ideology come together in
th^
P^°j-etariat is a central theme of
dealing with, andIS what ultimately sustains the spiritof rational optimism that is sopervasive a feature of it. in the case
® proletariat alone the pursuit oftruth and the demands of historicalexistence are found in a state notsimply of compatibility but ofreoiprocal dependence.
107
Ideology Is not "negative" for McCarney only in the sense
that he insists on a non-pe joratlve notion of working class
Ideology, and doesn't directly contrast Ideology negatively
with science. But 'ideology' does take on a negative sense
when one realizes how proletarian ideology is the only
Ideology Informed (indeed, joined) by science—all other
forms of ideology are, then, negative and cognitively
"defective" in precisely the sense McCarney bemoans in other
writers
.
This fundamental flaw in McCarney ' s work reduces his
notion of "proletarian ideology" (viz., proletarian science)
to doing the same work for him as did the concept of
science" for Althusser. In both cases social knowledge is
seen to be in need of the mantle of a science that protects
it from possible contamination from values, morality, or
other human interests that aren't normally afforded a
comfortably scientific" status, and allows it a monopoly of
access to the truth. It remains to be seen to what extent
these demands are unnecessary constraints on development of
a genuinely marxist theory of ideology.
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*******.it ********^^^^^^^^^
Sumner, Larrain, Parekh, and McCarney all explicitly
reject an interpretation of ideology as false consciousness.
In their arguments against such an interpretation they
acknowledge their discomfort with a strict opposition
between truth and falsity or science and ideology which they
all take their reconstructions of the concept of ideology to
avoid. This movement away from representing ideology as the
"false" (and science as the "truth") characterizes much of
the marxist-oriented commentary written after Althusser, who
prominently began the critique of identifying the
ideological with the false. Yet, as we have seen in these
authors, an antinomy between science's supposed truth and
Ideology's falsity continues to animate contemporary
marxism, albeit in subtler forms. Parekh 's framing of the
issue within strict epistemological and theoretical terms,
Sumner's account of the scientific reading of "modes of
signification", and Larrain 's commitment to ideology as
thought which conceals contradictions in the interests of
the dominant class all eventually come to resurrect in one
way or another an opposition between truth and falsity which
they had initially argued against. Furthermore, none of
these accounts offers a plausible explanation of the role
normative values may play within theory; these three authors
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either avoid the question entirely, or place morality,
normative values, and prescriptive beliefs In the category
of Ideology which by Implication plays no role In a properly
constituted science. Neither Parekh, Sumner, nor Larraln
allow for the possibility of theory confronting one set of
Ideological values with another set of values yet within a
scientific critique. while McCarney also rejects the
interpretation of Ideology as false consciousness, and Is
more successful In avoiding an opposition between truth and
falsity In his account of the relationship between science
and Ideology, a privileged science Is recovered In his work
in the form of "proletarian Ideology". Further, his
account, and one such as that of Geuss, falls to recognize
the complex web of psychological factors—the tension
between the Individual and the social subject— in the
functioning of ideology. An account of Ideology which
avoids some of these errors must offer an account of what
role normative values might play in theory and how Ideology
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In light of the fact that Marx’s work extends over
forty years and at least as many volumes, it remains a
scholarly task of enormous proportion to begin to review his
work on ideology In all its detail. I hope, however, that
the analysis of Marx's views on Ideology and science that
emerges In this dissertation has contributed to a
reassessment of his work that can be valuable In a number of
ways .
One very valuable aspect of Marx's approach to
Ideology, which I have argued is overlooked in much of
marxist commentary, emerges from his analysis of his
predecessors in political economy, particularly in the too
often ignored Theories of Surplus Value. With Smith and
Ricardo serving as the best examples here, Marx allowed how
good theory-- vi z . , good science--can carry within it
reflections of contradictions endemic to the capitalist
system of production. As theory reflects capitalist
cont radi ct ions --most often unconsciously in the cases of
Smith and Ricardo it itself can be contradictory, can
display both truth and falsity, can signal both the
"essences" of capitalist mechanisms and the "modes of
appearances", yet through these means can contribute to
progress in political economy. It was this dialectical
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maintained an organic connection to the contradictory
realities of capitalism that allowed them to at once give
voice to "appearances" and to "essences"-that made their
texts come alive for Marx. The "vulgar" economists on the
other hand brushed over these contradictions and
consequently failed to engage the realities of capitalist
production
.
To some extent this picture of a dialectically evolving
discipline must be seen as a subtext in Marx, one which he
at times appears reluctant to apply to his own work. He
admires, for instance, the fact that elements of Ricardo's
work at once attempt to give voice to the interests of
industrial capitalism and yet maintain an honesty that
speaks to developing crises; Marx saw this contrast as
valuable in the development of political economy. Yet often
in his later work Marx seems to speak as though he views his
own work as divorced from interests or values. This -can be
seen too in his emphasis on the "esoteric" principles of a
science, which presumably can and should be separated from
any "exoteric" values for the good of the science. While
Marx's main emphasis in the esoteric/exoteric distinction is
to isolate the exoteric interests that may work to a
discipline's misfortune, his presumption that there must
exist an esoteric core of principles that animate and define
a science is unargued for in the texts, and, as I have
argued earlier, in the end unconvincing as a portrayal of
the parameters of genuine science. With Smith and Ricardo,
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Marx allows. In fact finds valuable in the development of
the discipline, the convergence of Interests or values with
scientific or theoretical understanding, yet hesitates to
allow how interests or "exoteric" values may animate or
inform his own work.
Just as the view I've presented from Theories of
Surplus Value shows the ways in which Smith and Ricardo were
both scientific and ideological, and how their work
contributed to political economy in a non-linear way, Marx's
account also demonstrates how the discipline in general must
be seen as a commingling of science and ideology and as
making its way non-linearly as a developing discipline. it
becomes very clear in Theories of Surplus Value that one
cannot speak of how a discipline is scientific (or how it is
affected by ideology) without addressing the historically
specific conditions in which a discipline is practiced.
Thus, elements of theory produced by Smith and Ricardo are
differently evaluated when reiterated in a similar form by
economists writing after 1830, when political and economic
circumstances had radically changed.
In addition to his insistence that the scientific and
ideological aspects of a body of theory must be determined
in light of the historically specific conditions under which
theory is produced, Marx also suggests that the question of
the scientific and ideological aspects of theory must
address how well a body of theory can pick out and avoid
ideological aspects of earlier or competing theories and yet
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But here again
provide at least equal explanatory power,
there are two contrasting voices in Marx. There is a
tension running through Marx's work between, on the one
hand, his insight that what counts as science is theory that
can illuminate social biases in rival theories, avoid or
overcome these biases itself, and hence provide richer
explanatory power, and, on the other hand, an occasional
disposition to talk of breaking with and completely
overcoming any fundamental ideological assumptions of a
horizon of thought. The former position commits Marx to the
view that a better theory incorporates the immanent truths
of rival theories by means of a rigorous critique of them;
such a theory has a claim to being scientific only until
another theory comes along that can offer a critique of its
ideological character and thereby provide greater
explanatory power. In his review of political economy Marx
is suggesting that a theory is scientific not because it
somehow "overcomes" ideology or is immune to its influence,
but because it can offer a critique of the ideological
character of rival theories, along with greater explanatory
power, even though it may bring in its own ideological
commitments. This contradicts his other voice, which
alludes to a theorist's ability to completely overcome
fundamental biases and do away with ideology. As we saw
earlier, this other voice finds its way into Theories of
Surplus Value when Marx speaks as though the "esoteric"
elements could be easily and neatly separated out from the
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"exoteric" elements within a discipline. Marx, then, failed
to apply his understanding of how a science develops
historically to his own work; privileging his own work as
free from ideology violates the historical model for a body
of theory's claim to development as a science which he
constructed regarding classical political economy. if „e
apply, however, Marx's more considered judgment from
Theories of Surplus Value of how a discipline develops and
establishes a claim to being scientific, we can see how his
own work can be viewed as both scientific and ideological.
Smith and Ricardo embraced Interests some of which Marx
considered Ideological, yet he judged the nexus of science
and Ideology that was contained in their work as having made
a significant contlrbution to political economy. Similarly,
on this view it can be allowed that marxism embraces
Interests of its own. These interests need not restrict
theory; as with Smith and Ricardo, they can in fact animate
theory, and contribute to progress in science.
As I have attempted to demonstrate at length earlier in
this dissertation, much of recent marxist commentary has
taken the wrong tack in the question of science and
ideology. Althusser fueled the debate by sharply
demarcating the early, supposedly thoroughly ideological
Marx from the later, exclusively scientific Marx.
Furthermore, this shift is supposed also to signal the
radical transformation of a discipline's ideological
prehistory into a genuine science. This model simply fails
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on textual veracity to Marx-Marx didn't view his
predecessors in any such black and white ter.s, and there is
available in Marx a much different model of the historical
development of a discipline, both scientifically and
Ideologically. Further, marxist commentators writing after
Althusser have been heavily Influenced by his strict
demarcation between science and Ideology. i have argued
that, regardless of the degree of distance they mean to take
from the way Althusser draws the distinction, many of them
reamin committed to some rigid version of the distinction
aimed at privileging marxist science in a way that is untrue
to Marx's original analysis, and is in the end an inadequate
and unreflectlve account of the relationship between
Ideology and science. i see such an interest in preserving
for marxism this limited mantle of science as unfortunate,
as it disavows any role for moral theory or more general
interests or values in the human sciences, and as it
unreflectively avoids any marxist consideration of
ideological elements in its own discipline.
There are two further areas of inquiry which could be
suggested by this reconsideration of Marx's views on
ideology. There is a widely developing marxist literature
that focuses on an investigation of how ideology is produced
and transmitted on the cultural level. Along with the
Frankfurt school, the work of Terry Eagleton, Ernesto
and Fredric Jameson immediately comes to mind.
Historically there's been a gap between marxist analyses of
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the role of ideology in theory, and analyses
cultural artifacts. Some of the commentators
of ideology and
I ' ve surveyed
nave even suggested that these two areas of Inquiry are
fundamentally different and must remain separate. However,
if one accepts an aspect of the view of ideology and science
I've extracted from Marx above—namely that good theory can
at once reflect and bring into question the social realities
It describes—a link between the two approaches can be
imagined: Just as good science can reflect the true and the
false, as it were, cultural objects (say, Adorno's dally
astrology columns) can be read to reveal the admixture of
genuine human needs and mystified or false needs. Finally,
given the reconsidered account of Marx's views on science
and Ideology I have presented, it remains an undone but
enormously important task to reconstruct the views of the
major figures in the succeeding marxist tradition—Engels,
Lenin, Trotsky, Lukacs
, Gramsci--in an effort to establish
their relationship to the Marx texts. The views of these
men on science and ideology have of course been voluminously
considered on their own, but it remains an important charge
to marxist scholarship to analyze their work in light of any
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